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I. INTRODUCTION
Practicing law means working with people. To be effective in working
with clients, witnesses, judges, mediators, arbitrators, experts, jurors, and
other lawyers, attorneys must have a good understanding of how people think
and make decisions, and must possess good people skills.' Yet, law schools
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thanks go to Richard Birke, Chris Guthrie, Rebecca Scharf, and Nina Tarr for their
valuable comments on a previous draft of this article, and to colleagues at the Boyd
School of Law for feedback on any early lecture-version of this Article.
I An ongoing study by law professor Marjorie Shultz and psychology professor
Sheldon Zedeck has identified twenty-six factors that contribute to lawyers' effectiveness.
Many of these factors draw from psychological insights. The twenty-six factors are:
analysis and reasoning, creativity/innovation, practical judgment, researching the law,
passion and engagement, questioning and interviewing, influencing and advocating,
writing, speaking, integrity/honesty, ability to see the world through the eyes of others,
self-development, organizing and managing others, negotiation skills, networking and
business development, building client relationship including advice and counsel,
organizing and managing own work, developing relationships,
evaluation/development/mentoring, problem solving, stress management, fact finding,
diligence, listening, community involvement and service, and strategic planning.
University of California, Berkeley School of Law, 26 Effectiveness Factors,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/beyondlsat/effectiveness.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). The
ultimate purpose of this study, supported by the Law School Admission Council, is to
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have tended to teach very little, directly, about how to be good with people,
and current critiques of legal education do not focus much on the importance
of psychological insights to attorneys. 2
At the same time, the insight that the practice of law is far more people-
oriented than is legal education is not new. In 1955, then Harvard Law
School Dean Erwin Griswold gave a speech entitled "Law Schools and
Human Relations." He wrote:
There is some tendency, with the case method, for the study of law to be
something like the study of chess or the analysis of a bridge hand. When
analyzing the law in intricate detail, it may be hard to keep in mind the vital
fact that the problems really relate to people, either the people who are
parties to the case, or the people who will be affected by the law established
once the case is decided.3
Responding in part to the comments of Dean Griswold and others, as
well as to documents such as the MacCrate Report,4 law schools now offer
far more people-oriented courses than they did in the 1950s. Specifically, law
schools now often sponsor clinics that involve direct client contact and skills
courses such as trial practice, interviewing and counseling, negotiation, and
design a law school entry exam that can predict success as a lawyer, and not just as a law
student. See University of California, Berkeley School of Law, Law School Admission
Project: Looking Beyond the LSAT, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/beyondlsat/ (last
visited Feb. 8, 2008) (containing articles discussing study). See also Stephen Feldman &
Kent Wilson, The Value of Interpersonal Skills in Lawyering, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
311, 320 (1981) (reporting study showing that clients' perceptions of attorneys are most
favorable when the attorneys have both technical competence and good people skills).
2 See, e.g., Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION passim
(2007) (recognizing that lawyers need to possess communication and problem-solving
skills but failing to place much emphasis on psychological aspects of lawyering).
3 Erwin N. Griswold, Law Schools and Human Relations, 37 CHI. B. REC. 199, 201
(1956).
4 The MacCrate Report urged that law schools place more emphasis on teaching a
broad array of skills, and not merely focus on legal analysis. A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTiNUUM 330 (1992). This
Report received substantial attention, and has sparked follow-up symposia. See, e.g.,
Symposium, The MacCrate Report: 10 Years After, 23 PACE L. REV. 513 (2003). See also
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., Summary of the Findings and Recommendations, in
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 6 (2006), available at
http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/files/elibrary/EducatingLawyers_summary.pdf
(noting that law schools offer clinics and skills courses but urging that law schools
typically "give only casual attention to teaching students how to use legal thinking in the
complexity of actual law practice").
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mediation, as well as some doctrinal courses that incorporate various
psychological insights. 5
Nonetheless, lawyers and legal education have still not taken full
advantage of the great strides that have been made in the field of scientific
psychology in recent decades. 6 Psychologists know much and are learning
more about how people think, remember, and decide, but law schools have
not broadly integrated these insights into the law school curriculum. 7 Some
courses do draw on psychological science but still fail to take note of many
of the insights that psychology can offer. 8
Similarly, psychologists are not doing as much as they might to apply
their discipline to all aspects of law. While law and psychology texts and
5 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 7 (observing that while law schools offer more
experiential and contextual courses than they did fifty years ago, such courses are still
often placed in a subordinate status). One professor urges that interpersonal skills are so
important to lawyering that they should be taught directly. See Joshua D. Rosenberg,
Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the Importance, of
Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1225, 1283 (2004).
6 E.g., Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients.: Putting Professional Service on the
Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43, 43 (1991) (noting that law students
learn little about encountering people in stressful situations and fashioning solutions that
are responsive to human as well as legal concerns).
7 Psychology is not the only relevant social science. Lawyers can also learn a lot
from the fields of communications, sociology, economics, and many others. But to us,
psychology seems particularly relevant and, at a minimum, psychology offers enough
insights to fill an article.
8 For example, a number of excellent books have been written to teach the skills of
interviewing and counseling clients. Yet these books do not cover psychology in the
detail we think would be useful. See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH,
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING & NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
(1990) (drawing extensively from psychoanalysis and psychotherapy but failing to
consider various other psychological insights); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004) (offering practical
suggestions, some based on psychological insights, but failing to provide detail regarding
background psychology); ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1999)
(including some psychology, such as a section on information processing flaws); STEFAN
H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS:
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 59-107
(2d ed. 2003) (devoting a relatively small portion of the book to interviewing and
counseling, and within those pages focusing only briefly on psychology); THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (3d
ed. 1997) (drawing on literature from counseling, psychoanalysis, and other sources to
provide practical suggestions on interviewing and counseling, but failing to cover other
links between psychology and interviewing and counseling).
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courses are now commonly offered for undergraduate and graduate students
in psychology as well as for law students, these almost always focus
exclusively on a few limited aspects of law and legal practice. The typical
law and psychology course or book tends to cover primarily criminal rather
than civil law and practice, and places its emphasis on the psychology of
juries, eyewitness testimony, interrogation, and trials. 9
This Article begins to fill some of the gaps that exist in the application of
psychology to law, focusing on important lessons practicing civil attorneys
can learn from psychologists. In particular, this Article will look at
psychological insights that are important to the endeavor of interviewing and
providing initial counseling' ° to clients" in civil cases. 12 Law students
9 E.g., CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND APPLICATION (3d ed. 2004) (offering text focused, inter alia, on juries,
evidence, eyewitness testimony, and corrections); PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVE (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005) (offering detailed and
technical insights focused on psychology of the criminal justice system); MARK
COSTANZO, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LAW (2004) (discussing psychology as applied to
criminal and workplace contexts); ANDREAS KAPARDIS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2003) (addressing interface between psychology and
criminal law). But cf JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2006) (covering a broader range of topics). While it is
understandable that such texts focus on the applications of psychology that have been the
most thoroughly researched in the legal context-see Richard L. Wiener et al.,
Evaluating Published Research in Psychology and Law: A Gatekeeper Analysis of Law
and Human Behavior, in TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 371, 378-81 (James R.P. Ogloff ed., 2002)--we argue both that there is a wide
range of psychological theory that remains untapped and that there are a whole host of
legal areas for which the insights of psychology have not been carefully explored.
10 Given the large percentage of time attorneys spend interviewing and counseling
clients, this is a very important skill for attorneys to possess. E.g., David M. Trubek et al.,
The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 91 (1983) (concluding that
lawyers spent 16% of their time conferring with clients, and spent significantly less time
either conducting research or participating in trials or hearings); Paul Brest, The
Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers,
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 5, 8.
11 We focus on individual rather than organizational clients. We believe that our
insights are relevant to organizational clients as well, but also recognize that additional
group psychology would be useful to assist attorneys in representing organizational
clients.
12 Many of the insights that we develop here are also relevant to the handling of
criminal cases. We have chosen to focus on civil rather than criminal cases simply based
on our collective expertise and because we need to place some limits on this already
unwieldy topic. See Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think.- Cognitive Bias
in Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 783, 785-86 (2003) (applying
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commonly graduate from law school understanding little if anything about
perception, memory, communication, cognitive heuristics, or
decisionmaking. 13 While good lawyers ultimately pick up some of this
information through experience, there is no reason to leave new lawyers to
flounder based on a lack of understanding of these psychological
principles. 14 Further, even experienced lawyers can benefit from more
psychological insights to the interview of a criminal defendant).
13 There is an empirical question about the extent to which this psychological
material can be effectively taught in the classroom, or whether such insights are best
learned on the job. Research indicates that relevant strategies are teachable. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey T. Fong et al., The Effects of Statistical Training on Thinking about Everyday
Problems, 18 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 253, 280-82 (1986); Richard P. Larrick et al.,
Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life, 1 PSYCHOL. Sci. 362, 369
(1990); Darrin R. Lehman & Richard E. Nisbett, A Longitudinal Study of the Effects of
Undergraduate Training on Reasoning, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 952, 959 (1990);
Richard E. Nisbett et al., Teaching Reasoning, 238 SC. 625, 631 (1987). Certainly,
medical schools have operated under the assumption that communication skills and
improved bedside manner can be taught, as the majority of schools are now including
such courses in their curriculum. See, e.g., Dennis H. Novack et al., Medical Interviewing
and Interpersonal Skills Teaching in US Medical Schools: Progress, Problems, and
Promise, 269 JAMA 2101, 2101-02 (1993). An analysis of these medical school training
programs has shown them to be effective. Knut Aspegren, BEME Guide No. 2: Teaching
and Learning Communication Skills in Medicine-A Review with Quality Grading of
Articles, 21 MED. TEACHER 563, 566 (1999). Given that learning on the job will
necessarily be inefficient, in that lawyers who seek to learn by doing will inevitably
suffer from confirmatory bias, illusory correlations, constructed realities, and other
phenomena discussed in this Article, it seems worthwhile to attempt to teach some of the
relevant psychology in the classroom. However, as studies in the medical field seem to
show that experiential teaching of these matters yields far better results than instructional
teaching, thought will need to be given to how to best convey the kinds of material
covered in this Article. See id. at 565.
14 We recognize that the psychological makeup of many lawyers may present
challenges to the mastery of some interviewing and counseling skills. A number of
studies and articles emphasize that many lawyers are more comfortable with analysis and
rules than they are in confronting emotion. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Looking Down the
Road Less Traveled: Challenges to Persuading the Legal Profession to Define Problems
More Humanistically, J. DIsP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2008) (urging that we must
encourage lawyers and law students to feel more human connections); Marjorie A. Silver,
Love, Hate and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6
CLINICAL L. REV. 259 (1999) (urging that lawyers improve their emotional intelligence);
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997) (examining why
lawyers so persistently define problems in narrow analytical fashion); Tamara Relis, "It's
Not About the Money! ": A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs' Litigation Aims, 68 U.
Pirr. L. REV. 341, 380 (2006) ("[I]t is more difficult for attorneys-who tend to be
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explicit study of psychology. While the best lawyers may have intuited some
of what will be discussed here, some of the findings are counterintuitive, and
even experienced lawyers can improve their approach to interviewing and
counseling by drawing on relevant psychology.15
In general, interviewing and counseling sessions have three main
components. First, the attorney uses an interview to obtain information from
the client. Second, the attorney uses the counseling portion of the initial
session to provide information to the client. Third, throughout the session the
attorney is concerned with establishing rapport between attorney and client.
Success or failure in building rapport with the client will inevitably affect the
attorney's ability to obtain and provide information, and to ethically and
effectively counsel the client in this and future sessions.
Knowledge of the psychology of both client and attorney is highly
relevant to all three facets of interviewing and counseling and is critically
important as attorneys seek to build good rapport, obtain relevant information
from clients, retain that information, and guide clients regarding their
options. Thus, attorneys who read this Article should gain insights about
themselves, as well as about their clients. Interestingly, the former may prove
more challenging to apply than the latter. Studies have shown that people
display an asymmetry in their responses to learning about some of the
psychological phenomena described in this Article-demonstrating a
tendency to believe that such phenomena occur in others, but not in
themselves. 16
rational, logical and analytical-to be sensitive to parties' interpersonal, emotional or
extra-legal needs."); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHiO ST. L.J. 29, 43-
48 (1982) (contrasting lawyers' traditional legal and monetary focus with the more
holistic focus of mediation). Nonetheless, we are hopeful that many of the psychological
insights we provide will be of use even to the most analytically-inclined attorneys.
15 Our goal is to provide lawyers, law students, and law professors with enough
information about relevant psychology that they can go beyond our suggestions in
determining how to apply the psychology to interviewing and counseling. That is, rather
than provide an interviewing and counseling checklist or cookbook, we believe it is
important to provide our readers with enough raw ingredients that they can make their
own stew. The insights that can be drawn from the psychology we present here are
infinite, and the proper approach will vary substantially with context-specific differences
in clients and circumstances. Thus, whereas any checklist or set of instructions would
inevitably be deficient, we hope that psychologically-educated attorneys can find
additional applications. Moreover, we recognize that attorneys must balance many factors
in designing their interviews. Even an attorney who is knowledgeable about psychology
might find that financial or other constraints preclude her from following all of our
suggestions, which is another reason we opt to provide background rather than checklists.
16 See, e.g., Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People's
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The remainder of this Article will be organized as follows. First, in Part
II, we will introduce a lawyer, Jack, whom we think would benefit from
reading this Article. We will describe how Jack thinks about interviewing
and counseling and provide a few examples of interviewing and counseling
sessions he will soon conduct. Although Jack is not based on any single
person, we suspect that many readers will recognize aspects of Jack in
themselves or in students or lawyers whom they know. Part II will provide a
review of some relevant psychology. Of course we will not cover all aspects
of psychology or even all the nuances of the areas we review, but instead will
focus on research we see as most pertinent to interviewing and counseling
clients. As we discuss each topic we will provide a few applications, making
suggestions for how Jack might interview and counsel his clients. Finally, in
Part IV, we will offer a summary of some of the key insights psychology
provides with respect to legal interviewing and counseling sessions. 17
II. A TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
Jack is a lawyer whom we think might benefit from reading this Article.
Jack is very bright. He got high scores on his LSAT, and he did well in law
school. Not surprisingly, therefore, Jack is a whiz when it comes to legal
research and analysis. Give him the facts and the legal question and he can
recite or find the relevant statutes and cases. He writes well and also speaks
very clearly. He can assess the legal risks of situations well. Jack is also a
nice guy, truly interested in doing the best work he can on behalf of his
clients. While it may be easiest to envision Jack as a recent law school
graduate, no doubt more than a few Jacks have practiced law for many years
Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
680, 689 (2005); Cynthia McPherson Frantz, I Am Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a
Stumbling Block to Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 166
(2006); Joachim Krueger, Enhancement Bias in Descriptions of Self and Others, 24 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 505, 505 (1998); Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich,
"Naive Cynicism" in Everyday Theories of Responsibility Assessment: On Biased
Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 743, 751 (1999); Emily
Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self
Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REv. 781, 793 (2004); Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler,
Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias
Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 575 (2007).
17 As we begin this foray into psychology, one ethical caution is in order.
Psychology, like most things, can be used for good or evil. While there is a possibility
that lawyers could use the tools here to deceive or gain unfair advantage over other
people, it is hoped that the tools discussed here will only be used for just purposes.
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and may even be nearing retirement. 18
Let us now follow Jack, as he commences to interview and counsel a
client.' 9 In terms of logistics, Jack has never given any particular thought to
the location of an interview, to the way the room is set up, to whether food or
other amenities are provided, or to what he wears. Jack's sense is that all of
this is irrelevant to the task at hand: information extraction. He thinks he
could get the same information interviewing a client in a McDonald's, a bleak
conference room, or a luxury suite.
Jack always asks his secretary or paralegal to get at least a bit of
information on the potential case before he meets with the client. When
possible he uses intake forms, filled out prior to the interview. Then, if the
issue is unfamiliar, Jack does at least some advance research so that he can
be prepared to ask clients the most relevant questions and avoid going down
blind alleys.
Jack believes that it is best to be somewhat informal with clients. He
always shakes his client's hand at the beginning and end of an interview, and
he always addresses clients by their first names. He looks them straight in the
eye to show that he is sincere. Beyond this, Jack has not given much thought
to the idea of developing rapport with his clients. He believes that if he is
competent, and provides good legal advice, his clients by and large will like
him and bring him new business or refer additional clients. Once Jack is
beyond the inevitable preliminaries of the attorney-client privilege and
conflicts checks, he gets to the point as quickly as possible.
Jack's overall philosophy is that clients are an important, yet very
inefficiently organized, source of information. Jack often envisions himself
18 Jack is an amalgam, and certainly not based on any particular individual. Yet, lest
any readers doubt that Jacks really exist, see, for example, BASTRESS & HARBAUGH,
supra note 8, at 61-62 (quoting THE NAT'L L.J. 13, 44-45, 47 (Dec. 1, 1980)) (describing
a lawyer somewhat like Jack).
19 We do not assert that Jack's approach is typical. Indeed, few studies have been
done regarding how lawyers interview and counsel clients. See Brenda Danet et al.,
Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client Interaction: The Biography of a Failure, 14 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 905, 917-21 (1980) (discussing why researchers had great difficulty
attempting to study a set of civil cases from start to finish). Those few studies that have
been done seem to indicate, as one might expect, that lawyers' approaches vary according
to the type of practice and type of client. See Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client
Meet: Observations of Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer
Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 177, 194-98 (1986) (summarizing studies);
Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 115
(1979) (discussing many roles played by Wisconsin consumer lawyers). See also
HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION
(1990).
[Vol. 23:3 20081
INSIGHTS FOR INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING CLIENTS
as a detective or law professor, seeking to extract the relevant facts from his
client. Jack's frustration is that clients are even worse than the typical law
student in stating the relevant facts and he can't understand why so few
clients can present information in a coherent fashion. His clients, even those
clients with high-powered jobs and advanced degrees, often tell their stories
in a jumbled fashion. They fail to effectively organize the information they
present either in terms of the relevant law (somewhat understandable) or
even chronologically. In addition, a frustrating percentage of clients seem
unable to present the right amount of information. They either ramble
incessantly or try to keep their information tighter than a high security
operation. Don't they understand that their lawyer needs all the relevant
information in order to be helpful, and that drowning out the relevant
information with irrelevant meanderings only increases the cost of their own
representation?
Jack also wonders what is going on with people's memories. Jack's own
memory is not perfect when it comes to trivia questions or what he ate for
breakfast last Monday, but he certainly thinks he has good recall for the
kinds of important events at stake for his clients. Why do so many of his
clients say that they can't remember key facts? And, why do they so
frequently tell internally inconsistent stories or provide factual information
clearly controverted by key documents? Jack doesn't think most of his clients
are liars, so is it really that most people are just not very bright? Finally, why
are so many of his clients so emotional? Admittedly they are sometimes
talking about situations that are personally important and even hurtful, but
why can't more of them set aside their emotions long enough to provide the
facts in a coherent fashion? Jack knows that his time is money, and to aid
himself, his firm, and his clients he prides himself on his ability to extract the
relevant facts quickly and efficiently. If Jack could simply attach electrodes
to the client's brain, in order to obtain the important information, he would.
Unfortunately, as that technology does not yet exist,20 Jack does the best he
20 Scientific advances in neuroscience and neuroimaging techniques such as
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have captured the popular and legal
imagination. See generally MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN (2005). See,
e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, § 6, at 49;
Margaret Talbot, Duped: Can Brain Scans Uncover Lies?, NEW YORKER, Jul. 2, 2007, at
52. See also David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing: The Effect of Brain
Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, COGNITION (forthcoming 2008) (finding
that neuroimages are particularly persuasive). However, it is a leap from current
neuroscience to the kind of technology Jack desires. See, e.g., Paul Root Wolpe et al.,
Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and Perils, 5 AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Mar. 2005, at 39.
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can.
In terms of questioning technique, Jack does not hesitate to cut clients off
when necessary or to use cross examination-style questions. He finds that
these methods limit clients' rambling. Once Jack sees the key legal issues he
probes his clients' knowledge of the facts that are relevant to support claims
or defenses on particular causes of action. He often intersperses feedback on
the law with the extraction of information from the client both so that he can
impress the client with his knowledge and also so that he can guide the
discussion along appropriate lines.
As a counselor, Jack believes in "straight talk." If the client has a loser of
a claim or defense, Jack will tell him that. To the extent Jack's clients have
multiple options, Jack will give them his opinion regarding which choice is
best. In Jack's experience, most clients care most about money, so he will
typically help them find the option that is best from the perspective of
gaining or saving the most money.21 Jack does not believe in wasting time
trying to sugarcoat his advice: "lay it out quick and dirty" is his philosophy.
He expects his clients to be smart enough to understand what he is saying.
When offering clients advice, Jack is careful to stick to the law. While he
recognizes that some clients have emotional or psychological issues, he
believes that lawyers should stay as far away from those issues as possible. If
a client asks him for a referral to a "shrink," a chiropractor, or a masseuse for
that matter, he will provide it if he can. But, Jack certainly does not volunteer
such information unsolicited or attempt to counsel clients as to non-legal
aspects of their lives or problems. In his view that might almost amount to
malpractice, in that he might be seen to be offering suggestions outside his
expertise.
Jack is generally quite pleased with his own interview and counseling
style. He prides himself on the fact that many of his interviews only last a
half hour or so, even in complex cases. Jack believes that he excels in
obtaining information quickly from clients, just as he excelled in spotting
issues quickly on law school exams. He also believes that he excels in
providing guidance that is unbiased. Whether clients' claims are strong or
weak, he lays out their chances in an accurate fashion.
Jack works at a medium-size general practice law firm. To give you the
sense of his work, we have looked into a crystal ball to determine a few of
the interviews Jack will soon conduct:
Edna Employee will come to see Jack because she believes she may have
21 Jack's approach is consistent with what some have called a directive style. See,
e.g., COCHRAN, JR. ETAL., supra note 8, at 111-12.
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been treated illegally at work. Edna is a forty-five-year-old white woman
who worked at a major pharmaceutical company for eighteen years.
Recently the company conducted a major layoff, and Edna was one of the
victims. She believes her termination (with severance benefits) was very
unfair, and possibly illegal. The company retained some younger men in her
department whom she believes are less qualified and experienced. Indeed,
other than a secretary, Edna was the only woman in a ten-person
department. Edna believes that her supervisor, Sam Super, was responsible
for choosing to terminate her rather than other male employees. Jack will
consider a lawsuit for age or gender discrimination.
Carl Cementa owns a company called Carl's Creative Concrete. This
company, which has been in existence for twelve years, lays standard
concrete for driveways, sidewalks, and foundations. The company also does
colorful and creative concrete for backyard patios. The company generally
has a very good reputation. Carl will come to see Jack because a former
client, Henrietta Homeowner, is threatening a lawsuit. Carl installed a
backyard patio for Henrietta that he thought turned out quite well. Now,
however, three years later, Henrietta claims that the concrete is cracking and
that an improper slope has permitted water to enter her home and cause a
mold problem. She has made a nasty phone call to Carl, but has apparently
not yet retained an attorney.
Agnes Ageout is seventy-two-year-old widow with three children, three
grandchildren, and a fifty-two year-old-boyfriend. Her estate is currently
worth approximately $200,000. She is considering leaving everything to her
boyfriend, Lenny Lounger, whom she met about a year ago at a casino in
Las Vegas, and she will consult Jack for assistance with estate planning.
Kyle Kiddo is a six-year-old boy who will come to the office with his
parents. 22 Approximately one year ago Kyle suffered very serious
abdominal injuries after accidentally swallowing several magnetic balls.
These magnetic balls were part of a play set to be used for constructing
interesting shapes. The balls needed to be surgically removed, and surgery
22 Psychologists have done research that would be helpful to Jack in interviewing
children. See, e.g., Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, The Suggestibility of Children's
Memory, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 419 (1999); STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK,
JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY
(1995); Gail S. Goodman & Annika Melinder, Child Witness Research and Forensic
Interviews of Young Children: A Review, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1
(2007). Similarly, relevant work has been done with regard to interviewing older adults
such as Agnes. See, e.g., Allison M. Wright & Robyn E. Holliday, Interviewing
Cognitively Impaired Older Adults: How Useful is a Cognitive Interview?, 15 MEMORY
17 (2007). However, this work is outside the scope of this Article.
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also had to be done to correct harm caused to some of Kyle's internal organs
when the magnetic balls brought them closer together than they should have
been. Kyle and his parents are African-American. Jack will consider a
products liability suit for defective design and failure to warn against the
manufacturer of the magnetic balls.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS RELEVANT TO EFFECTIVE INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING
Jack analogizes his clients to computers or information repositories, and
wishes he could simply attach electrodes to elicit the relevant information.
However, most readers will not be shocked to learn that people are rather
different from computers with respect to how we take in information, how
we process that information, how we remember information that we have
previously perceived, how we access and convey information that is stored in
our brains, and how we think about desired courses of action.
Psychological scientists have studied many aspects of human cognition
and behavior that are potentially relevant to interviewing and counseling
clients. We focus here on empirical research-primarily from social and
cognitive psychology-that has explored how people perceive, interpret, and
make judgments about the world around them, how people remember and
talk about such information, the influence of culture and notions of justice,
and how people use that information to make decisions. Thus, we begin our
review by considering the ways in which attention and construal operate to
influence our perceptions and the ways in which cognitive heuristics
influence judgments about the world. Second, we consider the processes by
which people remember and communicate about their experiences, exploring
what the science of memory suggests about how to interview clients, whether
liars can be reliably identified, and the role of several different aspects of
communication in the effective transmission of information between attorney
and client. Third, we consider psychological research that finds broad
differences among cultures in how people think, resolve disputes, and
interact and research on the psychology of justice, both of which have
additional implications for lawyer-client interaction. Finally, we explore a
range of research findings related to understanding the ways in which people
grapple with and make decisions. 23
23 We do not attempt to review all possible aspects of psychological science that
could have implications for client interviewing and counseling. Nor does our focus
extend beyond the initial interview and counseling session to include subsequent
counseling and negotiation. Additional psychology would be relevant to those aspects of
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A. Perception and Construal
Jack assumes that people observe the world and what happens in it as it
is, and can't understand why people have so much trouble describing the
facts. However, it is clear from decades of psychological research that "[t]he
perceiver... is not simply a dutiful clerk who passively registers
information. Rather, the perceiver is an active interpreter, one who resolves
ambiguities, makes educated guesses about events that cannot be observed
directly, and forms inferences about associations and causal relations." 24
1. Attention and Interpretation
Our senses are constantly bombarded with an amazing array of
information-sounds, sights, physical sensations, odors, and tastes. It would
be virtually impossible to pay attention, let alone close attention, to all of the
stimuli to which we are exposed. Accordingly, we attend to only a fraction of
the possible features of the environment at any given moment.25 Features of
both the stimuli themselves (e.g., intensity, suddenness, unexpectedness, or
movement) and the perceiver (e.g., expectations) can influence what it is that
gets noticed.26
There are a variety of ways in which a person's ability to attend to and
practice. In addition to the categories we have identified above, emotion is an important
aspect of human psychology that has implications for interviewing and counseling. We
have chosen to weave material on emotion throughout our discussion, incorporating
aspects of emotion where they intersect with other aspects of psychology, rather than to
include a separate section on emotion. See infra Part III.A.4 (discussing anger and causal
attribution), Part III.B.5 (describing the affect heuristic), Part III.F.3 (discussing
retributive justice), Part III.G.5 (describing affective forecasting), Part III.G.6 (discussing
regret). See generally Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an
Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 119 (2006).
2 4 RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 17 (1980).
25 HAROLD E. PASHLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION 2 (1998) ("[T]he mind is
continually assigning priority to some sensory information over others, and this selection
process makes a profound difference for both conscious experience and behavior.").
26 Steven B. Most et al., What You See is What You Set: Sustained Inattentional
Blindness and the Capture of Awareness, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 217 (2005). "[Instances in
which stimuli draw a person's attention without that person's volition" are referred to as
"attention capture." Id. at 218. See also Jochen Triesch et al., What You See is What You
Need, 3 J. VISION 86 (2003); PASHLER, supra note 25, at 242 (describing "involuntary
shift of attention").
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become aware of stimuli is limited. For instance, psychological research also
shows it is difficult to attend to and take in information from multiple sources
simultaneously-a problem of divided attention. 27 When people attempt to
pay attention to multiple things or to engage in multiple tasks, performance
suffers. 28
Relatedly, people fail to notice even substantial changes in objects
(change blindness) or objects themselves (inattentional blindness) when their
attention is otherwise engaged. 29 In one series of studies, participants were
asked to watch two teams of three basketball players and keep track of the
players' passes.30 When participants' attention was focused in this way,
nearly half failed to notice a person in a gorilla costume or a person with an
open umbrella walk through the game. 31 In another study, people engaged in
an actual conversation (asking for directions) that was interrupted (as two
people carrying a door passed between them) failed to notice that they were
talking to a different person when the conversation resumed.32 Interestingly,
people incorrectly predict that they will be able to detect such changes-a
phenomenon known as change blindness blindness. 33
27 PASHLER, supra note 25, at 101-66.
28 Id.
2 9 See generally ARIEN MACK & IRVIN ROCK, INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS (1998);
Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Change Blindness, 1 TRENDS IN COGNrrIvE SCI. 261
(1997); Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink, Change Blindness: Past, Present, and
Future, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCi. 16 (2005).
30 Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained
Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059, 1062 (1999).
31 Id. at 1068. Objects can be in the visual field and "still not be 'seen' if they are not
specifically being attended." Id. at 1070. In other studies, people watching filmed
conversations failed to detect changes in the color of the speakers' plates, changes in
whether one speaker was wearing a colorful scarf or not, and changes in the actors
playing the speakers. Daniel T. Levin & Daniel J. Simons, Failure to Detect Changes to
Attended Objects in Motion Pictures, 4 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REv. 501, 502-03 (1997).
32 Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Failure to Detect Changes to People in a
Real- World Interaction, 5 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REv. 644 (1998). See also Daniel J.
Simons, Current Approaches to Change Blindness, 7 VIsUAL COGNITION 1, 5 (2000).
33 Daniel T. Levin et al., Change Blindness Blindness: The Metacognitive Error of
Overestimating Change-Detection Ability, 7 VISUAL COGNITION 397, 401 (2000) (finding
that 83% of participants predicted they would detect the changes, compared to the I 1%,
on average, of participants in previous studies who actually did detect the changes). See
also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1072 (2003) (discussing how change blindness may cause a driver
not to notice a change in his visual field, such as the sudden appearance of a child in the
middle of the road and how change blindness blindness may influence a factfinder's
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Thus, to the extent Jack is simultaneously listening to a client's answer to
one question, mentally formulating a different question, thinking about the
client he saw just before this one, and worrying about what needs to be
picked up at the grocery store, he is unlikely to be able perceive all of the
relevant information in the client's answer. Moreover, understanding these
limits on human attention can help Jack to understand why there are
sometime gaps in his clients' knowledge of the relevant facts.
Even once we have attended to and perceived the world around us, our
minds interpret the information gathered by our senses. 34 In one famous
example, students from rival schools watched a tape of a football game
between the schools' teams. Students' assessments of the rule violations
committed by each team and their overall assessments of the play were
influenced by which school they attended. 35 Rather than simply recording the
violations and the play, observers interpreted the action as they watched it. In
a recent study that seems to reflect the same phenomenon, researchers found
that NBA referees' foul calls were influenced by the race of the player and
the race of the referee. 36 In the case of both African-American and Caucasian
players, more fouls were called against players by an opposite-race
officiating crew. 37
Our construal or understanding of events and situations is guided by
basic knowledge structures-known as schemas-that define expectations
evaluation of the driver).
34 We also create some of what we see. Mark Snyder, When Belief Creates Reality,
in 18 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 247 (Leonard Berkowitz ed.,
1984) (reviewing studies). See generally ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON,
PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPECTATION AND PUPILS' INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENT (1968) (finding that teachers who expect high performance elicit high
performance); Mark Snyder et al., Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the
Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656
(1977) (finding that college students who believe they are talking to an attractive person
elicit more social responsiveness from that person); Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavioral
Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 187, 199 (2003) (finding that interrogators who believed a suspect was
guilty elicited more nervous and guilty behavior).
35 Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130-32 (1954). See also Emily Balcetis & David
Dunning, See What You Want to See: Motivational Influences on Visual Perception, 91 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 612 (2006).
36 Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13206, 2007), available at
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/NBARace(NBER).pdf.
3 7 1d. at25.
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about how the world operates, fill in gaps in information, and facilitate an
ability to "make inferences and judgments with heightened ease, speed, and
subjective confidence." 38 Thus, people have a schema for "baby" or for
"lawyer" that provides them with certain expectations and assumptions about
how such a creature should look and behave. Or Carl Cementa might have a
schema or script for how a typical job is conducted and, therefore, a tendency
to assume that Henrietta's patio was similar, that he staffed the job in a
typical way, and that he conversed with Henrietta in the way he normally
converses with his clients. Such schemas serve us well most of the time,
allowing us to process vast amounts of information quickly. In particular,
experts, like Jack, may have well-developed schemas that allow them to see
patterns that others might not and to use their expertise to select and organize
relevant information. 39 However, because schemas may not always
accurately represent the state of the world in a particular instance, they can
sometimes lead us astray.40
Social psychologists have shown that "preconceptions can be important
to interpreting data and therefore can strongly influence all other tasks that
depend on this most basic inferential undertaking."4 1 Specifically,
preconceptions and expectations can influence how information is labeled
and understood, how ambiguous information is interpreted, and the degree to
which information is scrutinized. For example, when told that someone is
"intelligent," one might understand the person to be "sensible, wise,
insightful, and stimulating" if their impression of the person is otherwise
positive. On the other hand, the same description ("intelligent") might be
understood as describing one who is "cunning and scheming" and "detached"
38 LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 76 (1991). Similarly, people have "scripts" that
are schemas for events and that allow an understanding of the typical course of an
episode. Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 715, 715 (1981). For example, if we hear that a person went to a
restaurant, sat down, then realized he had forgotten his reading glasses, we infer that the
person had difficulty reading the menu, even though this detail was not explicitly
recounted. Id.
39 Michelene T.H. Chi, Two Approaches to the Study of Experts' Characteristics, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 21, 23 (K.
Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 2006).
40 NISBETI & Ross, supra note 24, at 7 ("[Such] knowledge structures themselves
are not infallible guides to the nature of physical or social reality. Some beliefs, theories,
and schemas are relatively poor and inaccurate representations of the external world.
More dangerous, objects and events are not always labeled accurately and sometimes are
processed through entirely inappropriate knowledge structures.").
4 1 Id. at 67.
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if the person is otherwise perceived negatively.42
Lawyers' schemas may lead them to believe that clients are or should be
focused primarily on monetary recovery and on litigation success. 43 Yet, if
Jack can get beyond these schemas he may realize that for many clients non-
monetary issues are highly significant, and that non-legal courses of action
can often offer benefits that the courtroom cannot. 44 Far from constituting
malpractice, as Jack tends to believe, considering non-legal issues is part of
the ethical practice of law.45 But, considering non-legal issues may require
Jack to move beyond his initial schemas.
Similarly, when Jack interviews Carl about the problems with Henrietta
Homeowner's patio and Edna regarding her job situation he should be careful
to probe their answers, to ensure that they are describing things that they
know, and not just what they assumes based on their schemas. For example,
who made the decision that Edna should be part of the layoff? What criteria
were used to determine who should be included in the layoff? What kinds of
evaluations did the employees who were not laid off receive and how did
those compare to Edna's evaluations? Does Edna know as much as she thinks
42 See generally Solomon E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258 (1946). Preconceptions can also influence behavior.
For example, the name of a prisoner's dilemma game can influence people's decisions
about whether to cooperate or defect. When the game is called the "Wall Street Game"
players are more likely to defect than when the game is the "Community Game." Varda
Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations Versus
Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner's Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1177 (2004).
43 Relis, supra note 14, at 362-63, 382-83 (describing empirical research on
medical malpractice attorneys and plaintiffs indicating that whereas the attorneys assume
plaintiffs are primarily or exclusively interested in money, plaintiffs are far more
interested in principles, and in obtaining relief such as admissions of fault or
responsibility, ensuring the bad acts did not happen again, receiving answers to their
questions, or securing apologies). See also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers,
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 44 (1982) (noting lawyers' tendency to reduce nonmonetary goals to
money).
44 Relis, supra note 14, at 348-49. The extensive literature on client-centered
counseling is geared to help lawyers escape their own schemas and focus more on what
clients actually want. See generally COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., supra note 8; BINDER ET AL.,
supra note 8.
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007) (allowing lawyers to counsel on
non-legal issues and also to refer clients to experts in other fields). However, it is true that
it is possible for an attorney to focus so extensively on non-legal matters, that the attorney
might expose herself to malpractice liability. See Larry 0. Natt Gantt I, More than
Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal
Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 386-97 (2005).
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she knows? In addition, lawyers always need to be careful that their own
analyses are not inappropriately affected by their own preconceptions.
Although it will inevitably be difficult for lawyers to be sufficiently self-
aware such that they are conscious of their own preconceptions, they ought to
strive to rein in such biases to the extent possible.
Relatedly, psychology also teaches that individuals tend to exhibit a
confirmatory bias in the ways in which they seek out and evaluate
information. As a general matter, people unconsciously tend to seek out
additional information that confirms their already existing views and
disregard conflicting information, rather than attempting to systematically
gather accurate information. 46 Moreover, when evaluating information once
it is obtained, there is a tendency for assessments of the information to be
influenced by the extent to which the information is consistent with the
attitudes or expectations of the person doing the evaluation-a tendency
known as biased assimilation.47 Information that is inconsistent with
expectations or beliefs is discounted and scrutinized more carefully than is
expectation-congruent data. For example, one study asked participants to
review a police file, evaluate the evidence, and make decisions about further
investigation. Participants who were asked to name a suspect after reviewing
the file demonstrated confirmatory bias in seeking out and interpreting
additional investigatory information. Specifically, they were more likely than
participants who did not name a suspect to remember evidence consistent
with the named suspect's guilt, to discount evidence inconsistent with the
named suspect's guilt, to interpret ambiguous evidence in ways consistent
with the named suspect's guilt, and to choose to pursue lines of investigation
46 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
47 See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979) ("[J]udgments about the validity, reliability, relevance,
and sometimes even the meaning of proffered evidence are biased by the apparent
consistency of that evidence with the perceiver's theories and expectations."). See, e.g.,
Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision
Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 568 (1992) (finding biased assimilation in the review of medical test results);
Geoffrey D. Munro & Peter H. Ditto, Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and
Affect in Reactions to Stereotype-Relevant Scientific Information, 23 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 636 (1997) (finding biased assimilation in evaluations of research
on homosexuality); Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers'
Socio-political Attitudes on their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1999) (finding biased assimilation in state court judges' and
law students' evaluations of research on capital punishment).
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that focused on the named suspect.48
Knowledge of this bias may aid Jack when he interviews Carl Cementa
about the alleged defects in Henrietta's patio. It may turn out that from Carl's
perspective, Henrietta was a pain-in-the-neck client from the outset. Perhaps
she was very picky about the work Carl did-frequently asking Carl do redo
his plans even though the job was quite minor by his standards-and was
rude in her conversations with Carl. If Jack realizes that Carl comes into this
dispute with the predisposition that Henrietta's complaints are unfounded,
Jack may be able to help Carl take a step back and consider whether there
might be some actual problems that need to be addressed.
Interviewers have been shown to be subject to the confirmation bias as
well. For example, a study by Saul Kassin and his colleagues found that
interviewers who were led to believe that an interviewee was likely guilty of
a theft asked a higher proportion of questions that were consistent with the
interviewee's guilt ("guilt-presumptive"), used more interrogation techniques
early in the interview, and were more likely to judge the interviewee guilty
than were interviewers who were led to believe that the interviewee was
likely innocent.49
48 Barbara O'Brien & Phoebe Ellsworth, Confirmation Bias in Criminal
Investigations 22-23 (Sept. 19, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-913357. See also Harold H. Kelley, The Warm-Cold Variable in
First Impressions of Persons, 18 J. PERSONALITY 431 (1950) (finding that students'
evaluations of lecturers and their classroom behavior were influenced by their prior
expectations); E. Tory Higgins et al., Category Accessibility and Impression Formation,
13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141 (1977). Thus, people may maintain belief in a
theory even in the face of contrary, even discrediting, evidence-a phenomenon known
as belief perseverance. Craig A. Anderson, Belief Perseverance, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2007); Lee Ross et
al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional
Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880 (1975).
49 Kassin et al., supra note 34, at 187. See also Mark Snyder & William B. Swann,
Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1202, 1205 (1978) (finding that interviewers' choice of questions in a "get-acquainted"
interview were consistent with pre-existing beliefs about the interviewee). Observers who
were not privy to the interviewers' prior beliefs also judged interviewers with a guilt-
presumption as having a higher belief in the interviewee's guilt and as exerting more
pressure on the interviewee. Kassin et al., supra note 34, at 197. These observers also
judged interviewees who were interviewed by interviewers with a guilt-presumption as
behaving more defensively. Id. at 198. See also Ellen J. Langer & Robert P. Abelson, A
Patient By Any Other Name: Clinician Group Difference in Labeling Bias, 42 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 4 (1974) (finding that observers of a clinical
interview described the interviewee as more disturbed and less well adjusted when they
thought he was a "patient" than when they thought he was a "job applicant").
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Confirmatory bias and biased assimilation may have particular
importance for lawyers-whose training and experience might lead them to
pigeonhole clients and cases into readily accessible categories. 50 While
lawyers' expertise allows them to quickly integrate large amounts of
information about the facts of their clients' case and the law, such expertise
may also lead them to make assumptions, to ask questions designed to
confirm those assumptions rather than to disconfirm them, and even to
erroneously remember some individuating details. 51 However, it is also
possible that lawyers could use their experience to construct and pursue
alternative hypotheses that broaden the inquiry.52
Thus, Jack needs to be wary of his own potential biases when he
interviews his clients. For example, in chatting with Agnes about her will,
Jack may be likely to jump to a conclusion that boyfriend Lenny Lounger is a
fortune hunter as to whom Agnes should be wary.53 Yet, it could turn out that
Lenny himself is independently wealthy and that Agnes was previously
estranged from her own family. By jumping to conclusions too quickly, Jack
may ask questions designed to confirm that assumption, may miss out on the
50 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 39 (quoting MELVIN S. HELLER ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION To LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 11 (1960) ("The chief danger
that confronts a professional, in law or in any other field, is that he will tend to fill the
gap with related informational material from other similar situations in his experience.
Or, he may leap ahead and begin to anticipate information that may or may not actually
be involved in the situation that now confronts him."). See also Derek J. Koehler et al.,
The Calibration of Expert Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 686, 692-93 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("[Tlhe broader
knowledge base of experts might lead them to more readily generate a biased set of
reasons favoring the focal hypothesis."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of
Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo.
J. Disp. RESOL. 25, 31 (discussing narrowing of disputes due to attorney's categorization
of problem from an early point in time).
51 See Alan D. Castel et al., The Dark Side of Expertise: Domain-Specific Memory
Errors, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 4 (2007) (finding that expertise "can lead to recall of
domain-relevant information that was not .presented"). See also Hal R. Arkes & Marilyn
R. Freedman, A Demonstration of the Costs and Benefits of Expertise in Recognition
Memory, 12 MEMORY & COGNITION 84 (1984); Raymond R. Baird, Experts Sometimes
Show More False Recall than Novices: A Cost of Knowing Too Much, 13 LEARNING &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 349 (2003); Vimla L. Patel & Guy J. Groen, The General and
Specific Nature of Medical Expertise: A Critical Look, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY
OF EXPERTISE 93 (K. Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith eds., 1991).
52 Koehler et al., supra note 50, at 692. (stating that experts may be able to
"spontaneously generate alternatives to the focal hypothesis").
53 The fact that Lenny is twenty years younger than Agnes, and that she met him in
Las Vegas, might cause Jack to jump to conclusions that could be incorrect.
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opportunity to gather important information, and may also damage his
rapport with his clients.
One strategy that has proven helpful in countering the effects of
confirmatory bias and biased assimilation is to explicitly "consider the
opposite." 54 That is, when seeking out and evaluating information, one ought
to consciously and explicitly reflect on the possibility that one's
preconceptions are erroneous and to seek out disconfirming evidence.
Psychological research has found that such overt consideration of alternatives
is more effective in reducing reliance on preconceptions than is simply
making a good-faith effort to be unbiased.55 Thus, as Jack chats with Edna
Employee, who is convinced that her termination was based on her age and
gender, Jack may ask Edna to try to consider whether it is possible that the
supervisor who decided to terminate her made the decision based on other
legitimate criteria. Or, as Jack discusses the Kiddos' claim that their son's
internal injuries due to swallowing the magnets are permanent, Jack may ask
them to consider what the perspective of a doctor testifying on behalf of the
company is likely to be.
2. Stereotypes
Stereotypes are a category of schemas that categorize people and consist
of "beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, and behaviors of members of
certain groups."5 6 Thus, people may hold stereotypes based on a person's
race or ethnicity, 57 gender, 58 age,59 weight,60 attractiveness, 6 1 dress,62
54 See Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for
Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231 (1984).
55 Lord et al., supra note 54, at 1239-41 (obtaining results consistent with biased
assimilation for participants who were instructed to "be unbiased," but not for
participants who were instructed to "consider the opposite" and suggesting that what is
needed is a "change in strategy rather than in motivation"). See also Laura J. Kray &
Adam D. Galinsky, The Debiasing Effect of Counterfactual Mind-sets: Increasing the
Search for Disconfirmatory Information in Group Decisions, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 69, 76 (2003).
56 James L. Hilton & William von Hippel, Stereotypes, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 237,
240 (1996). See also DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: How THE MIND
FORGETS AND REMEMBERS 153 (2001) ("Stereotypes are generic descriptions of past
experiences that we use to categorize people and objects.").
57 See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314 (2002); Charles M. Judd et al., Automatic Stereotypes vs. Automatic Prejudice:
Sorting Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J.
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whether or not they smoke, 63 or other categories to which people can be
assigned.
Most of us don't like to think of ourselves as making decisions that are
grounded in stereotypes or prejudice.64 Yet, research has shown that we all
operate on the basis of stereotypes-racial, ethnic, and otherwise-though
we are often not aware of such influence.65 To some extent, reliance on
stereotypes is not necessarily bad. As with other schemas, stereotypes can
facilitate the rapid categorization of people and allow us to "save cognitive
resources." 66 Of course, some stereotypes may have no basis in fact
whatsoever, such as the idea that members of a certain race or ethnicity are
less intelligent than members of another race or ethnicity. Moreover, even
those stereotypes that have a basis in truth are not true in every case. Men in
general are stronger than women in general but there are plenty of women
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75 (2004); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception:
The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (2001); Jeff Stone et al., "White Men Can't Jump":
Evidence for the Perceptual Confirmation of Racial Stereotypes Following a Basketball
Game, 19 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291 (1997).
58 Kay Deaux & Marianne LaFrance, Gender, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 788, 793-96 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).
59 Richard L. Hense et al., Implicit Memory for Age Stereotypes, 13 SOC. COGNITION
399, 400 (1995); Mary E. Kite & Blair T. Johnson, Attitudes Toward Older and Younger
Adults: A Meta-Analysis, 3 PSYCHOL. & AGING 233 (1988).
60 Richard M. Ryckman et al., Male and Female Raters' Stereotyping of Male and
Female Physiques, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 244 (1989).
61 Alice H. Eagly et al., What is Beautiful is Good, But... : A Meta-Analytic Review
of Research on the Physical Attractiveness Stereotype, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 109 (1991).
62 Fabio Sani & Louise Thompson, We Are What We Wear: The Emergence of
Consensus in Stereotypes of Students'and Managers'Dressing Styles, 29 SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 695 (2001).
63 Agustin Echebarria Echabe et al., Social Representations and Intergroup
Conflicts: Who's Smoking Here?, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 339 (1994).
64 Susan Fiske distinguishes the cognitive (stereotyping), affective (prejudice), and
behavioral (discrimination) aspects of the way people respond to people from other
groups. Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds.,4th ed. 1998).
65 A website run by Harvard University allows users to evaluate their own reliance
on stereotypes. Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2007).
66 Fiske, supra note 64, at 367. See also C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen,
Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically About Others, 51 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 93, 96
(2000) ("In attempting to make sense of other people, we regularly construct and use
categorical representations to simplify and streamline the person perception process.").
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who are stronger than many men. In short, we are all influenced by
stereotypes, and we must be on guard to recognize when stereotypes are
either completely or sometimes false.
As with other schemas, stereotypes can shape perceptions of and
responses to people from "the earliest moments of encoding." 67 Accordingly,
stereotypes have been shown to influence information processing. For
example, one study demonstrated that people asked to distinguish between
tools and weapons were able to identify tools more quickly when they were
primed with white faces and to identify weapons more quickly when they
were primed with black faces. 68
Stereotypic beliefs are also subject to the same types of confirmatory
biases as are other preconceptions. There is evidence that people pay more
attention to information that is consistent with a stereotype and less attention
to stereotype-inconsistent information, that people seek out information that
is consistent with the stereotype, 69 and that people are better able to
remember information that is consistent with the stereotype.7 0 Such
preferences for confirmation of stereotypes can make them resistant to
change.7 1
The stereotyping literature is relevant to client interviewing in several
ways. First, attorneys need to bear in mind that they may unconsciously be
biased by the appearance of their client, in ways that ultimately may prove
not to be accurate. Jack may, for example, make incorrect assumptions about
Kyle and his parents because they are African-American. Perhaps he will
have a tendency to assume they are poor or that they are not particularly
good parents? Similarly, Jack may incorrectly assume that Edna, a middle-
aged woman, would not be good at the computer-related side of her job. Jack
needs to recognize the likelihood that he is influenced by stereotypes so that
he can make efforts to ask questions that will take him beyond these
stereotypes. 72 Otherwise, he may have difficulty establishing rapport with his
67 Id. at 368.
68 Payne, supra note 57, at 185. Moreover, participants were more likely to
misidentify tools as weapons when the tool was primed with a black face than they were
when the tool was primed with a white face. Id. at 188.
69 Fiske, supra note 64, at 368. See also Snyder and Swann, supra note 49.
70 Fiske, supra note 64, at 371.
71 See id. at 368 ("Stereotypes allow people to assimilate a person who fits within
the generally accepted boundaries of the outgroup, making people seem more similar to
their stereotype than they actually are.").
72 See Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra note 66, at 109 ("[F]or perceivers to avoid or
make adjustments for the possible influence of unwanted mental contents, such as
stereotypic thoughts, they must first be aware that such influences are a possibility in the
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clients and may fail to learn all the information that might have been helpful
to his clients' causes.73
Second, attorneys need to be aware that clients' stereotypes may
influence their own perceptions of events. Carl Cementa's views of Henrietta,
for example, may be influenced by his negative views towards members of a
group to which Henrietta belongs-by Henrietta's race, religion, or age-and
these views likely influence his interpretation of his dispute with Henrietta.
Third, attorneys also need to remember that their own appearance and
presentation inevitably creates an impression on clients, whether positive or
negative. We have learned that Jack's philosophy is that clients should
appreciate him for his brain, and that appearance matters very little. For this
first place."). There is evidence that the monitoring processes that are used to suppress
stereotypes can prime the stereotype and, therefore, result in better memory for
stereotypic characteristics. See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz,
Further Ironies of Suppression: Stereotype and Counterstereotype Accessibility, 43 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 833, 839 (2007); C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of Mind But
Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808,
814 (1994); Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV.
34, 47 (1994). However, other research has shown that under some circumstances people
can inhibit stereotype activation or avoid using stereotypes in decisionmaking. See, e.g.,
Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 15 (1989); Kerry Kawakami et al.,
Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of Training in the Negation of Stereotypic
Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 871 (2000);
Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for Progress
in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 483 (1993);
Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through
Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 182 (1999).
73 As attorneys assess clients' likelihood of success in a dispute they must,
unfortunately, factor in the extent to which a client's characteristics might positively or
negatively influence a jury or judge. Some clients may have great cases, but if their
appearance or manner will cause a judge or jury to disbelieve them or cast their claims in
a negative light, this is an unpleasant reality both lawyer and client may need to confront.
See, e.g., Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness,
Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of
Mock Jurors: A Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1315 (1994). While
Jack may not, in an initial interview, want to be so blunt as to say that "judges and juries
in our jurisdiction don't tend to like persons" in a particular category, Jack may want to
address this issue with his clients in a more subtle way. For example, in talking to the
Kiddo family Jack could let them know that if the case goes to trial the strengths and
weaknesses of their claim to product liability will not be determined by Jack, the Kiddos,
or the kinds of people with whom the Kiddos tend to socialize. Instead, the judge or jury
may include some people who do not necessarily think highly of African-Americans'
parenting skills, and thus blame the parents for the injuries suffered by Kyle.
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reason he often dresses very casually and behaves quite informally. Yet, at
least some clients may assume that an attorney who dresses quite casually
and behaves informally is not well-established or good at his job.74
3. Causal Attribution and Judgments of Responsibility
Another way in which people make sense of the world is by making
causal judgments-including making inferences of responsibility, weighing
the relative contributions of potential causes, and making predictions about
future behavior.75 Such causal judgments are often central to legal disputes.
Attribution theory in psychology is the study of the ways in which people
make attributions of causality or responsibility. 76 In particular, research
shows that people tend to prefer simple causal explanations (monocausality)
to more complex theories of causation,77 and are more likely to assign
responsibility to another person (rather than to another source) when they
judge the cause to be internal to and controllable by that person. 78 Attributing
cause to another person can lead to feelings of anger, 79 and to judgments of
74 See, e.g., Gary L. Brase, The White-Coat Effect: Physician Attire and Perceived
Authority, Friendliness, and Attractiveness, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2469, 2470-77
(2004); Yoon-Hee Kwon & Julie Johnson-Hillery, College Students' Perceptions of
Occupational Attributes Based on Formality of Business Attire, 87 PERCEPTUAL &
MOTOR SKILLS 987, 992-93 (1998).
75 Ross & NISBErr, supra note 38, at 77.
76 See generally EDWARD E. JONES, INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION 138-66 (1990);
Harold H. Kelley, The Processes of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107
(1973); NISBETT & Ross, supra note 24; BERNARD WEINER, JUDGMENTS OF
RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONDUCT 5 (1995).
77 NISBETr & Ross, supra note 24, at 17; Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster,
Motivated Closing of the Mind: "Seizing" and "Freezing," 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 263, 265
(1996).
78 WEINER, supra note 76, at 6-12 (comparing internal and controllable causes to
causes judged to be external or situational, that vary over time, or that are
uncontrollable). How one attributes causation may also depend in part on one's
explanatory style or habitual way of explaining things. See generally EXPLANATORY
STYLE (Gregory McClellan Buchanan & Martin E.P. Seligman eds., 1995); Christopher
Peterson, The Meaning and Measurement of Explanatory Style, 2 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1
(1991).
79 See Laurie J. Barclay et al., Exploring the Role of Emotions in Injustice
Perceptions and Retaliation, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 630 (2005); Dacher Keltner et
al., Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social Perception, 64 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 740 (1993); Brian M. Quigley & James T. Tedeschi,
Mediating Effects of Blame Attributions on Feelings of Anger, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC.
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responsibility, blame, and (sometimes) retaliation. 80
One aspect of the psychology of attribution with particular relevance for
interviewing and counseling clients is known as the fundamental attribution
error (or correspondence bias)-the tendency of observers to attribute
another person's behavior to dispositional factors (those internal to the
person) rather than to situational (external) factors. 81 Despite the fact that
much research has demonstrated the power of situational factors on
behavior,82 people are inclined to attribute a person's behavior to internal
personal characteristics rather than to situational constraints. Thus, people
attribute the views contained in a speech (say, for example, defending or
attacking the notion that marijuana should be legal) to the speaker, even
when they know that the person was assigned to speak on that side of the
issue.83 Thus, even when people grasp the nature of the situation, they may
discount the influence of those situational factors on another's behavior.
Research has also demonstrated an "actor-observer effect," such that
people view causation differently when evaluating their own acts, rather than
when evaluating others' acts. Specifically, while observers are particularly
likely to attribute others' behavior to dispositional factors, they are more
likely to attribute their own behavior to situational factors. 84
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1280 (1996); Paul Rozin et al., The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping
Between Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes
(Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 585 (1999)
(finding connections between violations of autonomy and anger); WEINER, supra note 76,
at 17 ("Anger is an accusation, or a value judgment, that follows from the belief that
another person 'could and should have done otherwise."').
80 WEINER, supra note 76, at 5.
81 JONES, supra note 76; NISBE1r & Ross, supra note 24; Ross & NISBETr, supra
note 38, at 4; Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in
the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977) ("People's inflated belief in the importance of personality
traits and dispositions, together with their failure to recognize the importance of
situational factors in affecting behavior, has been termed the 'fundamental attribution
error.').
82 Ross & NISBETr, supra note 38, at 27-58 (reviewing studies).
83 See Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 7, 10 (1967). See also Michael W. Morris et al.,
Misperceiving Negotiation Counterparts: When Situationally Determined Bargaining
Behaviors Are Attributed to Personality Traits, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 52,
53 (1999) (examining attributions in negotiation and finding that negotiators made
attributions about their counterparts even though they were aware of the counterparts'
situational constraints).
84 Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent
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Knowledge regarding how people think of causation can potentially be
very useful to Jack as he conducts his interviews. Edna, for example, may
come into the office very angry, and very sure that her supervisor, Sam
Super, terminated her because he is sexist and does not like her. She may
give short-shrift to situational factors that may have led to the layoffs-such
as budget problems-or that may have determined who was laid off-such as
who had skills in particular areas. Jack's awareness of persons' tendencies to
blame internal rather than external causes may help him see that Edna may
be attributing negative internal motives to Sam for actions that were largely
driven by circumstances and may help him to ask questions better aimed at
accurately assessing the strength of her case.8 5
Knowledge of how causal attributions are made could also help Jack
counsel Carl Cementa. Carl may have a tendency to absolve himself and his
company of any responsibility for the damage to Harriet's house. He may
instead blame Harriet or external factors such as the weather for the
problems. And Carl may have a tendency to find a single cause to blame,
such as bad weather, rather than a confluence of multiple causes. Jack's
knowledge of these tendencies may help Jack ask more pointed questions
that may ultimately help Carl see his own role in the problem.
4. Naive Realism and False Consensus
As discussed above, people construct their reality based on what they pay
attention to and as a function of how they construe data via their schemas and
expectations. However, people often fail "to recognize the degree to which
one's own understanding of the world is the result of an active, constructive
process, rather than a passive reception and registering of some external
reality"86 and, therefore, "fail to recognize or fail to make adequate
inferential allowance for the fact that their peers may construe the 'same'
situation quite differently. ' 87 This "naive realism" results in the "feeling that
[one's] own take on the world enjoys particular authenticity, and that other
Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF
BEHAVIOR 82 (Edward E. Jones et al. eds., 1972). See also Michael D. Storms, Videotape
and the Attribution Process: Reversing Actors' and Observers' Points of View, 27 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 165, 171-72 (1973). For the observer, it is the actor that
is salient, but for the actor it is the situation that is salient. See NISBETr & Ross, supra
note 24, at 123; Jones & Nisbett, supra.
85 Jack should also be aware that a judge or jury may fall prey to the fundamental
attribution error as well.
86 Ross & NISBETr, supra note 38, at 12.
87 Id. at 85.
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actors will, or at least should, share that take, if they are attentive, rational,
and objective perceivers of reality and open-minded seekers of truth."'88
Those affected by naive realism assume that others who see the world
differently do so because they lack sufficient information, are not reasonable,
or are otherwise biased in some way.89
NaYve realism has a number of implications that are relevant to
interviewing and counseling. First, people tend to overestimate the degree to
which others share their perspective.90 This false consensus effect "involves
an overestimation of the commonness of one's own responses and
reactions."91 Thus, people believe that their behavior, choices, and beliefs are
typical and, therefore, are "less revealing of personal attributes" than are
others' contrary behaviors, choices, and beliefs.92 In addition, naive realism
has implications for the ways in which people convey information. In
particular, people have great difficulty conveying information with which
they are familiar to someone who lacks their mental representation of the
material. For example, in one telling study, one group of people was asked to
tap the rhythms of familiar songs for the second group to identify. The
"tappers" (who had mental representations of the songs that included the
melody and words) overestimated the likelihood that the "listeners" (who
heard only taps) would correctly recognize the songs.93
Finally, secure in the belief that they see the world accurately, people
tend to be confident in their abilities to persuade those on the other side and
88 Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological
Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 646
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, NaiVe Realism in
Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND
KNOWLEDGE 103, 110-11 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996).
89 Ross & Ward, supra note 88. See also Glenn D. Reeder et al., On Attributing
Negative Motives to Others Who Disagree with Our Opinions, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1498, 1499 (2005).
90 Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal
Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1091 (2003).
91 Pronin et al., supra note 88, at 642. See, e.g., Lee Ross et al., The False
Consensus Effect: An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977).
92 Pronin et al., supra note 88, at 642.
93 See id. at 643-44. See also Justin Kruger et al., Egocentrism Over E-Mail: Can
We Communicate as Well as We Think?, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 925, 926
(2005) (finding that senders of e-mail overestimate the degree to which they are able to
communicate tone, humor, and emotion to e-mail recipients).
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neutral third-parties of the merits of their position.94 However, when efforts
to "enlighten" the other side are unsuccessful, people are likely to conclude
that such others are unreasonable or biased.95 Indeed, the more the other
disagrees, the more they are thought to be displaying bias.96
Jack could benefit from knowledge of naive realism in chatting with the
Kiddo parents. Perhaps the Kiddos will assume that a wealthy manufacturer
of the magnetic balls that caused their son severe injury must have a duty to
compensate them and their child for the harm that occurred. As the Kiddos
see the world, any belief to the contrary on the part of the company simply
demonstrates the company's lack of good faith. Yet, Jack may realize that
others, and even the law, might construe this situation differently and assess
liability to the company only if the product is found to have been defective in
its design or if the company was somehow negligent in the way it
manufactured or distributed the product.
Jack must also recognize that his own view of the world may be quite
different from the Kiddos' view of the world. Perhaps Jack tends to assume
that the only reason one would bring a lawsuit is to obtain monetary
benefit.97 Yet, the Kiddos may see the bringing of a lawsuit as a moral
statement-a way to ensure than an evil company is called to account for its
bad action.98 Jack needs to be aware of and probe for the many ways in
which his clients' world view may differ from his own in order to effectively
interview and counsel his clients.
B. Cognitive Heuristics
Cognitive heuristics are ways in which people simplify or take shortcuts
in making judgments. Much of the time these shortcuts are efficient routes to
accurate judgments. However, on occasion, reliance on these heuristics can
produce systematic errors in judgment. An understanding of how these
cognitive heuristics influence judgment can aid Jack as he interviews and
94 Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 90, at 1091. See also Lee Ross & Andrew Ward,
Psychological Barriers to Conflict Resolution, in 27 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 255, 265 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1995); Leigh Thompson &
George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict,
51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 193 (1992) (finding that
disputants are overly optimistic about third-party decisions).
95 Ross & Ward, supra note 88.
96 Pronin et al., supra note 16, at 781.
97 See Relis, supra note 14.
9 8 Id. at 341.
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counsels his clients.99
1. Availability
People tend to judge the likelihood of an event by the ease with which
they can recall examples of similar events. 100 Therefore, events that are more
available in memory-because they are more vivid, have been repeated more
often, are concrete (as opposed to abstract), are more recent, hold emotional
interest, or otherwise come to mind more easily-are judged to be more
common. 101 In contrast, less memorable but more probative information,
such as statistical summaries, tend to hold less interest. 10 2 Availability also
influences judgments of causality-the more common an event is judged to
be, the more likely it is thought to have a causal influence.' 0 3 Thus, people
tend to estimate that motor vehicle accidents (highly available in memory)
cause more deaths per year than stomach cancer, even though the reverse is
true. 1
04
Knowledge of the availability heuristic may help Jack understand why
Edna feels so wronged by her termination, and feels her chances of success
are high, even though her claim may not in the end be particularly strong.
Instances of gender and age discrimination may be available in Edna's mind
as she has read about successful lawsuits in the newspaper or has heard about
99Not all heuristics are reviewed here. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 4-11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
(describing the representativeness heuristic).
100 Amos Tveresky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probabilility, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 163 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
101 NISBETr & Ross, supra note 24, at 8; Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 463 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
102 See Ruth Hamill et al., Insensitivity to Sample Bias: Generalizing from Atypical
Cases, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578, 586-88 (1980); Amos Tveresky &
Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153, 153 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
103 NISBETT & Ross, supra note 24, at 22.
1 04 See J. EDWARD Russo & PAUL J.H. SCHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPS: TEN
BARRIERS TO BRILLIANT DECISION-MAKING AND How TO OVERCOME THEM 82-83 (1989)
(reviewing 2 newspapers over a 1-year period and finding 137 articles about deaths in
motor vehicle accidents and only 1 story about a stomach cancer death). Id. at 83.
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them from friends. 10 5 Such familiarity may lead her to judge the likelihood of
discrimination as high or to predict that she is likely to win her case. Yet,
newspapers report plaintiff victories more often than defeats, 106 and Jack
may find that statistical information regarding the company's approach to the
layoff paints a different portrait of the layoffs. However, such aggregate
information is likely to be less compelling to Edna than more colorful
anecdotes involving purported discrimination. Jack may, therefore, find it
useful to use concrete, vivid, examples in trying to communicate this
information to his client-such communication may have a stronger impact
than summary statistics. 10 7
Further, Jack needs to guard against his own tendencies to fall prey to the
availability heuristic. As he helps his clients assess their likelihood of success
he should try to look to statistical information, rather than be guided by his
gut feeling as to the likely success of a particular claim or defense.
2. Anchoring
Anchoring and adjustment is a phenomenon by which available values-
even irrelevant values-provide a starting point (or "anchor") for a judgment;
adjustments are then made away from the anchor, but are often
insufficient. 108 For example, in one classic study, participants' estimates of
the number of African countries in the U.N. were influenced by their prior
assessments of whether the correct percentage was higher or lower than an
arbitrary number (determined by spinning a "wheel of fortune"). 10 9 In the
legal context, juror judgments and settlement decisions have been shown to
be influenced by anchors provided by ad damnum requests 01 and damage
105 See generally Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, News Media
Reporting on Civil Litigation and Its Influence on Civil Justice Decision Making, 27 LAW
& HuM. BEHAV. 5 (2003).
106 See generally Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks
with the Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 419 (1996); Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 105.
107 See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 24, at 281-82 (advocating "Teaching by
Concrete Illustrations and Vivid Anecdotes").
108 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 99, at 14-18.
109 Id. at 14. See also ScoTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 146 (1993) (describing unpublished study in which estimates of average
temperature in San Francisco were influenced by answering previous question about
whether such average was higher or lower than 580).
110 See Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the
More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
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caps,"' l and the media.112 Similarly, first offers in negotiation have been
shown to anchor final negotiated outcomes. 1 13
Jack needs to know about anchoring so as to avoid inadvertently
anchoring his clients to a particular valuation during the initial interview and
to address other anchors that his clients might encounter. For example, were
Jack to say to the Kiddos, "I think we have a million dollar claim here," it
might prove difficult for the Kiddos to accept a settlement for less than a
million dollars down the road, even if the Kiddos had been subsequently
informed of weaknesses in their case. Or, if Jack were to say to Carl
Cementa, "I think you have a good shot at getting rid of this claim for
nuisance value," Jack might later come to regret this comment if he and Carl
learned that Harriet's case were actually quite strong.14
3. Positive Illusions
Psychological research has found that people perceive the world in more
positive terms than they might if they were being completely objective."l 5 In
519, 522 (1996); Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiffs
Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
445 (1999); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage
Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991, 1005, 1010, 1013-15
(1995); John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting
Different Damages Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 494
(1989). See also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777,
802-03 (2001) (anchoring effect of diversity amount on judges' damage awards).
111 See Hinsz & Indahl, supra note 110; Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A.
Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 353, 359 (1999); Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in
Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 243, 252 (1997).
112 See Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 111, at 367-70 (reviewing studies).
113 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court
Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
1 (1994) (anchoring effect of first offer in settlement negotiation).
114See also Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients:
Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 795, 802 (1998) (discussing management of client
expectations by "avoiding reference to specific figures for case outcomes, deflating
expectations, and emphasizing uncertainty"); Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything
You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision Making, 9 CLNICAL L. REv. 783, 802
(2003) (arguing in the criminal law context that lawyers should "resist the temptation to
make early diagnoses and predictions").
115 See generally SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-
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particular, people have a tendency to be overconfident in the forecasts that
they make-failing to sufficiently allow for uncertainty in their judgments."16
Therefore, for example, people routinely underestimate the time they will
need to complete a task (the "planning fallacy"), 1 7 anticipate that they will
enjoy their jobs 1 8 and their vacations1 19 more than they actually do,
underestimate the likelihood that they will suffer from ill-health, 120 and
predict that they will not divorce.121 Experts, too, demonstrate
DECEPTION AND THE HEALTHY MIND (1989); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown,
Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103
PSYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988).
116 See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to
1980, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 306, 314 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions
Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)
("One of the most robust findings in the psychology of prediction is that people's
predictions tend to be optimistically biased. By a number of metrics and across a variety
of domains, people have been found to assign higher probabilities to their attainment of
desirable outcomes than either objective criteria or logical analysis warrants."). Such
overconfident predictions are more likely the more uncertainty is involved in the
prediction. Id. at 338. Interestingly, "research has found that optimistic biases are
attenuated when people are choosing between goals, but exaggerated once a particular
goal is selected and the individual begins thinking about implementing particular plans
for action." Id. at 340. Another aspect of over-optimism is that people tend to
overestimate their ability to control events and outcomes that are not within their control.
Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 323-
27 (1975); Taylor & Brown, supra note 115, at 196. See also Paul K. Presson & Victor
A. Benassi, Illusion of Control: A Meta-Analytic Review, 11 J. SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 493, 502-06 (1996).
117 Roger Buehler et al., Exploring the "Planning Fallacy": Why People
Underestimate Their Task Completion Times, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 366,
373 (1994). See also Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold
Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SC. 17, 26-27 (1993).
118 Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 812 (1980).
119 Terence R. Mitchell et al., Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events:
The "Rosy" View, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 421, 428 (1997).
120 Linda S. Perloff & Barbara K. Fetzer, Self-Other Judgments and Perceived
Vulnerability of Victimization, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 502, 502 (1986);
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems:
Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481 (1987).
121 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 439,442-43 (1993).
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overconfidence-for example, financial analysts tend to overestimate
earnings. 122 Similarly, people tend to have unrealistically positive views of
themselves-perceiving themselves to be "better than average" on a variety
of dimensions and perceiving themselves in more positive terms than do
observers. 123 Research has shown, for instance, that the majority of people
estimate that they are above average drivers, 124 and that most negotiators
think that they are above average negotiators.125
Manifesting a related bias-the self-serving (or egocentric) bias, people
often make judgments about events in ways that are consistent with their own
interests. 126 Thus, for example, spouses' estimates of their contributions to
the work of the household add up to more than 100%, 127 as do authors'
122 Thomas G. Calderon, Predictive Properties of Analysts' Forecasts of Corporate
Earnings, 29 MID-ATLANTIC J. Bus. 41, 42 (1993); Andrew L. Zacharakis & Dean A.
Sheperd, The Nature of Information and Overconfidence on Venture Capitalists'Decision
Making, 16 J. Bus. VENTURING 311, 322-23 (2001) (showing such an effect for venture
capitalists). See also Chi, supra note 39, at 25 (reviewing studies of experts and
overconfidence).
123 See generally Taylor & Brown, supra note 115.
124 See, e.g., Ola Svenson, Are We Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow
Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 (1981). See also James R. Dalziel & R.F. Soames
Job, Motor Vehicle Accidents, Fatigue and Optimism Bias in Taxi Drivers, 29 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 489, 493 (1997) (showing such an effect for taxi drivers); D.
Walton, Examining the Self-Enhancement Bias: Professional Truck Drivers' Perceptions
of Speed, Safety, Skill and Consideration, 2 TRANSP. RES. 91, 99 (1999) (showing such an
effect for truck drivers).
125 See Roderick M. Kramer et al., Self-Enhancement Biases and Negotiator
Judgment: Effects of Self-Esteem and Mood, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEVAV. & HuM.
DECISION PROCESSES 110, 124 (1993); Leigh Thompson & Reid Hastie, Judgment Tasks
and Biases in Negotiation, in 2 RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 31, 43
(Blair H. Sheppard et al. eds., 1990). Interestingly, such unrealistically positive views
also operate at the group level-with a tendency for people to view others in their group
more positively (and above average) than they view others. See generally Jonathon D.
Brown, Evaluations of Self and Others: Self-Enhancement Biases in Social Judgment, 4
SOC. COGNITION 353 (1986); Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory
of Intergroup Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS (Stephen Worchel &
William G. Austin eds., 1986). Members of one's own group are more often credited with
successes, more likely to be seen as honest and trustworthy, and thought to be more
cooperative. Id.
126 See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION
MAKING 99-101 (4th ed. 1998); Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in
Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979).
127 See, e.g., Ross & Sicoly, supra note 126. See also David M. Messick & Keith P.
Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 418 (1979)
470
[Vol. 23:3 20081
INSIGHTS FOR INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING CLIENTS
estimates of their contributions to a joint work. 128 Similarly, sports fans from
opposing teams make self-serving judgments about the fairness and conduct
of the teams in the game. 129 Self-serving bias no doubt affects lawyers as
well as their clients. For example, Chris Guthrie and his colleagues showed
that a large majority of the magistrate judges in their study estimated that at
least half of their peers had higher reversal rates on appeal than they did.130
In addition, several studies have shown that litigants and their representatives
make biased estimates of the fair settlement value of civil cases and
predictions about what a neutral decisionmaker will award-those on the
plaintiff side make higher estimates than do those on the defense side.131
Given this psychology, it would not be surprising if Agnes Ageout were
quite optimistic about her longevity, the nature and future of her relationship
with Lenny Lounger, and the likelihood that her own children and
grandchildren would fail to contest her will if she chooses to leave all her
assets to Lenny. Jack may need to gently warn Agnes that some of her
assumptions may be overly optimistic. Similarly, it would not be surprising if
Edna Employee represented her contributions to the company in a very
positive manner, or if Carl Cementa was very positive on the quality of work
done by his company. Jack needs to be prepared for the fact that further
investigation and discovery may show that their perspectives may be subject
to challenge. It is not necessarily that Edna or Carl would lie, but just that
they would naturally present their contributions in a very positive light.
At the same time, Jack needs to be aware of his own tendencies towards
over-optimism. It is natural that a lawyer like Jack would be quite confident
in his own abilities to win a case at trial or to procure a good settlement for
his client. Jack needs to guard against these tendencies in attempting to help
his client decide whether to pursue a claim at all, and how to pursue that
claim. Jack can take some comfort, at this initial stage of client
(demonstrating the self-serving bias in mechanisms for compensating joint work).
128 TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 18.
129 Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 35.
130 Guthrie et al., supra note 110, at 802-03. See also Theodore Eisenberg, Differing
Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979 (1994)
(reporting study of bankruptcy judges' and lawyers' perceptions of lawyers' fees).
131 See Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM.
ECON. REv. 1337 (1995); Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997); George
Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric
Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176 (1992).
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representation, from the fact that research has shown less of a tendency
toward over-optimism when choosing between options, such as doing
nothing, attempting a quick settlement, or commencing litigation. 132 Later,
once Jack and his client have potentially commenced litigation, they will
need to be even more wary of the dangers of over-optimism. Similarly, Jack
must be attentive to the effects of self-serving bias. Jack's awareness of the
tendency to make self-serving evaluations of his clients' cases can help him
and his clients see that their assessments and predictions may not be shared
by others.
4. Hindsight Bias
A related bias-hindsight bias-is the tendency to unconsciously
overestimate the likelihood one would have assigned to an event once the
outcome is known. 133 Thus, people predicting the outcome of an event after
the fact are more certain that they would have predicted the actual outcome
than are those who attempt to predict in foresight-resulting in a feeling that
they "knew it all along."'134 Following the injury to their son, the Kiddos may
feel that it should have been obvious to the magnetic ball manufacturer, from
the outset, that a defect in their product would cause an injury to a child. Yet,
while this may be a manifestation of hindsight bias on the part of the Kiddos,
Jack can also take some comfort from the idea that a judge or jury could
eventually suffer from that same bias. 135
5. Affect Heuristic
Judgment is also affected by a phenomenon psychologists call the "affect
heuristic." 136 People tend to make judgments based on an "overall, readily
132 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
133 See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge
on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HuM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 288 (1975); Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, " Knew It Would Happen".-
Remembered Probabilities of Once Future Things, 13 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 1 (1975); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments
of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311 (1990).
134 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging
in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998) (exploring the complex interface between
hindsight bias and legal judgments).
136 See generally Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of
Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000); Paul Slovic et al., The
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available affective impression"-using their feelings toward the object of
judgment as a guide' 37 Thus, for example, people may rely on their general
feelings toward activities such as nuclear power or cellular phones to make
judgments about the activities' risks and benefits. Similarly, we might expect
people to judge others (clients, lawyers, opponents) or courses of action (do
nothing, file a lawsuit) with regard to their general affect toward those people
or actions. If the company that manufactured the magnetic balls that injured
Kyle Kiddo were Chinese, during a period when Chinese companies are
being widely reported to have manufactured shoddy or dangerous
merchandise, that might cause Jack, the Kiddos, or a judge or jury to more
readily find the company culpable. Or, if Jack's mother were an administrator
for a company similar to the pharmacy company at which Edna worked,
Jack's assessment of Edna's company might be colored, for better or for
worse, by his feelings toward his mother's company. Similarly, Edna might
discount the benefits and emphasize the costs of filing a lawsuit due to her
negative emotional reaction to the concept of litigation. Jack needs to guard
against such errors, whether his own or his clients'.
C. Memory
Jack, like many law students and particularly new attorneys, believes
human memories are better than they really are. Psychologists have
demonstrated that both short-term and long-term memories are extremely
frail. As in the movie Rashomon,138 different people's descriptions of the
Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
397 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and
Affect, 15 CURRENT DIR. IN PSYCHOL. SCi. 322 (2006). See also George F. Loewenstein et
al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001) (describing the "risk as feelings"
hypothesis); Norbert Schwartz & Gerald L. Clore, How Do I Feel About It? Informative
Functions of Affective States, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: NEW
EVIDENCE AND INTEGRATIVE ATTEMPTS 44 (Klaus Fiedler & Joseph Forgas eds., 1988)
(describing the role of affect as information). For a recent example see Dan M. Kahan et
al., Affect, Values, & Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions: An Experimental Investigation
(Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 155, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-968652.
137 Slovic et al., supra note 136, at 400.
138 RASHOMON (Daiei Motion Picture Co. Ltd. 1950). Directed by Akira Kurosawa,
the film describes a rape and murder. But, the various eyewitness accounts of the crime,
including by the perpetrator and the victim (speaking through a medium) are inconsistent,
and viewers never learn a "truth" of what actually transpired. See Wikipedia, Rashomon,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rashomon_(film) (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). See also Atul
Gawande, Investigations Under Suspicion: The Fugitive Science of Criminal Justice, THE
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same event often vary significantly. It is not merely that people misremember
whether someone was wearing a red or green shirt. We also do a poor job of
remembering very significant events, their timing, the order in which events
took place, or who was present:
Our minds are not capable of making complete records of events; rather we
encode features selectively. Even when we do remember events reasonably
well, we do not come close to remembering all the fine details that are part
of the event. We are not like video recorders, faithfully taking in and storing
all the details in a scene. 139
Interviewers should be concerned with clients' ability to remember
relevant information (i.e., quantity), with the degree to which the information
reported by clients is accurate (i.e., quality), and with the interviewer's own
ability to recall the content of the interview itself.140 However, both clients
and attorneys may be unable to provide relevant and accurate details because
they did not attend to or encode such details accurately at the time the event
occurred, 141 because they have forgotten, or because their memories have
become distorted since the event occurred.
1. How Memory Works
We have seen that not all details of an event attract our attention and that
significant interpretation takes place as events occur.1 42 But even details that
were noticed and could have been accurately reported immediately after the
event may be forgotten. Working memory "holds on to small amounts of
information for short periods of time-usually a few seconds-while people
engage in such ongoing cognitive activities as reading, listening, problem
solving, reasoning, or thinking." However, to be retained, this information
must be transferred from short-term working memory to long-term memory:
NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2001, at 50.
139 Henry L. Roediger HI & David A. Gallo, Processes Affecting Accuracy and
Distortion in Memory: An Overview, in MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENsIC
INTERVIEW 3, 8 (Mitchell L. Eisen et al. eds., 2002).
140 See Asher Koriat & Morris Goldsmith, Memory in Naturalistic and Laboratory
Contexts: Distinguishing the Accuracy-Oriented and Quantity-Oriented Approaches to
Memory Assessment, 123 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 297 (1994)
(distinguishing the storehouse conception of memory which focuses on quantity and the
correspondence metaphor for memory which focuses on accuracy).
141 See supra Part III.A. 1.
142 See supra Part II.A.
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"the system must constantly discard what is no longer needed at the moment,
and devote its resources to the temporary storage of incoming information.
Unless special effort is made-such as repeating a sentence over and over
again-information is lost from the system almost immediately after it
enters." 14
3
Moreover, even memories that are stored in long-term memory tend to
deteriorate as time passes:
At relatively early points on the forgetting curve-minutes, hours, and
days, sometimes more-memory preserves a relatively detailed record,
allowing us to reproduce the past with reasonable if not perfect accuracy.
But with the passing of time, the particulars fade and opportunities multiply
for interference ... to blur our recollections.144
Test yourself, and you will likely find that you no longer remember
things that were once deeply embedded in your memory, such as an old
home phone number, how to drive to a particular location, or the name of
grade school teachers or old friends.
In addition, there are a variety of "ways in which what is remembered
can depart from what actually occurred."' 145 For example, people sometimes
remember events in ways that are distorted from what actually happened,
combine aspects of multiple events into a single memory, or remember
events that did not happen.
One factor that leads to many of these errors is that people have
difficulty with what is called "source monitoring."'146 When people try to
remember something they do not call up a perfectly accurate real-time
recording of the event. Instead, they access a range of sources of information
including their own "internal mental representation of the event," other basic
information they have about how the world works, their schemas for how
events such as this one typically happen, what they have been told by others
about what happened, their experiences in other similar situations,
stereotypes, what they imagined doing, and so on. 147 A large body of
143 SCHACTER, supra note 56, at 27-28.
144 Id. at 15-16. See also HERMANN EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (Dover 1964).
145 Asher Koriat et al., Toward a Psychology of Memory Accuracy, 51 ANN. REv.
PSYCHOL. 481, 517 (2000).
146 See Marcia K. Johnson et al., Source Monitoring, 114 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 4
(1993); Marcia K. Johnson, Memory and Reality, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 760, 761
(2006).
147 Ronald P. Fisher, Interviewing Victims and Witnesses of Crime, 1 PSYCHOL.,
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psychological research has demonstrated that people have difficulty
discriminating between these different sources of information. 14 8 Thus, when
someone tries to remember whether he turned off the stove before he left the
house and seems to remember doing it, he may have difficulty determining
whether he actually did it, or just thought about doing it, or remembered
doing it on a different occasion.
One consequence of these difficulties in source monitoring is that people
can be suggestible-exposure to information from sources other than what
was actually observed can influence memories of what happened, altering
details of memory or introducing new elements. 149 For example, in one study
participants viewed a videotape of an automobile accident. Next, they were
asked a series of questions about the accident-including a question that
asked about the speed of the car as it passed a barn. When asked questions
about the accident one week later, 17% of participants reported having seen a
barn, despite the fact that there had not been a barn in the video., 50
Finally, in a phenomenon with particular relevance to legal disputes,
memories can be distorted when people make judgments that attribute blame.
For example, in one study memory of an event-a customer leaving a
PuB. POL'Y, & L. 732, 738 (1995).
148 See generally Johnson et a]., supra note 146; Mara Mather et al., Stereotype
Reliance in Source Monitoring: Age Differences and Neuropsychological Test
Correlates, 16 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 437 (1999). Thus, people tend to identify
things that are familiar or predictable as being remembered. See Bruce W.A. Whittlesea,
Illusions of Familiarity, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, &
COGNITION 1235, 1239 (1993).
149 See SCHACTER, supra note 56, at 113 ("Suggestibility in memory refers to an
individual's tendency to incorporate misleading information from external sources-other
people, written materials or pictures, even the media-into personal recollections.").
There is evidence that longer delays between the event to be remembered and the
interview are associated with greater suggestibility. See, e.g., Jodi A. Quas et al.,
Developmental Differences in the Effects of Repeated Interviews and Interviewer Bias on
Young Children's Event Memory and False Reports, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 823
(2007).
150 Eliabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGNrFIvE
PSYCHOL. 560, 566 (1975). In a similar study, participants were asked about an accident
they had viewed, including either a question about how fast the car was going "when it
ran the stop sign" or "when it turned right." Id. at 563-65. When later asked if they had
seen a stop sign in the video, 53% of those who had been asked the question referencing a
stop sign indicated that they had seen a stop sign compared to only 35% of those who had
been asked the question referencing a right turn. Id. at 564. See also ELIZABETH F.
LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Semantic Integration
of Verbal Information into a Visual Memory, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
LEARNING & MEMORY 19 (1978).
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restaurant without paying-was assessed one week after the event was
described. 151 As compared to participants who had been provided with a
justification for the customer's behavior that tended to attenuate blame,
participants who had been led to accentuate blame (i.e., were provided with
negative information about the customer) remembered the price of the meal
as being higher, were more likely to overestimate the price of the meal, and
were more likely to incorrectly report that the customer had also failed to pay
for a pre-dinner drink.152
2. Eliciting Memories
Given the frailty of human memory, attorneys need to know how to help
clients access their memories successfully. 153 Anyone who has experienced
the "tip of the tongue" phenomenon knows that having information available
in memory is not the same as being able to access it on demand. 154
Psychologists have explored a number of aspects of how people retrieve and
report memories that have implications for interviewing clients. Importantly,
since the interviewee is the one who possesses the information, the
interviewee ought to be the focus of the interview. 155 In particular,
interviewers can help interviewees access their memories successfully by
asking open-ended questions, avoiding leading questions, asking the
151 David A. Pizzaro et al., Ripple Effects in Memory: Judgments of Moral Blame
Can Distort Memory for Events, 34 MEMORY & COGNmON 550, 552 (2006).
152 Id. at 553. See also Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of
Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556 (2000).
153 The ease with which memory can be manipulated may, unfortunately, also tempt
some attorneys to try to help their clients "remember" a version of the facts that is most
helpful to their side of the case. For purposes of this Article we assume and hope that
attorneys are honestly trying to probe their clients' accurate memories, rather than to
reshape or change those memories. For discussions of the tension between adequately
interviewing and preparing witnesses versus improperly coaching those witnesses' trial
testimony see Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional Conduct and the Preparation of
Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching," 1 GEO. J. LEG.
ETHICS 389 (1987) and Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17
CARDOzo L. REV. 1 (1995). A scene from Anatomy of a Murder is often used in
professional responsibility classes to help students see how a client interview can result in
improper coaching of a witness. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 44-49 (1958)
(written under a pseudonym by Judge John D. Voelker).
154 See Endel Tulving & Zena Pearlstone, Availability Versus Accessibility of
Information in Memory for Words, 5 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 381
(1966).
155 See Fisher, supra note 147, at 747.
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interviewee to include details that may not seem important, and adopting
interviewee-centered sequencing of questions. 156
First, psychological research suggests that interviewers ought to use
open-ended questions when possible, following up with focused questions in
areas in which more detail is needed. Asking open-ended questions "allows
the interviewee time to collect his or her thoughts and consequently promotes
more elaborate memory retrieval."'157 Interviewees are able to focus their
attention on remembering the event rather than being distracted from this
task by a series of interviewer questions. 158 Accordingly, open-ended
questions can elicit more accurate information than do more focused
questions. 159
In particular, open-ended questions also allow interviewees to control the
level of detail they report in their initial responses. For example, a witness
could choose to report that a particular event occurred "back in the spring" or
that it happened "in April" or that it occurred "on April 10 during the
morning break." Psychological research has shown that people intuitively
adjust the level of detail that they report so as to choose a level of detail that
favors accuracy (even at the expense of some precision) and that they
therefore provide a higher proportion of accurate information. 160 This finding
156 Id. at 747-48.
157 Martine B. Powell et al., Investigative Interviewing, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:
AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 11, 19 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005).
158 Id. at 19-20 ("Given that witnesses have only limited mental resources with
which to process information, any distraction or deflection of these mental resources may
impair the ability to remember the critical event. Excessive questioning-as opposed to
asking fewer, but open-ended questions-is therefore distracting for witnesses, because
the questions redirect their attention from searching internally through memory to
focusing externally on the interviewer's next question."). See supra Part III.A. 1.
159 See Fisher, supra note 147, at 749-53 (reviewing studies); Jack P. Lipton, On the
Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 90, 94 (1977) (finding that
responses to open-ended questions were more accurate than responses to multiple-choice
questions or leading questions); Koriat et al., supra note 145, at 508 (reviewing studies).
See also Debra L. Roter & Judith A. Hall, Physicians' Interviewing Styles and Medical
Information Obtained From Patients, 2 J. GENERAL INTERNAL MED. 325 (1987) (finding
that open-ended questions were related to more patient disclosure of relevant
information). Responses to open-ended questions may be less detailed and, therefore,
may require follow-up questions. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
160 See Morris Goldsmith et al., Strategic Regulation of Grain Size in Memory
Reporting, 131 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 73, 88 (2002) (finding that people
are "at least moderately successful in choosing a grain size that [will] enhance their
accuracy with minimal loss of informativeness."); Asher Koriat & Morris Goldsmith,
Monitoring and Control Processes in the Strategic Regulation of Memory Accuracy, 103
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is consistent with other research that finds that although people may not be
able to completely recreate an event from memory, the information in
people's unassisted reports does tend to be quite accurate. 161 Thus,
interviewees ought not to be initially forced to give specific answers to
questions and, instead, should be given the opportunity to control the level of
detail in their initial responses, and to indicate that they do not know the
answer, are not sure, or cannot remember. A greater degree of confidence can
be placed in the accuracy of such unaided, unpressed reports.
It may be inevitable, however, that a lawyer will ultimately have to press
the client for further and more precise responses. Clients will likely be able
to comply with such requests-people are able to adopt different accuracy
and precision thresholds for their reports-although increasing the precision
of the information provided can come at a cost to accuracy. 162 One recent
study found that when witnesses were forced to guess, more information was
provided, but this information included both more correct information and
more incorrect information. 163 In addition, there is evidence that "guessing"
can result in the same types of source misattribution errors described above,
with the witness' conjectures later being remembered as having actually
happened. 164 The client, therefore, should be allowed to indicate where she is
less sure of such details and both lawyer and client should keep in mind the
PSYCHOL. REV. 490, 498-503 (1996) (finding that free report resulted in an increase in
accuracy but a decrease in the quantity of information provided); Ulrich Neisser, Time
Present and Time Past, in PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF MEMORY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND
IssuEs 553 (Michael M. Gruneberg et al. eds., 1988) (finding that in answering open-
ended questions, people responded at "a level of generality at which they were not
mistaken"). See also Ilan Yaniv & Dean P. Foster, Precision and Accuracy of Judgmental
Estimation, 10 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 21 (1997).
161 See Fisher, supra note 147, at 741 (reviewing studies).
162 Asher Koriat & Morris Goldsmith, Memory in Naturalistic and Laboratory
Contexts: Distinguishing the Accuracy-Oriented and Quantity-Oriented Approaches to
Memory Assessment, 123 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 297, 307 (1994)
(finding that incentivising accuracy resulted in a greater proportion of accurate answers,
but a decrease in the quantity of answers provided). See also Koriat & Goldsmith, supra
note 160, at 499; Goldsmith et al., supra note 160, at 82-86.
163 Kathy Pezdek et al., Interviewing Witnesses: The Effect of Forced Confabulation
on Event Memory, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 463 (2007).
164 Id. See also Jennifer K. Ackil & Maria S. Zaragoza, Memorial Consequences of
Forced Confabulation: Age Differences in Susceptibility to False Memories, 34
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1358 (1998); Reid Hastie et al., Eyewitness Testimony: The
Dangers of Guessing, 19 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1978); Maria S. Zaragota et al., Interviewing
Witnesses: Forced Confabulation and Confirmatory Feedback Increase False Memories,
12 PSYCHOL. SCL 473 (2001).
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potential for decreased accuracy.
By using open-ended questions and encouraging the interviewee to relay
even unrequested information, the interviewer may also be able to minimize
retrieval-induced forgetting. Retrieval induced forgetting occurs when
"memory quantity for the reviewed items is enhanced, [but] memory quantity
for related, non-reviewed items is reduced."' 165 For example, in one study,
participants were asked to view pictures of two categories of items that had
been stolen from two houses. Participants then answered questions about
some of the items from one of the categories. Subsequently, participants were
better able to recall the items about which they had been questioned than the
other items. 166 Thus, to the extent that focused, detailed questions are limited
to specific aspects of the event or situation, they may inhibit memory for
other related aspects of the dispute.
In contrast to open-ended questions, asking specific questions early in
the interview-such as multiple choice questions or questions asking the
interviewee to confirm or disconfirm a statement--can limit the range of
information obtained, decrease accuracy, and increase the possibility that
information contained in the question will be subsequently "remembered." 167
Leading questions--questions that suggest or presuppose their answers-
pose particular problems for memory. In one study, participants were shown
a videotape of a car accident and asked to describe what they had seen. 168
When asked about the speed of one of the cars, one group of participants was
asked, "About how fast were the cars going when they hit each other?" Other
groups of participants were asked the same question, but the word "hit" was
165 Ainat Pansky et al., Eyewitness Recall and Testimony, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 93, 108 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds.,
2005). See also SCHACTER, supra note 56, at 81-82; Elizabeth W. Dunn & Barbara A.
Spellman, Forgetting by Remembering: Stereotype Inhibition Through Rehearsal of
Alternative Aspects of Identity, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 420 (2003); Fisher,
supra note 147, at 748.
166 Malcolm MacLeod, Retrieval-Induced Forgetting in Eyewitness Memory:
Forgetting as a Consequence of Remembering, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 135,
139-41 (2002). The items that were in the same category as the items they were
questioned about were the least well-remembered. Id. See also John S. Shaw II et al.,
Retrieval-Induced Forgetting in an Eyewitness-Memory Paradigm, 2 PSYCHONOMIC
BULL. & REV. 249 (1995) (finding similar effects of questioning on memory of photos of
the scene where a wallet was lost); MacLeod, supra, at 142-45 (finding similar effects
for memories for people).
167 Fisher, supra note 147, at 743.
168 Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile
Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J.
VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 585 (1974).
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replaced by one of the following: smashed, collided, bumped, or
contacted. 16 9 Estimates of speed varied depending on the descriptor used. 170
In a follow-up experiment, participants who were asked about the speed of
the cars when they "smashed into" each other were more likely to incorrectly
remember that they saw broken glass than were participants who were asked
about the speed of the cars when they "hit" each other. 17 1 Thus, Jack's use of
a cross examination-style in initial interviews seems unlikely to yield the
disclosure of full memories and may create mistaken memories, and Jack
should certainly avoid asking questions based on faulty or unknown
premises.
It is also important for Jack to consider the relationships among and the
ordering of the questions he asks. Interviewers often ask questions according
to a standard interview protocol or in the order that the questions occur to the
interviewer. 172 Instead, the ordering of questions ought to be tied to the
interviewee's conception of events. That is, Jack should let Edna and his
other clients tell their stories in the way that makes sense to them. Thus, if it
makes sense to Edna to tell her story in a non-linear or non-chronological
fashion, Jack may have to defer some questions that occur to him until an
appropriate point in her narrative. While this approach may result in
interviews that last longer than Jack's standard half-hour, the reward will be
that Edna and his other clients will be able to provide more detail and
potential evidence than Jack otherwise would have obtained. For example, in
recounting her history at the company over a number of years, Edna may
provide facts that could help Jack prove that her termination was part of a
larger discriminatory scheme affecting both Edna and other employees. Or,
Edna may reveal ethical improprieties that could lead to a successful separate
whistle-blower action against the employer.
169 Id. at 585-86.
170 Id. at 586 (smashed (40.8 mph), collided (39.3 mph), bumped (38.1 mph), hit
(34.0 mph), or contacted (31.8 mph)).
171 Id. at 587. In another study, participants who viewed a video of a car accident
were more likely to report seeing a broken headlight when they were asked whether they
saw "the" broken headlight (i.e., implying that there was one) than when they were asked
whether they saw "a" broken headlight. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Guido Zanni, Eyewitness
Testimony: The Influence of the Wording of a Question, 5 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 86,
87-88 (1975). Importantly, it is not simply reference to a potential detail that results in
these effects. While observers who are asked leading questions about an incorrect detail
(e.g., Did you see the children getting on the school bus?) are more likely than others to
remember the detail (i.e., the school bus), observers who are asked direct questions about
the same detail (e.g., Did you see a school bus?) are not. Loftus, supra note 150, at 569.
172 Fisher, supra note 147, at 734.
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What else should Jack do to help his clients remember all that they can?
As a general matter, simple encouragement to the interviewee to provide
more information does not tend to be helpful and can even impede
accuracy. 173 Thus, rather than just asking Carl towards the end of the
interview, "Is there anything else you can recall about your conversations
with Henrietta?," there are a number of other useful strategies that Jack might
employ to help Carl access his memories. First, the interviewee can be
encouraged to focus on the facts. There is evidence that a factual focus
results in fewer memory errors and less frequent personal commentary. 174
That is, Jack could move Carl away from his potential emotions such as
anger, guilt, or embarrassment, and ask him to recall all that he can of the
details of the contract, the job, and any subsequent discussions. Second,
interviewees can be encouraged to base their memory decisions on specific
recollections, rather than relying on overall familiarity.175 That is, if Carl
simply says, "Henrietta never said anything to me about water problems,"
Jack could ask Carl to try to remember how many times he spoke with
Henrietta, when and where each conversation took place, and what
specifically was discussed.
Third, "countless studies have.., shown that seemingly lost information
can be recovered by cues or hints that remind us of how we initially encoded
an experience."1 76 Thus, attorneys might suggest that the interviewee attempt
to "recreate the environmental, cognitive, physiological, and affective states
that existed at the time of the original event."177 Specifically, Jack could ask
Carl to think about the time of year and the weather when he did the work for
Henrietta Homeowner, where he physically negotiated the contract with
Henrietta, and how his business was doing otherwise at the time he
negotiated with Henrietta Homeowner. Although these facts would not seem
173 Id. at 742.
174 Elizabeth J. Marsh et al., How Eyewitnesses Talk about Events: Implications for
Memory, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 531, 541 (2005) (comparing a factual focus to
an emotional focus). Though this does not mean that Jack should ignore his clients'
emotions.
175 SCHACTER, supra note 56, at 102.
176 Id. at 33. Roediger III & Gallo, supra note 139, at 20 ("[T]he encoding
specificity principle states that the more a retrieval cue matches... the way an
experience was initially encoded, the more effective it is in provoking a memory for the
experience.").
177 Fisher, supra note 147, at 745-46 (reporting study of scuba divers who learned
word lists under water or on land; participants performed better when tested in the same
environment). When the experience was traumatic, however, one danger of invoking the
original condition is too much heightened arousal. Id. at 746.
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to be directly relevant to the situation with Henrietta, they may help trigger
relevant memories. Finally, the interviewer can ask the interviewee to
approach the memory search in different ways-for example, chronological
order and reverse chronological order.178
Jack should be careful regarding the extent to which he uses documents
to potentially aid clients' memories. Certainly documents can be helpful in
refreshing memory, but documents can also be incomplete or erroneous. If
documents are used too early in the interview, they may actually cause
clients to forget or neglect matters they otherwise would have reported. Thus,
we suggest that attorneys first question clients without documents, and then
go back and question them again using seemingly relevant documents. While
this approach may be more time-consuming, it is more likely to produce a
more complete set of memories.
Finally, clients can and often should be interviewed on multiple
occasions. 179 There are several reasons why multiple interviews might be
helpful. First, people sometimes experience "reminiscence"-the ability to
remember information in later interviews that they were unable to recall
initially. 180 Second, there is evidence that retrieval-induced forgetting' 8 ' is
transient. 182 Thus, temporarily forgotten information might be recalled in a
subsequent interview. 183 On the other hand, repeating errors (just like
rehearsing any information) tends to reinforce them.1 84 Thus, because
178 Id. The Cognitive Interview also recommends asking the interviewee to imagine
different perspectives on the incident. However, while this approach may result in greater
recall, it may also increase inaccuracy and suggestibility. See, e.g., Ayanna K. Thomas &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Creating Bizarre False Memories Through Imagination, 30
MEMORY & COGNITION 423, 429 (2002).
179 Repeated interviews may also be useful because clients may change their minds
or have new information.
180 See David G. Payne, Hyperamnesia and Reminiscence in Recall: A Historical
and Empirical Review, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 5, 5 (1987). See also Brian H. Bomstein et
al., Repeated Testing in Eyewitness Memory: A Means to Improve Recall of a Negative
Emotional Event, 12 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 119, 128 (1998).
181 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
182 Malcolm D. MacLeod & C. Neil Macrae, Gone But Not Forgotten: The
Transient Nature of Retrieval-Induced Forgetting, 12 PSYCHOL. SC. 148, 149 (2001).
183 In addition, witnesses who have been pushed to guess in previous interviews will
sometimes re-indicate that they do not know a particular detail. See Pezdek et al., supra
note 163.
184 Karen J. Mitchell & Maria S. Zaragoza, Repeated Exposure to Suggestion and
False Memory: The Role of Contextual Variability, 35 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 246, 253
(1996); Henry L. Roediger III et al., Misinformation Effects in Recall: Creating False
Memories Through Repeated Retrieval, 35 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 300, 301 (1996).
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repeated interviewing increases the opportunities for suggestion, using high
quality interview techniques is paramount.185
To sum up, if Jack were to apply these insights to his interview with
Edna Employee, he might start the interview by asking Edna to discuss the
nature of her former job from the time when she first started working for the
company, to describe her job responsibilities and how they changed over
time, and to describe her supervisors and co-workers and the nature of her
relationship with each. While Jack would eventually get to the layoff-and
would likely at some point need to ask some pointed questions regarding
why Edna felt her selection for the layoff was inappropriate-he would have
first allowed Edna to give substantial open-ended detail regarding her
perspective on her former position. If Edna prefers to tell her story in a non-
linear fashion, Jack should let her take that approach. When asking Edna
about the layoff itself, Jack might ask Edna to describe her experience of the
layoff, eventually asking for detailed descriptions of any meetings she had
regarding the layoff. He can prompt her memories using questions regarding
who was present at the meetings and where they took place. After soliciting
these memories, Jack might move to more specific questions, minimizing the
risk that important details will be neglected and then forgotten. Jack should
use documents, such as performance reviews or personnel files, to question
Edna only after having permitted her to tell her story.
3. Distinguishing Accurate and Inaccurate Memories
As described above, some of our memories are erroneous. It turns out
that people have an impressive ability to remember things incorrectly, and
then to be certain that the incorrect memory is accurate. They are not lying,
but rather just misremembering. What can attorneys do to distinguish
accurate and inaccurate memories? Probably the best solution is to look for
confirmation, particularly in contemporaneously prepared written materials
or photos. While documents sometimes contain inaccuracies too, 186
confirmation of human recollection by a document may at least decrease the
185 These suggestions apply to interviews of non-client witnesses as well, though of
course the attorney must balance the time that would be needed to conduct multiple
interviews versus the likely payoff of an additional interview. While it will virtually
always be worthwhile to conduct multiple interviews of a critical potential witness like
one's own client, it may not always be necessary to conduct multiple interviews of less
critical potential witnesses.
186 See Malcolm Gladwell, The Picture Problem: Mammography, Air Power, and
the Limits of Looking, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 13, 2004, at 74 (considering whether we
"place too much faith in pictures").
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likelihood of error. Thus, rather than to depend on Edna to provide the date
on which she was hired or fired, it is better to look also at the documents
which should have been prepared in connection with those events. Similarly,
Jack should try to procure plans or photos pertinent to Carl's patio project.
It is tempting and likely common to use a client's degree of confidence in
his or her own memories as a guide to whether such memories should be
trusted. However, attorneys ought to be cautious about assuming that the
confident witness is more reliable than the less-confident witness. 87
Psychological research has demonstrated that confident witnesses are not
necessarily more accurate than non-confident witnesses.1 88 On the other
hand, the relative confidence of a particular interviewee for different pieces
of information can be a useful guide. As noted earlier, interviewees are
reasonably good judges of the level of detail which they can accurately
report.189 Accordingly, details for which the interviewee is confident do tend
to be more accurate than details for which the same interviewee is less
confident.190
187 Studies show people are inclined to think that confident witnesses are more
accurate. See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy:
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 817 (1995) (reviewing
studies).
188 Research has demonstrated a generally weak correlation between confidence and
accuracy, although the relationship can be stronger under some circumstances. See
Penrod & Cutler, supra note 187; Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence,
and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness
Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315 (1995); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness
Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SC. PUB. INT. 45 (2006).
189 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
190 Fisher, supra note 147, at 744 (reviewing studies). Brian H. Bornstein &
Douglas J. Zickafoose, 'I Know I Know It, I Know I Saw It": The Stability of the
Confidence-Accuracy Relationship Across Domains, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
APPLIED 76, 181 (1999); Colleen M. Kelley & Lili Sahakyan, Memory, Monitoring, and
Control in the Attainment of Memory Accuracy, 48 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 704 (2003);
Koriat & Goldsmith, supra note 160; Wayne T. Roberts & Philip A. Higham, Selecting
Accurate Statements from the Cognitive Interview Using Confidence Ratings, 8 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 33 (2002). Similar results have been found for
witness consistency. That is, across witnesses, witness consistency may be only weakly
related to witness accuracy. See Neil Brewer et al., Beliefs and Data on the Relationship
Between Consistency and Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 13 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 297 (1999); Ronald P. Fisher & Brian L. Cutler, The Relation Between
Consistency and Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, in PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 21
(Graham Davies et al. eds., 1995). However, for a particular witness, information that is
provided consistently may be more accurate than information for which that witness is
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4. Jack's Own Memory
Finally, attorneys themselves are not immune from memory lapses.
While some of us have better memories than others, none of us should feel
comfortable relying entirely on memory. Thus, we need to be careful in the
way we record information obtained from clients, and we also need to make
good records of "to do" lists that arise out of client interviews. Jack may tend
to rely too heavily on his own memory for client information. Yet, like the
rest of us, Jack needs to devise a good system for remembering important
things in his work, including in his client interviews. Some attorneys choose
to make video or audio tapes of interviews. Such recordings can be quite
helpful, but could be undesirable if they diminish client rapport. 191 Similarly,
careful notetaking can also interrupt the flow of a conversation and make it
harder to build rapport. Perhaps Jack will want to ask a paralegal to take
notes on his interviews. Or, Jack may want to take some notes and then
dictate a detailed file memo right after the interview ends. Jack will need to
explore which of these or other options works best.
D. Identifying Liars and Truth Tellers
While there is a lot of folklore regarding how to distinguish liars from
truth tellers, 9 2 it turns out that identifying liars is extremely difficult, even
for experts. Although Jack feels comfortable in his own lie-detection
abilities, there is no particular cue or set of cues that can reliably be used to
identify a lie.193 Many of the cues that could be associated with deception
can also be associated with other states likely common to legal clients, such
as stress. Indeed, across a variety of studies, psychological research has
found that people are not adept at distinguishing those who are lying from
those who are telling the truth-performing at levels that are little or no
inconsistent. Fisher, supra note 147, at 744 (citing Amina Memon & Ray Bull, Children's
Event Memory: The Effects of Interview Technique and Repeated Testing, paper
presented at the meeting of the 23rd International Congress of Applied Psychology
(1994)).
191 See infra Part III.E.4.
192 See generally Craig C. Reilly, The Truth About Lying, 29 (#4) LrrIG. 40 (2003).
193 See PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES To DECEIT IN THE MARKET PLACE 80
(2001).
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better than chance. 194 Moreover, there is little correlation between our degree
of certainty that we have identified a liar and our accuracy. 195 Apparent
experts do not tend to perform any better than lay people, though they do
tend to be more confident in their determinations. 196 Thus, whereas Jack may
believe that he is quite good at figuring out whether clients are lying based
on whether they blink, look away, or tap their fingers, he is probably wrong
as often as he is right.
A primary reason why people are unable to reliably distinguish lies and
truths is that we pay attention to the wrong things. Psychological research has
identified a number of cues that people believe are related to deception. 197 In
particular, people strongly believe that liars avert their gaze, engage in lots of
movement (e.g., shifting position, hand movements, foot movements,
gestures of illustration), smile, and have more disturbed speech (e.g.,
hesitation, pauses, slower speech). 198 Many of these anticipated cues are
194 See generally Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception
Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214 (2006) (reporting a meta-
analysis of such studies); Bella M. DePaulo et al., Attentional Determinants of Success at
Detecting Deception and Truth, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 273 (1982);
Robin S. Edelstein et al., Detecting Lies in Children and Adults, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
1 (2006); Saul M. Kassin et al., "I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One": A
Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators, 29 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 211 (2005); Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, "I'm Innocent!": Effects of
Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 23 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 499 (1999); ALDERT VRu, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF LYING AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (2000).
195 Bella M. DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection
of Deception, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 346 (1997); Aldert Vrij, The
Impact of Information and Setting on Detection of Deception by Police Detectives, 18 J.
NONVERBAL BEHAV. 117, 130 (1994).
196 Bella M. DePaulo & Roger L. Pfeifer, On-the-Job Experience and Skill at
Detecting Deception, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 249, 249 (1986); Kassin et al., supra
note 194, at 213.
197 Lay people and practitioners (e.g., police officers, customs officers) have similar
beliefs. See Leif A. Str6mwall et al., Practitioners' Beliefs about Deception, in THE
DETECTION OF DECEPTION IN FORENSIC CONTEXTS 229, 233-35 (Par Anders Granhag &
Leif A. Str6mwall eds., 2004) (reviewing studies examining beliefs about deception).
Criminals actually have less stereotypical beliefs about cues to deception-and are better
at detecting lies. Id. at 243 (same).
198 Id. at 230-31 (reviewing studies). See also Lucy Akehurst et al., Lay Persons'
and Police Officers' Beliefs Regarding Deceptive Behaviour, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 461, 462 (1996); D. Eric Anderson et al., Beliefs About Cues to Deception:
Mindless Stereotypes or Untapped Wisdom?, 23 J. NONVERBAL BEHAv. 67, 80 (1999);
Aldert Vrij & Gun R. Semin, Lie Experts' Beliefs About Nonverbal Indicators of
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thought to be associated with nervousness. However, many of these believed
indicators do not in fact prove reliable in distinguishing liars and truth
tellers. 199 Accordingly, it is important that Jack not rely on stereotypes about
lying that do not discriminate between liars and truth tellers.
On the other hand, Jack can learn even more from psychology regarding
the detection of liars than simply to be careful about his intuitions. There are
some dimensions on which liars do tend to differ from those who are telling
the truth. Liars tend to offer fewer details,200 give accounts that are less
plausible and coherent,20 and speak with more vocal tension and higher
pitch20Z-though the size of these effects can be quite small.20 3
Unfortunately, these cues, too, can also be present for other reasons-for
example, a high pitch could be a sign of lying or a sign that the person is
upset or nervous for some other reason (such as the stress of being
questioned or talking about personal information). 204 Similarly, lack of detail
or coherency can reflect poor memory rather than lying. 20 5 Thus, cues such
as these ought to be seen as signals that are worth pursuing further in order to
get more information.
In addition, particular attention can be paid to changes in the behavior of
the particular speaker. 20 6 While one individual's speech and behavior may
simply differ from another person's even when they are telling the truth,
Deception, 20 J. NONVERBAL BEHAv. 65, 67 (1996).
199 For instance, the cue more commonly believed to indicate deception-averted
gaze-has not been shown to distinguish liars and truth-tellers. Bella M. DePaulo et al.,
Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 92 (2003) (reporting a meta-analysis of such
studies); Str6mwall et al., supra note 197, at 232 (reviewing studies). Similarly, while
people anticipate that liars will display more movement, studies have shown either no
differences or that liars made fewer movements. DePaulo et al., supra, at 92 (discussing
meta-analysis). A decrease in movement may result from attempts to compensate for the
expectation that they will show an increase in motion or from cognitive effort to carry out
the lie. Str6mwall et al., supra note 197, at 232. In the same way, higher rates of blinking
and speech disturbances do not appear to distinguish liars and truth-tellers. DePaulo et al.,
supra, at 93-94 (describing meta-analysis). People also tend to incorrectly associate
trustworthiness with attractiveness. See Leslie A. Zebrowitz et al., "Wide-Eyed" and
"Crooked-Faced": Determinants of Perceived and Real Honesty Across the Life Span, 22
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1258 (1996).
200 DePaulo et al., supra note 199, at 91.
20 1 Id. at 92.
202 Id at 93-94.
203 Id. at 104.
204 EKMAN, supra note 193, at 51, 94, 113.
205 See supra Part III.C.
206 EKMAN, supra note 193, at 96, 109, 167.
[Vol. 23:3 20081
INSIGHTS FOR INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING CLIENTS
making distinctions difficult to draw, changes in an individual's behavior
may be more predictive and worth following up.207 Thus, just as within-
person confidence is more useful in assessing memory than are cross-person
comparisons, 20 8 within-person behavior is more useful in identifying lying.
Additional guidance can be provided by examining the handful of people
who tend to be better than most at distinguishing liars and truth tellers.209
These lie detection "wizards" have been shown to perform better than others
at identifying liars, although they do not perform better than others at
identifying truthfulness. 210 Such wizards' success may be attributable in part
to the fact that they are more likely than others to keep an open mind as to
whether someone is lying, and avoid committing to a conclusion until they
have processed all the information.2 11 In considering all the available
information, the wizards have been found to pay closer and more
sophisticated attention to nonverbal cues and to focus closely on nuances of
language. 212 Relatedly, good lie-detection has been shown to be related to the
ability to identify brief expressions of emotion on people's faces.213
All of this is complicated by the fact that much of the time people are not
dealing with others who are blatantly lying but instead who hold varying
207 Id.
208 See supra Part III.C.3.
209 Paul Ekman et al., A Few Can Catch a Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. Sc. 263, 265 (1999);
Maureen O'Sullivan, Emotional Intelligence and Deception Detection: Why Most People
Can't "Read" Others, But a Few Can, in APPLICATIONS OF NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION
215 (Ronald E. Riggio & Robert S. Feldman eds., 2005). The effects of training on lie
detection ability have been inconsistent. See Ray Bull, Training to Detect Deception from
Behavioural Cues: Attempts and Problems, in THE DETECTION OF DECEPTION IN
FORENSIC CONTEXTS 251 (Par Anders Granhag & Leif A. Str6mwall eds., 2004); Kassin
& Fong, supra note 194.
210 EKMAN, supra note 193, at 333.
211 Id. at 245. In contrast, many people begin the analysis with a predisposition that
influences judgment-either a truthfulness bias (lay people) or a deception bias (law
enforcement officers). See generally Kassin et al., supra note 194; Miron Zuckerman et
al., Facial and Vocal Cues of Deception and Honesty, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 378 (1979). This is a form of confirmatory bias. See supra notes Part III.A.I.
See also Maureen O'Sullivan, The Fundamental Attribution Error in Detecting
Deception: The Boy-Who-Cried-Wolf Effect, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1316, 1317 (2003); Miron Zuckerman et al., Anchoring in the Detection of Deception and
Leakage, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 302 (1984).
212 O'Sullivan, supra note 209, at 244.
213 Mark G. Frank & Paul Ekman, The Ability to Detect Deceit Generalizes Across
Different Types of High-Stake Lies, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1429, 1430
(1997).
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versions of reality.
Telling the whole truth and nothing but the truth is rarely possible or
desirable. All self-presentations are edited. The question is one of whether
the editing crosses the line from the honest highlighting of aspects of
identity that are most relevant in the ongoing situation to a dishonest
attempt to mislead.
2 14
Probably the most common way in which clients lie to their attorneys is
that they fail to inform the attorney of particular details.215 Such omissions
may be deliberate. Notwithstanding attorneys' incantation of the attorney-
client privilege and urging their clients to be forthright, some clients may
believe that their attorneys will represent them more effectively if they are
not aware of certain skeletons in the clients' closets.216 Clients may also fear
that if they disclose damaging information to the attorney, the attorney will
feel compelled to disclose it to the opposing side or to a finder of fact.217 In
other instances, such omissions may simply be a function of misconstrual or
a need to be viewed positively.218 If outright lies are difficult to discern,
surely it is even more difficult to discern nuances of shading, positive spin, or
editing.
Thus, Jack should be aware that clients may lie, recognize his own
limitations in detecting lies, keep an open mind, and be prepared to try to
check clients' veracity. A few helpful measures can include using documents
to confirm or contradict clients' accounts, interviewing multiple or married
214 DePaulo et al., supra note 199, at 105.
215 KRIEGER & NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 102-04 (discussing semiconscious fudging
and conscious lying).
216 See generally BINDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 19-21 (noting that clients tend to
withhold information they deem threatening either to their self-esteem or to their
likelihood of success in the case).
217 This fear is not irrational. Despite the protections of the attorney-client privilege,
attorneys may often be compelled by rules of procedure and professional responsibility to
provide damaging information to opposing counsel. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (2002) (providing, in text and comments that the lawyer may disclose information
relating to the representation of client where the disclosure "is impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation" or for other reasons such as "to prevent reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm," or "to comply with other law or a court order").
218 See supra Part III.C. 1. See also Douglas P. Crowne & David Marlowe, A New
Scale of Social Desirability Independent of Psychopathology, 24 J. CONSULTING
PSYCHOL. 349 (1960); Theresa J. DeMaio, Social Desirability and Survey Measurement:
A Review, in SURVEYING SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA 257, 276 (Charles F. Turner &
Elizabeth Martin eds., 1984).
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clients-such as the Kiddos-separately, and interviewing other witnesses
who might be in a position to serve as a check on the clients' stories.
E. Communication2 19
If Jack can communicate well with his clients, he will build better
rapport with those clients and will be better able to both obtain information
from and provide information and advice to those clients. When we first met
Jack, we learned that he wished he could communicate with his clients
directly, as if he and they were both computers that could be networked.
Given that Jack's wish for networking is not going to be granted in the
foreseeable future, Jack will need to think beyond verbal exchanges.
Whereas computers communicate exclusively using strings of numbers,
humans rely on body language and environmental settings to assist their
verbal expressions. Jack will need to understand that both good
communication and the perception of good communication are critically
important to being an effective interviewer and counselor.
Ideally, Jack should master quite a few aspects of communication. To
obtain good information from his clients, Jack will need to be a good listener
and to understand conversational norms. Jack will also need to understand
the role that perspective taking and the development of empathy can play in
facilitating communication. Whereas Jack has never seen a need to be
particularly empathetic, the relevant psychology suggests that the empathetic
lawyer can both learn more from and provide more information to his client,
as well as build better rapport and trust. Improved rapport, in turn, is
beneficial not only for retaining client relationships and bringing in more
business, but also because it will aid Jack in obtaining information from and
providing information to his clients. In communicating with his clients, Jack
should also pay attention to what psychologists know about how people
learn. Providing clients information in ways that are consistent with the ways
in which they learn can improve Jack's ability to counsel. Finally, Jack ought
to pay attention to the physical setting in which client communication occurs,
using the environment to promote communication.
219 See generally Robert M. Krauss & Ezequiel Morsella, Communication and
Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 131
(Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) (discussing the relationship between
communication and conflict).
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1. Listening
It is important, psychologically, for attorneys to listen carefully and also
to demonstrate to their clients that they are listening carefully.220 At a basic
level, if the attorney does not pay attention to the information that the client
is providing, she is likely to miss important data.22' Moreover, clients, like
all other people, like to feel that someone is listening when they speak.222
In order to both listen effectively and appear to clients to be listening
effectively, lawyers should typically let their clients tell their initial stories
without interruptions, 223  follow up their accounts with clarifying
questions,224 and then provide feedback and legal information that reflects
that the attorney was listening carefully. 22 5 Studies of interviewers, including
lawyers,226 police interviewers, and physicians, have found that interviewers
are prone to interrupt early and often.227 Research shows that interjecting a
220 An attorney who listens well but appears not to be listening will not be as
effective as the attorney who is, more obviously, paying close attention to her client. The
appearance of good listening is also important to the building of rapport and trust with the
client. See infra notes 263-80 and accompanying text.
221 See supra Part III.A. 1.
222 Lawrence J. Vilardo, Communicating with Clients, 27 (#3) LITIGATION 45, 45
(2001) ("Clients come to lawyers to be heard. In fact, when you deal with your clients,
listening is the more important half of the communication equation."); Jenny B. Davis,
What I Like About my Lawyer, 89 A.B.A. J. 33, 36 (2003) (noting that being an excellent
listener is one of various qualities clients appreciate in their lawyers).
223 Of course, some clients may ramble so extensively that there is no choice but to
interrupt.
224 See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 91-93 (noting that the initial stage of
the interview, designated by the authors as "preliminary problem identification," should
typically begin with open-end questions); KRIEGER & NEUMANN, JR., supra note 8, at 87
(explaining that clients should be given chance to provide their initial story before
attorney jumps in with numerous questions).
225 Vilardo, supra note 222, at 46.
226 One study showed that lawyers interrupt their clients more often than people
interrupt one another in the course of normal conversation. Bryna Bogoch & Brenda
Danet, Challenge and Control in Lawyer-Client Interaction: A Case Study in an Israeli
Legal Aid Office, 4 TEXT 249, 254 (1984). Another study, of legal services lawyers,
showed they interrupted clients ten times during the course of the interview, on average
once every three minutes. Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We
Only Care About What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26
SOC. PROBS. 599, 605 (1979).
227 See Fisher, supra note 147, at 734-36 (describing research on police interviews);
Howard B. Beckman & Richard M. Frankel, The Effect of Physician Behavior on the
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large number of specific questions can make it difficult for the interviewer to
listen to the answers provided by the interviewee. "Directing those limited
mental resources to formulating many questions-rather than listening
intently to the witness's narrative response to open-ended questions-ought
to increase the difficulty of understanding or notating the witness's
responses." 228 In addition, as we have already discussed, psychological
research has documented the benefits to memory that come from listening to
interviewees and not interrupting their answers to questions.229
In addition, attorneys need to be conscious of messages they may
inadvertently convey to their clients that signal a lack of attention to clients'
answers. Studies have shown that people have a tendency to convey more
detail in their answers when the listener is attentive and not distracted.
230
Thus, if Jack allows himself to tap his pen or feet nervously, frustrated that
his client seems to be rambling, the client may well pick up on a sense of
boredom or frustration and this may cause the client to stop communicating
thoroughly. Instead, Jack should use his face, words, and body to show that
he is listening carefully, for example by leaning forward and using
supporting phrases (e.g., "uh huh").231
Thus, when Jack begins to interview Agnes Ageout about her estate
planning, he needs to be cognizant that Agnes may well not be comfortable
speaking directly about her needs and wishes. Agnes may, for example, be
embarrassed by the fact that she wants to leave all her assets to Lenny, rather
than to her children and grandchildren. Agnes may want to speak explicitly
Collection of Data, 101 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 692, 694 (1984) (describing research on
physicians); M. Kim Marvel et al., Soliciting the Patient's Agenda: Have We Improved?,
281 JAMA 283, 285 (1999) (describing research on physicians). See generally DEBRA L.
ROTER & JUDITH A. HALL, DOCTORS TALKING WITH PATIENTS/PATIENTS TALKING WITH
DOCTORS: IMPROVING COMMUNICATION IN MEDICAL VISITS (2d ed. 2006). One study
found that physicians interrupted patients, on average, only 18 seconds after they began
their answer. Beckman & Frankel, supra, at 693-94 (also finding that in only 23% of
visits did patients complete their statement of complaint and that only 1 out of 52
interrupted statements was subsequently completed by the patient).
228 Powell et al., supra note 157, at 20. See supra Part III.A.1.
229 See supra Part III.C.2. See also Monisha Pasupathi et al., How What We Tell
Becomes What We Know: Listener Effects on Speakers' Long-Term Memory for Events,
26 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 1, 10-13 (1998).
2 3 0 Id.
231 We recognize that good listening is not many attorneys' forte. One old saw
states: "You can always tell a barber by the way he parts his hair; You can always tell a
dentist when you're in the dentists' chair; And even a musician-you can tell him by his
touch; You can always tell a lawyer, but you cannot tell him much." Anonymous,
LIFETIME SPEAKER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jacob M. Braude ed., 1962).
493
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
about some of her fears, such as that Lenny might decide to break up with
her, that her health might decline in unpleasant ways, or that her children or
grandchildren might try to challenge her will. To listen well in such a
context, Jack will need to focus all his attention on Agnes. He will certainly
not want to be multitasking or permitting unnecessary interruptions relating
to other cases. In addition, Jack will need to focus on all the verbal and visual
cues that Agnes may provide. Jack needs to hear changes or hesitations in
Agnes's voice so that he can follow up with additional questions or raise
additional issues. If Agnes's facial expression or posture reveals that she is
distressed or concerned about a particular subject, Jack needs to be able to
perceive and understand those forms of communication so that he can
respond appropriately. If Jack senses that Agnes is hesitant, confused, or
embarrassed, he needs to try to address her concerns. Rather than leave
important issues unaddressed, Jack ought to raise them, at least to ask Agnes
whether she wishes to discuss them further.
2. Conversational Norms
Interviews deviate from typical conversations in ways that have
implications for interviewers' ability to elicit information from
interviewees. 232 First, in the context of an interview, a client will usually be
expected to report information at a higher level of detail than would be
expected in a typical conversation. 233 Whereas Edna might simply tell her
friends, "I am sure I was discriminated against," Jack will need her to provide
details as to when, where, and how she believes she was mistreated. If Edna
does not go into this level of detail voluntarily-and most clients do not-
Jack will eventually need to ask specific and detailed follow-up questions.
Second, the norms of everyday conversation posit that information
provided by a speaker should contribute to the ongoing conversation-that it
should not be information that the questioner already has. 234 Accordingly,
"[u]nless the person asked has reason to believe that the questioner did not
understand the answer given in response to the first question, he or she is
likely to interpret the second question as a request for new information" and
will provide an answer that differs in some way from the answer to the
232 See generally NORBERT SCHWARTZ, COGNITION AND COMMUNICATION:
JUDGMENTAL BIASES, RESEARCH METHODS, AND THE LOGIC OF CONVERSATION 63 (1996)
(discussing conversational norms).
233 Powell et al., supra note 157, at 16. See supra Part III.C.
234 SCHWARTZ, supra note 232, at 63. While some persons do, of course, violate this
norm, society tends to look upon such persons as blabbermouths.
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previous iteration of the question.2 35 Thus, because attorneys often need their
clients to violate this conversational norm, by either repeating themselves-
so the attorney can verify her understanding--or providing additional detail,
attorneys. need to explain clearly what they need from their client.
Specifically, at the beginning of an interview Jack ought to inform his
clients that he will often need very detailed responses, and to encourage his
clients not to edit their responses, but rather to provide complete answers:2 36
Mrs. Kiddo, I know it will be very painful for you to discuss your son's
injuries. But I want to warn you up front that I will need to ask you a lot of
questions and sometimes even seemingly ask you to repeat. yourself In
order for me to fully understand what happened, and in order for me to be
fully prepared for everything the other side may throw at us, I will need to
ask you to go into lots of detail and sometimes will have you tell me the
same thing over again from a different angle. As you are telling me the
story, try not to leave anything out, as I would like to hear about everything
that is possibly related to this incident.
Similarly, when Jack sees the need as the interview progresses to repeat
questions or revisit topics, he should clearly communicate his purposes and
clarify that the repetition should not signal the need to change an answer or
to speculate. In other words, Jack needs to be very transparent in the way that
he conducts the interview:
Mr. Kiddo, I know that you have already told me the gist of what happened
to your son, Kyle. But now I would like for you to go back and tell me
again everything you can remember of the day when Kyle swallowed those
magnetic balls. This time try to describe the events in chronological order.
This will help me to make sure I understand everything that happened and
that I don't miss anything important.
3. Perspective Taking and Empathy
Perspective taking-the ability to take the perspective of other people
and imagine their experiences, perceptions, and feelings-may be
particularly important to the lawyer-client relationship. Importantly, people
who take the perspective of another person have been shown to experience
235 Id. at 64.
236 The interviewer should then give the interviewee sufficient time to do so. See
also Powell et al., supra note 157, at 17 (noting the importance of conveying to
interviewees the need to report all information).
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greater empathy towards that other-perceiving and sharing in the other's
emotions. 237 In addition, those who take the perspective of others engage in
less stereotyping, 238 make attributions about the other that are closer to the
types of attributions they would make about themselves (i.e., giving more
consideration to situational factors), 239 perceive the interests 240 and
intentions 241 of the other more accurately,242 and make less self-serving
judgments of fairness. 243 Thus, striving to take the perspective of another
237See MARK H. DAVIS, EMPATHY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 17
(1996). See also C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 83-86 (1991). Empathy, broadly conceived, can include a
variety of "constructs having to do with the responses of one individual to the
experiences of another," including their affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses.
DAVIS, supra, at 12. Professor Robert Mnookin and his co-authors emphasize the
behavioral aspect of empathy: "For purposes of negotiation we define empathy as the
process of demonstrating an accurate, nonjudgmental understanding of the other side's
needs, interests, and perspective." ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 46 (2000). According to
Mnookin, a good negotiator manages the tension between empathy and assertiveness,
listening well and speaking persuasively. Id. at 68. "Sympathy," in contrast, includes
"heightened awareness of the suffering of another person as something to be alleviated."
Lauren Wispd, The Distinction Between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a
Concept, a Word is Needed, 50 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 314, 318 (1986).
238 Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing
Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 708, 721 (2000). See also John F. Dovidio et al.,
Perspective and Prejudice: Antecedents and Mediating Mechanisms, 30 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1537, 1538-43 (2004).
239 Dennis T. Regan & Judith Totten, Empathy and Attribution: Turning Observers
Into Actors, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850, 854 (1975); Storms, supra note
84, at 169. See also Mark H. Davis et al., Effect of Perspective Taking on the Cognitive
Representation of Persons: A Merging of Self and Other, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 713, 715-18 (1996).
240 Nancy Eisenberg et al., The Development of Empathic Accuracy, in EMPATHIC
ACCURACY 73, 97-99 (William Ickes ed., 1997).
241 See Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, The Role of Perspective-Taking
Ability in Negotiating Under Different Forms ofArbitration, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
378, 380 (1983).
242 See William M. Bernstein & Mark H. Davis, Perspective-Taking, Self-
Consciousness, and Accuracy in Person Perception, 3 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1, 5-9 (1982) (finding that perspective taking is associated with accuracy in person
perception).
243 Aimee Drolet et al., Thinking of Others: How Perspective Taking Changes
Negotiators' Aspirations and Fairness Perceptions as a Function of Negotiator
Relationships, 20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 23, 28 (1998) (finding effect of
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person may be important for lawyers. If Jack can learn to empathize with his
clients, he will be better able to understand how their desires and concerns
differ from his own. For example, whereas Jack is a logical person who
believes that his primary goal in most disputes would be to maximize his
monetary well-being, many of his clients may well approach disputes
differently.244 They may feel a wide variety of emotions relating to their
situation-including anger, guilt, embarrassment, or fear-and may be
interested in pursuing a wide variety of goals. For example, as Agnes
approaches her estate-planning issues, she may be more interested in her
relationships with Lenny and her children and in her own emotions about her
impending death than she is on maximizing her economic well-being. The
Kiddos may want sufficient money to be able to care for Kyle adequately,
but beyond that, they may be more interested in obtaining a public statement
that the magnetic ball manufacturer was at fault, clearing their own names,
and absolving their own guilt than in obtaining additional money. If Jack can
come to understand and empathize with these inclinations, he will be able to
communicate with his clients more successfully, establish better rapport, and
represent them more effectively in future settlement negotiations. 245
People in more powerful roles, however, tend to be less likely to take
another's perspective. Recent research has found that people with power are
less likely to "adopt another person's visual perspective," are less likely to
"take into account that other people [do] not possess their privileged
knowledge," and are less accurate in identifying emotions in others.24 6 Thus,
perspective taking when relationship between negotiators was positive, but not when it
was negative). See supra Part III.B.3.
244 See Relis, supra note 14, at 382-83 (emphasizing differences between plaintiffs'
actual goals and the goals that are imputed to them by attorneys); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of
Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2677 (1995) ("[P]eople and entities in
disputes may have a wide variety of interests (of which legal principles may be one class)
and may decide that, in any given case, social, psychological, economic, political, moral,
or religious principles should govern the resolution of their dispute."); Jean R. Sternlight,
Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to
Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269,
302-06 (1999) (detailing a number of nonmonetary goals that parties may have that "may
reflect a rationality that is broader than the mere maximization of wealth").
245 Empathy in physicians is associated with trust in them by their patients,
treatment compliance, and overall satisfaction. See, e.g., Jo Silvester et al., "Trust
Me. . . ": Psychological and Behavioral Predictors of Perceived Physician Empathy, 92
J. APP. PSYCHOL. 519, 519 (2007) (reviewing studies of empathy and trust in physicians).
246 Adam Galinsky et al., Power and Perspectives Not Taken, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI.
1068, 1072 (2006).
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attorneys-who occupy a position of power relative to their clients-may
need to pay particular attention to the perspective of their clients. 247
Assuming that Jack wants to do a better job in taking his clients'
perspectives and to be more empathetic, how could he achieve that result?
Research has shown that when people value the welfare of another person,
they are more likely to take that person's perspective and to experience
empathic concern for that person's situation.248 In addition, Jack may want to
talk less and listen more. 249 Studies in the medical context have shown
"empathy ratings were positively associated with physicians' use of open and
reassuring communication styles, and negatively associated with a
controlling communication style. ' 250 Jack can also pay attention to his
clients' nonverbal messages-watching for cues to their discomfort and
emotions.251 While lawyers may not want to try to become close friends with
their clients,252 or to allow lawyering to drift into therapy,253 they do need to
247 Receiving feedback about how the accuracy of one's empathic inferences
improves future empathic accuracy. See William Ickes et al., Studying Empathic
Accuracy in a Clinically Relevant Context, in EMPATHIC ACCURACY 282, 298-300
(William Ickes ed., 1997).
248 See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson et al., An Additional Antecedent of Empathic
Concern: Valuing the Welfare of the Person in Need, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 65, 72-73 (2007).
249See supra Part III.E.1. See, e.g., Cathy Gillotti et al., Communicative
Competence in the Delivery of Bad News, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1011, 1018 (2002)
(finding that physicians were rated as being more empathetic if they asked fewer closed-
ended questions). See also Klea D. Bertakis et al., The Relationship of Physician Medical
Interview Style to Patient Satisfaction, 32 J. FAMILY PRACTICE 175, 175 (1991); Mary
Klein Buller & David B. Buller, Physicians' Communication Style and Patient
Satisfaction, 28 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 375, 384 (1987) (finding that an affiliative
communication style was associated with greater patient satisfaction); Silvester et al.,
supra note 245, at 522 (finding that empathy was associated with "discussion of personal
topics, fewer missed patient cues, more personal responsibility, and more personal action
statements" by the physician as well as with "more positive statements and [discussion
of] the medical procedure in more detail").
250 Silvester et al., supra note 245, at 523. Open and reassuring communication
styles included the use of open-ended questions, positive statements, and statements
about procedure; a controlling communication style consisted of behaviors such as
interrupting, making summary statements, and closed questions. Id.
251 See generally Ronald E. Riggio, Nonverbal Skills and Abilities, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 79, 81 (Valerie Manusov & Miles L.
Patterson eds., 2006) (discussing the importance of skill in nonverbal decoding).
252 The Model Rules explicitly proscribe attorneys from engaging in sexual
relationships with their clients and also limit attorneys' opportunities to do unrelated
business with their clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) & (j). See also
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try to use their ears and eyes to better understand not only what their clients
are saying but also what they mean and, sometimes, what they are not saying.
It may also be useful for lawyers to try to teach the importance of
perspective taking and empathy to their clients. To the extent that clients can
come to better understand a seeming adversary's perspective, clients may be
able to better understand their likelihood of prevailing in litigation, to devise
a mutually acceptable settlement, and to make an informed decision
regarding whether it even makes sense to try to litigate a particular dispute.
While attorneys cannot, of course, teach an actual class on empathy to their
clients, they may want to help their clients imagine how the world might look
through the eyes of the seeming adversary. In practice, it may be difficult for
attorneys to engage in such discussions with clients. Clients often treasure
the idea that their attorney is their advocate who would never see the world
through anyone but the clients' eyes. 2 54 However, to be truly effective in
representing their clients' interests, attorneys must at times try to impart
empathy.
4. Trust and Rapport
Trust is central to the attorney-client relationship. To trust is to "accept
vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of
another."25 5 Clients, who are often in a vulnerable position, trust their
attorney when they rely on the attorney to act in ways that are consistent with
the clients' well-being--expecting both that the attorney will act with fidelity
Howard W. Brill, Sex and the Client: Ten Reasons to Say "No!," 33 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 651 (1993); Robert J. Condlin, "What's Love Got to Do With It?" "It's Not Like
They're Your Friends for Christ's Sake": The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer
and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211 (2003).
253 See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 8, at 20-21 (distinguishing the roles of
lawyers and psychotherapists and noting that while some skills may overlap, lawyers
should not be in the business of probing their clients' psyche or otherwise providing
psychological counseling). See also Gantt II, supra note 45, at 386-97 (noting that
counseling that too closely resembles therapy can expose lawyers to ethical risks).
254 See generally William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power.
Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1447 (1992).
255 Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View
of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393, 395 (1998). See generally Roy J. Lewicki &
Carolyn Wiethoff, Trust, Trust Development, and Trust Repair, in THE HANDBOOK OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 86 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman
eds., 2000) (discussing trust and conflict).
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to their interests and will act competently in doing so.256
Trust can further the attorney-client relationship by improving
communication between attorney and client-promoting disclosure of
important information by the client and facilitating the counseling process.
Clients want to believe that their lawyer is their ally and advocate-and may
hesitate to provide full information if they don't feel supported.257 In contrast,
people tend to be more willing to share more information (particularly
sensitive or personal information) with those whom they trust.258 In addition,
if clients trust their attorneys, discussions regarding settlement and other
options will be far more successful. Clients who trust their attorneys may be
more willing to consider and follow the attorneys' advice.259 It is natural that
when an attorney begins to discuss settlement, the client may feel let down or
even abandoned. The lawyer who the client had seen as her knight in shining
armor is now urging that the client's position may not be so strong after all. Is
the lawyer perhaps looking out for her own interests rather than those of the
client?260 However, if the client has real trust in her attorney, she is less
256 See Mark Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It,
Can It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 620-24 (2001). Distrust,
which can exist simultaneously with trust, involves negative expectations about the
behavior or intentions of the other. See id. at 618-19. See also Roy J. Lewicki et al.,
Models of Interpersonal Trust Development: Theoretical Approaches, Empirical
Evidence, and Future Directions, 32 J. MGMT. 991, 1002 (2006).
257 For example, clients may hesitate to provide personal information regarding
finances, relationships, misconduct, and similar matters if they do not trust and have good
rapport with their attorney.
258 John K. Butler, Jr., Trust Expectations, Information Sharing, Climate of Trust,
and Negotiation Effectiveness and Efficiency, 24 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 217, 227 (1999);
See Hall et al., supra note 256, at 614; Lewicki et al., supra note 256, at 1004.
259 See Janet A. Sniezek & Lyn M. Van Swol, Trust, Confidence, and Expertise in a
Judge-Advisor System, 84 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 288, 297-98
(2001) (finding that the more inexpert decisionmakers trusted their expert advisors, the
more likely they were to make decisions consistent with the advisors' advice and the
more confident they were in their decisions). See also Marcus T. Boccaccini et al.,
Development and Effects of Client Trust in Criminal Defense Attorneys: Preliminary
Examination of the Congruence Model of Trust Development, 22 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 197,
206-07 (2004) (finding that incarcerated criminal defendants who trusted their attorneys
were more satisfied with their attorneys and their sentences); David H. Thom et al.,
Patient Trust in the Physician: Relationship to Patient Requests, 19 FAM. PRAC. 476, 481
(2002) (finding that trust in physician was associated with intent to follow physician's
advice); Felicia Trachtenberg et al., How Patients' Trust Relates to their Involvement in
Medical Care, 54 J. FAMILY PRAC. 344 (2005) (finding that trust was associated with
following physician recommendations).
260 Clients may sometimes suspect that lawyers recommend a particular course of
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likely to feel that the attorney misled her at any point.
Trust can be facilitated in a variety of ways. As an initial matter, existing
reputations and institutional structures-such as the requirements and norms
of professional responsibility-can lay a foundation for a relationship of
trust.261 While lawyers often inform their clients that their communications
are covered by the attorney-client privilege, urging clients to be forthcoming
on this basis, merely informing clients of the existence of such a privilege
may not be enough to create real trust.262 Beyond this, however, trust is
influenced by patterns of communication and interpersonal interaction.
Moreover, people can build trust through the ways in which they
communicate openness and concern for the other's needs. 263 Through his
words, conduct, eye contact, and body language, Jack needs to try to
communicate a genuine concern for his clients. Communicating in such a
action because they are friends with the opposing attorney, afraid to take a case to court,
afraid of hurting their own relationship with the opposing client, or seeking to aggrandize
their own reputation-perhaps at the expense of the client. For a general discussion of
possible attorney-client conflicts of interest and their potential impact on settlement, see
Stemlight, supra note 244 , at 316-31.
261 See generally Debra Meyerson et al., Swift Trust and Temporary Groups, in
TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 166 (Roderick M.
Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (factors include role expectations, professional
standards, reputations); Susan P. Shapiro, The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 93
AM. J. Soc. 623, 626-29 (1987) (discussing institutions and structures that allow for
trust); Ellen M. Whitener et al., Managers as Initiators of Trust: An Exchange
Relationship Framework for Understanding Managerial Trustworthy Behavior, 23
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 513, 516-18 (1998) (noting trust built on routines or the normalcy of
encounter-as in the case of banks).
262 We are not aware of any empirical studies on assurances of confidentiality in
legal counseling. In the context of survey research, studies have found that assurances of
confidentiality can result in more disclosure of sensitive topics (but not of other
information). See Eleanor Singer et al., Confidentiality Assurances and Response: A
Quantitative Review of the Experimental Literature, 59 PUB. OPINION Q. 66 (1995).
However, there is some evidence that strong assurances can actually make confidentiality
concerns salient, rather than establish trust. See Eleanor Singer et al., Confidentiality
Assurances in Surveys: Reassurance or Threat?, 4 INT'L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 256 (1992).
263 Michael Morris et al., Schmooze or Lose: Social Friction and Lubrication in E-
Mail Negotiations, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 89, 90 (2002) (discussing
communicating openness (handshakes, open-palmed gestures, disclosures of personal
non-task-relevant information) and interest (smiles, nodding, questions about the other))
(citing Michael Morris & Dacher Keltner, How Emotions Work: An Analysis of the Social
Functions of Emotional Expression in Negotiations, 22 REV. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1
(2000)); Rousseau et al., supra note 255, at 397 (discussing openness and concern);
Whitener et al., supra note 261, at 516-18 (discussing demonstrating concern).
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way as to provide information that is accurate and to provide explanations for
actions also contributes to a sense of trust.264 In particular, advisor
explanation of and elaboration on the information provided has been shown
to be associated with trust.26 5 In addition to communication, trust is
influenced by the degree to which a person acts consistently and predictably,
competently, and with integrity and honesty.2 66 Moreover, shared control and
participation in decisionmaking tends to foster a sense of trust. 267 In
particular, psychological research has found that criminal defendants whose
actual participation in their cases was congruent with their level of desired
participation were more trusting of their attorneys.268 In short, Jack can build
his clients' trust in him by spending ample time on the initial interview,
responding promptly to subsequent client queries, sharing with his clients
some of his thinking about the pros and cons of various courses of action,
and allowing clients to participate in decisions regarding their case. 269
Rapport in a relationship or interaction is closely related to trust and has
been conceptualized as having three interrelated characteristics: 1) mutual
attentiveness-where both participants attend to and are involved with each
other; 2) "positivity"-a reciprocal sense of consideration for each other; and
3) "coordination"-a sense of responsiveness to each other or of being "in
sync." 270 Some have argued that "[b]uilding rapport is considered so
important that it is listed as a discrete training phase in most prominent
264 Whitener et al., supra note 26 1, at 517.
265 Sniezek & Van Swol, supra note 259, at 297.
266 Rousseau et al., supra note 255, at 397 (including factors like competence and
reliability); Whitener et al., supra note 261, at 516-18 (including factors like consistency
and integrity).
267 Whitener et al., supra note 261, at 516-18 (1998) (sharing and delegating
control).
268 Boccaccini et al., supra note 259, at 210 (finding that those who did not desire to
participate and those who both desired to and were allowed to participate had more trust
in their attorneys than those who desired to but were not allowed to participate).
269 Rule 1.2 of the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct requires attorneys to abide
by a client's decisions concerning the "objectives of representation" and to consult with
the client as to "the means by which they are pursued." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2. We suggest that this is wise from a psychological standpoint as well.
270 Linda Tickle-Degnen & Robert Rosenthal, The Nature of Rapport and Its
Nonverbal Correlates, I PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 285, 286 (1990). See also Aimee L. Drolet &
Michael W. Morris, Rapport in Conflict Resolution: Accounting for How Face-to-Face
Contact Fosters Mutual Cooperation in Mixed-Motive Conflicts, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 26, 27 (2000) (characterizing rapport as a "state of mutual positivity and
interest that arises through the convergence of nonverbal expressive behavior in an
interaction").
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investigative interview protocols."2 7 1 Indeed, psychological research has
found that rapport can result in increased trust 272 and more cooperative
interactions. 2 73 More generally, people tend to remember and disclose greater
amounts of information when they feel comfortable and at ease. 274 People
may also be more forthcoming as a sense of rapport contributes to feeling
"less constrained to present [them]selves continuously in a favorable or
pleasant light." 275 Finally, people may be more willing to consider and
comply with professional advice when they have a trusting and comfortable
relationship with their advisor.276
A number of nonverbal behaviors have been found to contribute to a
sense of rapport. In particular, a variety of behaviors related to posture and
orientation-such as directly facing the other person, leaning forward, and
not crossing one's arms-are associated with assessments of rapport in
interpersonal interactions.277 Similarly, other non-verbal behaviors that
signal attentiveness and coordination-such as smiling and nodding-are
also related to the development of rapport.278 Studies have also found that
feelings of rapport are facilitated when people spend some time getting to
know each other-engaging in small talk, "schmoozing, 279 or discussing
personal or shared interests can provide the opportunity to develop a
connection. 2 80
271 Powell et al., supra note 157, at 14.
272 Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Negotiating Via Information Technology:
Theory and Applications, 58 J. Soc. IssuEs 109, 111 (2002) (describing Aimee L. Drolet
& Michael W. Morris, Communication Media and Interpersonal Trust in Conflicts: The
Role of Rapport and Synchrony on Nonverbal Behavior, unpublished manuscript (1995)).
273 Drolet & Morris, supra note 270, at 42-44 (finding rapport associated with more
cooperation overall and more coordination on mutual cooperation in a prisoner's
dilemma).
274 Powell et al., supra note 157, at 13-14. As a general matter, stress has been
found to inhibit memory. See, e.g., Dominique J.-F. de Quervain et al., Acute Cortisone
Administration Impairs Retrieval of Long-Term Declarative Memory in Humans, 3
NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 313, 313 (2000) (finding that stress hormones impede memory).
275 Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, supra note 270, at 287.
276 See generally ROTER & HALL, supra note 227 (reviewing studies).
277 Id. at 42-53 (reporting meta-analysis of studies).
278 Id.
279 LEO ROSTEN, THE NEW JOYS OF YIDDISH 366 (1968) ("[B]oth verb and noun,
shmooz means a friendly, gossipy, prolonged, heart-to-heart talk-or to have such a
talk.").
280 See generally Don A. Moore et al., Long and Short Routes to Success in
Electronically-Mediated Negotiations: Group Affiliations and Good Vibrations, 77
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When we first met Jack we learned that he typically wanted to get right
down to the business at hand, and "waste" as little time as possible. However,
Jack needs to recognize that creating rapport and trust are not just niceties, or
a waste of time. Instead, creating trust and rapport is necessary in order to
have a truly productive relationship with his clients. Engaging in effective
schmoozing is itself something of an art form, as it requires good listening
skills and good memory, and a standard line may not be sufficient. Agnes
may not appreciate a conversation about sports, or then again, she may
happen to be an avid Yankees fan. Jack needs to try to become acquainted a
bit with his clients at a more personal level.
5. How People Learn
Jack has never worried much about how people learn. He figures that if
he says something to his client in an interview, his client will absorb it.
Psychologists, on the other hand, have demonstrated a number of ways in
which to improve the learning of information. First, psychologists have
found that people learn by building on what they already know.28' Thus,
taking into account people's existing knowledge and beliefs can improve
learning. Second, people have differing preferences about the ways in which
information is presented to them. Some people prefer to receive and process
information orally, others may prefer written material or do better with visual
representations such as pictures or diagrams, and still others may need to be
able to take notes.282 Similarly, some people prefer abstract thinking, while
others prefer concrete examples.283 Ultimately, people may rely on a mix of
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 22 (1999) (finding that people
who were instructed to share personal information with each other and to ask personal
questions reported increased rapport); Morris et al., supra note 263 (finding that
"schmoozers" who had a short "get acquainted" call before negotiating via e-mail felt
more rapport, had fewer impasses, and had more positive impressions of each other).
281 How PEOPLE LEARN: BRIDGING RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 10 (M. Suzanne
Donovan et al. eds., 1999).
2 82 See generally WALTER B. BARBE & RAYMOND H. SWASSING, TEACHING
THROUGH MODALITY STRENGTHS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES (1979); Richard E. Mayer
& Laura J. Massa, Three Facets of Visual and Verbal Learners: Cognitive Ability,
Cognitive Style, and Learning Preference, 95 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 833 (2003); Richard
Riding, The Nature and Effects of Cognitive Style, in PERSPECTIVES ON THINKING,
LEARNING, AND COGNITIVE STYLES 47, 57 (Robert J. Sternberg & Li-Fang Zhang eds.,
2001); but cf Gregory P. Kratzig & Katherine D. Arbuthnott, Perceptional Learning
Style and Learning Proficiency: A Test of the Hypothesis, 98 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 238, 238
(2007).
283 See, e.g., David A. Kolb et al., Experiential Learning Theory: Previous Research
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learning strategies and their preferences may vary with the type of learning
task. 284 Third, we know that people do not always ask questions when they
do not understand or want more information. Studies that compare the
perspective of patients with that of doctors are particularly illuminating-
while doctors report believing that patients will ask follow-up questions if
they want more information, patients prefer that doctors provide them with
information without expecting them to ask.285
In light of this psychology, we have a few specific suggestions for Jack.
First, Jack should try to build on his clients' existing knowledge base. Thus,
he will need to present information differently in different contexts. If Carl
Cementa has been involved in litigation before, Jack can draw on those
experiences in discussing his options for dealing with Henrietta Homeowner.
By contrast, if the Kiddo family has never before participated in litigation,
Jack will not be able to take any knowledge for granted, and will need to
explain things about the nature of discovery and the high emotional and other
costs of litigation. If Mrs. Kiddo is a civil engineer, perhaps Jack can find
some analogies between building a bridge and preparing a case for trial.
286
Second, in conveying new information to his clients, Jack should not use a
single approach, such as always providing verbal advice. Instead, while
continuing to provide verbal advice, Jack should also use other formats. For
example, following the initial interview, he may want to write letters to his
clients that highlight some of the key issues that he sees and some of the
choices that must be made. In some situations it may be appropriate to use
graphical presentations. In particular, clients often have a difficult time
understanding discussions of probability, and some may find visual
representations to be useful.287 Along the same lines, some attorneys have
found it useful to show clients "decision trees" as a means to demonstrate the
probability of interrelated events.288 Videos, too, can sometimes be useful to
and New Directions, in PERSPECTIVES ON THINKING, LEARNING, AND COGNITIVE STYLES
227, 228 (Robert J. Sternberg & Li-Fang Zhang eds., 2001).
284 Kratzig & Arbuthnott, supra note 282, at 244.
285 See, e.g., Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes
Regarding the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1003 (2003).
286 See generally Keith J. Holyoak, Analogy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
THINKING AND REASONING 117 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005).
287 See, e.g., Erika A. Waters et al., Formats for Improving Risk Communication in
Medical Tradeoff Decisions, I 1 J. HEALTH COMM. 167, 167-68 (2006). See also Ulrich
Hoffrage et al., Communicating Statistical Information, SCIENCE, Dec. 22, 2000, at 2261.
288 See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY:
THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 34-44 (1991);
David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 113,
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provide clients with an understanding of events, such as depositions, that
they may not have experienced. 289 Third, now aware that confused clients
will not necessarily ask clarifying questions, Jack needs to be sure to invite
questions and offer additional insights even when no questions are asked.
6. Physical Space
Psychological research has shown that the physical environment can be
important in setting the tone for an interview. Certainly, there are obvious
physical issues, such as noise, excessive heat, or excessive or deficient
lighting, that can be problematic. 290 However, the research reveals that even
environments that avoid such problems can still differ quite substantially in
how conducive they are to effective interviewing.
Importantly, the interview setting must be private. Not surprisingly,
research has shown that people are more willing to disclose relevant personal
information in surroundings in which their privacy is assured.291 In addition,
in setting up his interview space, Jack ought to take into account his clients'
probable preferences about their personal space-"the area individuals
maintain around themselves into which others cannot intrude without
arousing discomfort." 292 Intrusion into a person's personal space can cause
distress, inhibit disclosure, and result in a negative impression of the
intruder.293 While personal space preferences vary by individual and among
cultures, a comfortable social distance is usually between four and twelve
feet294 and many clients are likely to feel most comfortable with this distance
113-20 (1996).
289 Videos are commonly used for juror orientation. See American Judicature
Society, Prospective Jurors, http://www.ajs.org/jc/faq/jcfaqstatelinks.asp#videos (last
visited Feb. 26, 2008).
2 90 See generally Janetta Mitchell McCoy, Work Environments, in HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 443,450-52 (Robert B. Bechtel & Arza Churchman eds.,
2002) (reviewing research on temperature, lighting, sound, and air quality in work
settings).
291 See Charles J. Holahan & Karl A. Slaikeu, Effects of Contrasting Degrees of
Privacy on Client Self-Disclosure in a Counseling Setting, 24 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL.
55, 58 (1977).
292 Leslie A. Hayduk, Personal Space: Where We Now Stand, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL.
293, 293 (1983) [hereinafter Hayduk 1983]. See also Leslie A. Hayduk, Personal Space:
An Evaluative and Orienting Overview, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 118 (1978) [hereinafter
Hayduk 1978].
293 Hayduk 1983, supra note 292, at 314-15, 319.
294 See EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 121-23 (1969).
506
[Vol. 23:3 20081
INSIGHTS FOR INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING CLIENTS
between themselves and the interviewer.295 Because individual clients may
differ in terms of the distance at which they are comfortable interacting 296
and because clients may feel more comfortable when they have some control
over interaction distance and orientation,297 it may be advisable to have
several seating options or chairs that can be moved so that clients can select
their seating.298 Finally, relatively uncluttered offices have been shown to
elicit more favorable reactions as compared to messy offices299 and there is
some evidence that indicia of expertise (e.g., diplomas) increase observers'
perceptions of competence. 300 Certainly the McDonald's locale, which Jack
thought would be acceptable, is far from ideal in terms of privacy, messiness,
and comfort.
F. Cultural Differences
Jack has never paid much attention to cultural differences. He prides
himself on being open-minded and not prejudiced. In his view, "people are
people" no matter where they come from or how they were raised. Jack
assumes that everyone pretty much sees the world as he does,30 1 other than
the fact that many people are not as intelligent as he, often act irrationally,
and sometimes do not speak English very well, if at all.
In popular parlance, culture is often thought of as something exotic that
295 See Page K. Pressly & Martin Heesacker, The Physical Environment and
Counseling: A Review of Theory and Research, 79 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 148, 151
(2001) (reviewing studies).
296 In particular, cultural or gender differences may impact the contours of personal
space. See generally HALL, supra note 294; Hayduk 1983, supra note 292; Pressly &
Heesacker, supra note 295; Nan M. Sussman & Howard M. Rosenfeld, Influence of
Culture, Language, and Sex on Conversation Distance, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 66 (1982).
297 See Pressly & Heesacker, supra note 295, at 153 (reviewing studies).
298 Id. at 152 (reviewing literature).
299 See id.
300 See generally id. at 152-53 (reviewing studies); P. Paul Heppner & Steve Pew,
Effects of Diplomas, Awards, and Counselor Sex on Perceived Expertness, 24 J.
COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 147 (1977); Jeffrey C. Siegel, Effects of Objective Evidence of
Expertness, Nonverbal Behavior, and Subject Sex on Client-Perceived Expertness, 27 J.
COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 117 (1980); Lee Stapleton Milford, Nonverbal Communication,
27 (#4) LITIGATION 32, 32 (2001) (discussing pros and cons of various office
environments); William T. Hoyt, Antecedents and Effects of Perceived Therapist
Credibility: A Meta-Analysis, 43 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 430 (1996).
301 See supra Part III.A.4.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
other people have (special accents, food, dress), but that we do not. More
properly, our culture provides a set of lenses through which we see the
world.30 2 These lenses do not dictate our behavior, but may shape our
perceptions and intuitive responses. 303 While people tend to think of cultural
differences as existing between groups who live in different parts of the
world, significant cultural differences also exist within the United States.
Cultural differences can be based not only on ethnicity, but also on
differences in age, gender, world view, economic status, or religion. Thus,
everyone operates from one or more different cultural perspectives. While
culture affects many aspects of our world view,304 we will highlight several
ways in which cultural differences may be particularly relevant to lawyers
who are interviewing and counseling clients.
302 Edward Hall has been one of the most prolific and best writers on culture. See,
e.g., EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE 51-53 (1956) ("Culture [is] ... a form of
communication... Culture is not an exotic notion studied by a select group of
anthropologists in the South Seas. It is a mold in which we are all cast, and it controls our
daily lives in many unsuspected ways.... [T]he real job is not to understand foreign culture
but to understand our own."). See also Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five Habits for
Cross-Cultural Lawyering, in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, & LAw 47, 48 (Kimberly
Holt Barrett & William H. George eds., 2005) ("Culture is the logic through which we
give meaning to the world."); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, MAKING GLOBAL DEALS:
NEGOTIATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET PLACE 45 (1991) ("Culture includes the
socially transmitted beliefs, behavior patterns, values, and norms of a given community.
It consists of rules, concepts, categories, and assumptions which the people of that
community use to interpret their surroundings and guide their interactions with other
persons within the society."); PAUL B. PEDERSEN AND ALLEN IVEY, CULTURE-CENTERED
COUNSELING AND INTERVIEWING SKILLS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (1993) ("Culture controls
our lives. We may attend to our culturally learned assumptions or we may ignore them,
but in either case, these assumptions will continue to shape our decisions. Culture is not
something outside ourselves, but, rather, an internalized perspective that combines the
teachings of every significant person or group we have experienced, read about, or heard
about and from whom we have learned something.").
303 See Darrin R. Lehman et al., Psychology and Culture, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
689, 701 (2004) ("Culture does not rigidly determine the responses of its group members.
Instead, culture provides interpretive perspectives for making sense of reality."). See also
NADYA A. FOUAD & PATRICIA ARREDONDO, BECOMING CULTURALLY ORIENTED:
PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS AND EDUCATORS 53 (2007) (noting, in the
context of psychological counseling, the importance of being "aware of how cultural
dimensions may affect a client but also remain[ing] flexible enough to understand when
those dimensions conflict or are less salient to the particular issue").
304 See generally Lehman et al., supra note 303; RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE
GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: How ASIANS AND WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY... AND
WHY (2003).
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Cultures can differ in terms of their approach to dispute resolution.305 In
particular, psychological research has shown that people from different
cultures tend to differ in the importance they ascribe to the possible
objectives of dispute resolution processes. Different cultures may place
varying degrees of importance on goals such as maintaining relationships,
achieving "justice," saving face, achieving economic gains, or laying a
foundation for the future. 30 6 Clients from more individualistic cultures 307
may be primarily concerned with their own personal success.30 8 Clients from
more collectivist cultures 30 9 may be more highly attuned to how their
behavior has affected or will affect the social standing of the broader group
with which they identify, how they are viewed by that group, the joint
success of the parties, or how relationships are affected.310 In addition, a
client may be concerned about the "cultural consequences" of her actions-
that is, the consequences of "taking steps that are out of her culture's
norm."
3 11
Not surprisingly then, clients from different cultures also tend to display
differing preferences for how to go about resolving disputes. For example,
people from more individualistic cultures may prefer resolving disputes
through strategies that focus on the immediate conflict, involve direct
confrontation, and result in a determination of who is right and who is
wrong.312 In contrast, those from more collectivist cultures tend to prefer
305 See generally THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER (Pat K. Chew ed., 2001);
RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (1991); Michael W. Morris & Ho-Ying Fu, How Does
Culture Influence Conflict Resolution? A Dynamic Constructivist Analysis, 19 SOC.
COGNITION 324 (2001); Kwok Leung & Michael W. Morris, Justice Through the Lens of
Culture and Ethnicity, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 343, 352 (Joseph
Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
306 Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi et al., Cultural Values in Conflict Management: Goal
Orientation, Goal Attainment, and Tactical Decision, 30 J. CROSS-CULTRUAL PSYCHOL.
51,60 (1999).
307 Individualist cultures prioritize individual goals and agendas and tend to be more
assertive and competitive. See NISBETT, supra note 304, at 47-48; Harry C. Triandis &
Michele J. Gelfand, Converging Measurement of Horizontal and Vertical Individualism
and Collectivism, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 118, 118-19 (1998).
308 Lehman et al., supra note 303, at 699-700.
309 Collectivist cultures tend to privilege the goals of the group and group
membership. See NISBETT, supra note 304, at 48-49; Triandis & Gelfand, supra note
307, at 118-19.
310 Triandis & Gelfand, supra note 307, at 118-19.
311 FOUAD & ARREDONDO, supra note 303, at 58.
312 See Lehman et al., supra note 303, at 700 (reviewing studies); NISBETr, supra
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more relational strategies that involve the use of intermediaries, mediation,
collaboration, accommodation, or avoidance. 313 In addition, cultural
difference can influence whether one prefers resolving disputes by looking to
universal principles or rules, or whether one prefers a case-by-case analysis
of the particular circumstance involved.314 Culture may also influence the
value placed on debate,315 and the inclination to take other perspectives 316 or
to consider counterarguments. 317
Culture may also be related to differences on a variety of other
dimensions that have implications for client interviewing and counseling. For
example, cultures differ in terms of the meaning that is attributed to silence
in an interaction,3 18 the degree of formality that is expected,319 the
appropriateness of interruptions, 320 understandings of the meaning of eye
note 304, at 75-76, 194; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 306, at 52. See also Catherine
Tinsley, Models of Conflict Resolution in Japanese, German, and American Cultures, 83
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 316, 317 (1998).
313 See NISBETr, supra note 304, at 75-76. Those from collectivist cultures may pay
more attention to and give more weight to relational information. Lehman et al., supra
note 303, at 696. See also Kwok Leung, Some Determinants of Reactions to Procedural
Models for Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National Study, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 898, 900 (1987) (finding cultural differences in expectancies about how to
accomplish goals).
314NISBETT, supra note 304, at 65, 194 (describing a preference for rules in
independent cultures and a preference for case-by-case evaluation in interdependent
cultures).
315 Id. at 73 (describing a lack of interest in debate in interdependent cultures).
316 See generally Dov Cohen & Alex Gunz, As Seen By the Other... : Perspectives
on the Self in the Memories and Emotional Perceptions of Easterners and Westerners, 13
PSYCHOL. Sci. 55 (2002); Shali Wu & Boaz Keysar, The Effect of Culture on Perspective
Taking, 18 PSYCHOL. Sci. 600, 605 (2007) (finding that "compared with Americans,
Chinese are better at solving perspective-taking problems, make fewer errors in assessing
the intentions of another person, and are less distracted by their own private
perspective").
317 See generally Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and
Reasoning About Contradiction, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741 (1999).
318 See generally Richard W. Brislin & Eugene S. Kim, Cultural Diversity in
People's Understanding and Uses of Time, 52 APPLIED PSYCHOL.: AN INT'L REV. 363,
374 (2003) (discussing reactions to periods of silence).
319 See, e.g., Harry C. Triandis, Some Dimensions of Intercultural Variation and
Their Implications for Community Psychology, 11 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 285, 296-97
(1983).
3 2 0 See DERALD WING SUE & DAVID SUE, COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY DIVERSE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 143 (2003).
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contact,321 the contours of personal space,322 conceptions of time,
323
conventions about the display of emotion, 324 the appropriateness of self-
disclosure, 325 how agency is viewed, 326 and attitudes toward authority.327 In
addition, one's cultural background is related to the ways in which one
perceives associations among people and events in the world. In particular,
psychological research has shown cultural variation in people's tendency to
make dispositional attributions-people from more interdependent cultures
are more likely to pay attention to the whole context and to make attributions
that are more strongly influenced by situational factors.328 Similarly, people
from collectivist cultures have been shown to be less susceptible to making
self-serving judgments. 329
In applying these insights the attorney's challenge is to recognize that
persons from different cultures see the world differently, while at the same
time avoiding the trap of assuming that all persons from a particular culture
321 Id.
322 See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
323 See generally Brislin & Kim, supra note 318 (reviewing studies related to
punctuality, clock versus event time, time on task, multitasking, pace of life, time
horizons, and work versus leisure tradeoffs, among others).
324 David Matsumoto, Ethnic Differences in Affect Intensity, Emotion Judgments,
Display Rule Attitudes, and Self-Reported Emotional Expression in an American Sample,
17 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 107, 118 (1993); Nathan Yrizarry et al., Culture and
Emotion, in CROSS-CULTURAL TOPiCs IN PSYCHOLOGY 131, 132 (Leonore Loeb Adler &
Uwe P. Gielen eds., 2001).
325 See, e.g., Rosaleen Ow & Dafna Katz, Family Secrets and the Disclosure of
Distressful Information in Chinese Families, 80 FAM. IN Soc'Y 620, 620 (1999).
326 Lehman et al., supra note 303, at 698-99 (describing cultural differences in
whether personal or group agency is privileged).
327 See generally GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED VALUES (1989) (describing cultural value dimension of
"power distance" or the degree to which people prefer autocratic or consultative
authority); Tom R. Tyler et al., Cultural Values and Authority Relations: The Psychology
of Conflict Resolution Across Cultures, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1138 (2000).
328 See Incheol Choi et al., Causal Attribution Across Cultures: Variation and
Universality, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 47, 51-53 (1999); Lehman et al., supra note 303, at
696; Michael W. Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese
Attributions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 949,
961 (1994); NISBErr, supra note 304, at 129. People from collectivist cultures tend to
consider the relevance of a wider range of factors, considering a situation holistically. See
id. at 89-96, 111-35; Takahiko Masuda & Richard E. Nisbett, Attending Holistically
Versus Analytically: Comparing the Context Sensitivity of Japanese and Americans, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 922, 922 (2001).
329 Lehman et al., supra note 303, at 698.
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see the world the same way. That is,
[t]he task here is to appreciate and respect the differences among your
clients, but without resorting to stereotypes or stubborn myths about race,
sex, ethnicity, and culture. To ignore likely differences in culture is an
invitation to malpractice in counseling; to presume you know what those
differences will be once you know your client's race or sex or cultural
background is an invitation to dehumanize or reify your client, and to
assume generalizations that may not apply to him. 330
Jack's major task is to realize that things which he takes as a given may
not be well accepted by others. For example, Jack has noted that he believes
it is best to be somewhat informal with clients, to use first names, to shake
hands, and to look his clients directly in the eye.33' Yet, while these
conventions seem "natural" to many Americans, they are not universally
accepted. Depending on what culture Agnes Ageout is from, she may be
uncomfortable touching the hand of a male who is essentially a stranger or
may be insulted by direct eye contact. Carl Cementa may not appreciate the
informality of first names, particularly if used by a man younger than he.
Similarly, Jack should not assume, based on his own culture, that Edna
Employee is most concerned about obtaining monetary compensation for her
termination, or that she views her termination as an individual harm. Perhaps
Edna comes from a culture in which her termination is seen as a mark of
shame that harms not only her but also others in her family. If so, Edna may
care more about cleansing her record and obtaining an apology than about
receiving monetary compensation. Also, Edna may need to bring her family
or extended family into discussions in order to resolve her dispute through
negotiation. Jack may want to discuss with Edna the possibility of trying to
mediate her dispute in a setting that would allow not only Edna, but
potentially members of her family to participate as well. 332
Cultural sensitivity may also help Jack realize that clients who, to him,
may seem "difficult" are actually just different. If Edna comes from a
collectivist culture, she may not feel comfortable with confidentiality rules
that lead Jack to try to exclude Edna's family from the interview. Or, Jack
330 Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and
Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 378 (2003). See also supra Part III.A.2.
331 See supra Part II.
332 Such mediations are fairly common in Hawaii, where persons often come from a
more collectivist orientation than elsewhere in the United States. See generally James A.
Wall, Jr. & Ronda Roberts Callister, Ho'oponopono: Some Lessons from Hawaiian
Mediation, 11 NEGOT. J. 45 (1995).
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may be angered if Mr. Kiddo nods in a seemingly approving way as Jack
describes a possible course of action and then, at the end, disapproves of
following that course. Yet, in Mr. Kiddo's culture nodding may signify
understanding rather than approval. 333 Agnes Ageout's unwillingness to
consider or discuss marrying her boyfriend, Lenny, may also reflect cultural
issues such as differences in supposed caste or status or age. Carl Cementa's
habitual "lateness" may reflect a different sense of time, rather than
sloppiness or a lack of care for his case or his attorney. 33
4
In addition, clients' own perceptions of their attorney will also be
affected by their culture. The steps Jack will want to take to try to establish
his competence and to gain his clients' trust may depend in part on his clients'
and his own cultural background. 33 5 For example, depending on his client's
cultural background, Jack may want to dress more or less formally, set up the
conference room in a particular way, start the conversation with a recitation
of his credentials, or ask a member of his firm with a similar background to
sit in on the initial interview.
G. The Relevance of Perceived Justice and Injustice3 36
Like many lawyers, Jack has never given a lot of thought to the concept
of justice. Indeed, he tends to think that the concept is somewhat bogus. He
assumes that his clients will feel treated justly, to the extent that they even
care about justice, if they receive a lot of money (as plaintiffs) or avoid
having to pay a lot of money (as defendants). One of Jack's heroes is Jerry
Facher, one of the "big firm" defense lawyers made famous in the book and
333 See Bryant & Peters, supra note 302, at 49.
334 See Brislin & Kim, supra note 318, at 367.
335 See Teresa D. LaFromboise & David N. Dixon, American Indian Perception of
Trustworthiness in a Counseling Interview, 28 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 135, 138 (1981);
Ruth H. Gim et al., Asian-American Acculturation, Counselor Ethnicity and Cultural
Sensitivity, and Ratings of Counselors, 38 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 57, 60 (1991) (Asian
mental health clients found culturally sensitive mental health providers more credible
than those who were not.); Donald R. Atkinson et al., Mexican-American Acculturation,
Counselor Ethnicity and Cultural Sensitivity, and Perceived Counselor Competence, 39
J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 515, 518 (1992) (finding similar results based on study of
Mexican Americans).
336 See generally THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Michael Ross & Dale T.
Miller eds., 2002); Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Social Justice and Social
Movements, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 2, at 595 (Daniel Gilbert et al.
eds., 1998); HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee
Hamilton eds., 2001).
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movie A Civil Action. Facher famously said after a session of cross
examination: "The truth? The truth is at the bottom of a bottomless pit."337
Jack thinks the same could be said ofjustice.
Psychologists, in contrast, have learned that people often care a great
deal about various types of justice. Individuals are concerned with the
distributive fairness of their outcomes, with the procedural and interactional
fairness of the process itself, and with achieving an appropriate level of
retribution. Lawyers who are aware of these various aspects of justice can do
a more effective job of representing their clients than those who are not.
1. Distributive Justice
Models of distributive justice attempt to explain how people determine
whether an outcome is substantively fair. The distributive fairness of an
outcome can be judged by a number of metrics, including principles of equity
(distribution in proportion to relative contribution), equality (distribution by
equal shares), or need (distribution in proportion to need). 338 Which of these
metrics is chosen by an individual depends in part on their goals (e.g.,
productivity or harmony), 339 the relationships among the parties, 340 and the
337 JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 340 (1995). See also A CIVIL ACTION
(Touchstone Pictures 1999).
338 See Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value
Will be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 137, 143-47
(Summer 1975); see also Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 151, 152-53 (1973).
339 See Edith Barrett-Howard & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice as a Criterion in
Allocation Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 296, 300-01 (1986). See
generally TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 56-62 (1997)
(discussing the criteria people use for analyzing distributive justice). For example, one of
Carl Cementa's goals is to minimize his payout to unhappy clients so as to maximize his
own wealth. However, Carl also hopes to maximize former client happiness, or at least
minimize their unhappiness, so as to help his longer term efforts to retain old clients and
attract new clients. Thus, even if he could potentially negotiate a solution where he paid
nothing to and did nothing for Henrietta, this might not serve his longer term goals.
340 Alan Page Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a
Unified Theory of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 689, 690-93 (1992)
(distinguishing relationships based on communal sharing, authority ranking, equality
matching, and market pricing). For example, even though Agnes Aged may, at some
level, want to leave all her wealth to Lenny, she may also need to consider the nature of
her relationship with her family and the extent to which the family's challenge of her will,
if it were to occur, might bring grief to Lenny.
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type of resource at issue.341 Importantly, regardless of which of these metrics
is used, people resist agreeing to substantive outcomes that do not comport
with their notions of substantive fairness.342
If Jack is knowledgeable about the psychology of distributive justice, he
will be able to question clients more effectively about their range of goals.
Rather than simply assume that the Kiddos want the most money possible in
compensation for the injury suffered by their son, Jack can ask the Kiddos
more broadly what kind of relief they are seeking. He can suggest the
possibility of internal measures that might be taken by the company (e.g. take
the magnetic balls off the market, increase their size, improve warning
labels); public or private apologies that might be demanded; or non-monetary
compensation that might be sought, such as continued medical care for Kyle.
In addition, Jack's knowledge of the psychology of distributive justice
can help him, even in an initial interview, to begin to prepare his clients to
think about settlement prospects. As noted, clients often resist outcomes that
they do not believe are completely fair.343 Yet, the nature of settlement is
often that neither side will feel completely vindicated. Jack can begin to
prepare his clients to think about settlements by helping them to see that
341 Foa and colleagues distinguish six categories of resources: money, goods,
services, information, status, and love. See Gregory V. Donnenwerth & Uriel G. Foa,
Effect of Resource Class on Retaliation to Injustice in Interpersonal Exchange, 29 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 785, 786 (1974); Jim L. Turner et al., Interpersonal
Reinforcers: Classification, Interrelationship, and Some Differential Properties, 19 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 168, 169 (1971). See also Alan Page Fiske & Philip E.
Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions that Transgress the Spheres of
Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 285-86 (1997). Although Jack may assume that Edna
cares most about bettering her financial situation, given her termination, she may place as
much or more value on clearing her reputation, obtaining a new job, or setting precedent.
One of Jean Stemlight's clients once cared a great deal about getting a plaque recognizing
his twenty-five years of good service to his former employer, although that employer had
ultimately fired him and although the plaque had no monetary value.
342 Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations
and Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 86 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Max H. Bazerman et al.,
Perceptions of Fairness in Interpersonal and Individual Choice Situations, 4 (#2)
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Scl. 39, 39-40 (1995); Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining
Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253, 282-302 (John H.
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE:
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 21-35 (1992). See generally George F.
Loewenstein et al., Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts, 57 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 426 (1989); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in
Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 753 (2004).
343 See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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there are a range of metrics for judging distributive justice and that their own
view of a fair solution, and that of their adversary, may likely be quite
different.344 For example, Jack might ask Carl to consider what Henrietta
might believe would be a fair resolution of her complaints against Carl's
company. Similarly, Jack may want to note that while most disputes are
ultimately resolved through settlements, neither side necessarily achieves
everything it wants in a settlement. While this point will seem entirely
obvious, it is nonetheless quite common for clients to reject settlement
proposals on the ground that they think they could do better in court.345 This
is another way for the client to say that she believes the proposed settlement
is unjust. In the initial interview Jack may find it wise to begin to prepare his
clients for the fact that settlements do not typically provide what either side
sees as a perfectly just resolution to the dispute.346
2. Procedural Justice
Perceptions of procedural justice relate to the fairness of the processes,
procedures, and rules by which a decision is reached. 347 People take into
account a variety of concerns in making judgments of procedural justice. In
particular, when evaluating the features of a decisionmaking procedure,
people pay attention to both the quality of decisions and the quality of
interpersonal treatment such features produce. 348 Thus, procedures are
considered to be more fair to the extent that they incorporate features-the
use of objective decision criteria, the opportunity for voice, neutrality, and
trustworthiness-that are thought to produce fair outcomes.349 In addition,
344 See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
345 For a discussion of the reasons cases do not settle, see Samuel R. Gross & Kent
D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 50-59 (1996).
346 Attorneys who, alternatively, lead their clients to be wildly optimistic as to their
chances of prevailing in litigation or obtaining a highly desirable settlement often must
face the problem of very angry clients when, later in the course of the representation,
such assurances cannot be fulfilled. See generally Kritzer, supra note 114.
3 4 7 See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); TYLER ET AL., supra note 339, at 88-89 (1997).
348 Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural
Justice: Defining the Meaning of a "Fair" Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 747, 748 (2003).
349 Id. at 748. For a discussion of procedural justice as a fairness heuristic, see E.
Allan Lind, Fairness Judgments as Cognitions, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY
LIFE 416, 421 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002). E. Allan Lind et al.,
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procedures are considered to be more fair to the extent that they ensure
dignified and respectful treatment.350 In making these evaluations of
procedural fairness, people tend to be concerned both with whether the
formal "policies, rules, and prevailing norms of the group as a whole" are
fair, as well as with whether individuals act fairly in carrying out the formal
rules. 351 The manner in which an individual is treated signals information
about the degree to which he or she is valued by others in the system.352
Therefore, "treatment with dignity and respect are important because they tell
people that they have status within the group."353 In contrast, treatment that
does not signal dignity and respect conveys a message that indicates a lack of
status within the community.
When people believe that a decisionmaking procedure is fair, they are
more likely to believe that the outcome produced by that procedure is fair,354
have more respect for the institution or decisionmaker,355 are more willing to
Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision
Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 226 (1993).
350 Blader & Tyler, supra note 348, at 748. See also Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and
the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 527, 530 (2001); Robert J. Bies, The
Predicament of Injustice: The Management of Moral Outrage, 9 RES. IN
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. 289, 292 (1987) [hereinafter Bies, Predicament of Injustice];
Robert J. Bies & Joseph S. Moag, Interactional Justice: Communication Criteria of
Fairness, 1 RES. ON NEGOT. IN ORG. 43, 47 (1986); Robert J. Bies, Are Procedural
Justice and Interactional Justice Conceptually Distinct?, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 85, 85-112 (Jerald A. Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt eds.,
2005).
351 Blader & Tyler, supra note 348, at 749. Accordingly, people care about both the
formal and informal aspects of decisionmaking quality and also about the formal and
informal aspects of the quality of their treatment. Id. (describing evidence for this four-
factor model).
352 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 347; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Strategies for
Gaining Deference: Increasing Social Harmony or Creating False Consciousness?, in
SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 69 (John M. Darley et al.
eds., 2001).
353 Tyler, supra note 352, at 80. According to social identity theory, individuals
construct their social identity using information they acquire as they interact with others.
See generally Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 1 (1982). In the context of procedural justice, Tyler argues that "[p]eople may
value this favorable identity-relevant information more than they value receiving fair or
favorable outcomes." Tyler, supra note 352, at 80.
354 See Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to
Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 103, 128 (1988).
355 See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas:
Procedural Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J.
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comply with the decision reached, 356 and have more positive opinions of the
social policies that are formulated under the procedure.35 7 Similarly, fair,
interpersonal treatment in negotiation has been shown to diminish self-
serving bias, reduce the likelihood of impasse, and increase satisfaction with
substantive outcomes. 358
Procedural justice theory is obviously relevant in considering whether a
formal courtroom or administrative hearing procedure is fair. However, it
also has implications for less formal procedures such as mediation or
negotiation. 359 As Jack counsels his clients on the choice of procedures for
resolving their disputes, he ought keep in mind the ways in which various
approaches to dispute resolution may impact procedural justice perceptions.
In addition, procedural justice theory provides a lens through which attorneys
can better understand clients' perspectives on the events that have led them to
consult a lawyer. One study on layoffs found that employees who did not
receive any explanation as to why they were being let go were the most
angry about their treatment.360 If Jack learns that Edna not only received no
explanation as to why she was terminated, but was also escorted out of the
building immediately by security, the procedural justice literature will help
Jack understand Edna's sense of violation and loss of respect.
The procedural justice literature can also be applied to the interview
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482, 488 (1995).
356 See generally E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to
Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 192 (Austin Sarat et al.
eds., 1998); Lind et al., supra note 349, at 225 (1993); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (1990).
357 See Tyler & Degoey, supra note 355, at 482.
358 See, e.g., Kwok Leung et al., Effects of Interactional Justice on Egocentric Bias
in Resource Allocation Decisions, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 405 (2004); Tina Nabatchi &
Lisa B. Bingham, Expanding Our Models of Justice in Dispute Resolution: A Field Test
of the Contribution of Interactional Justice, IACM 15th Annual Conference,
http://ssm.com/abstract=305205 (finding that an index comprised of questions about the
interactions between the negotiators had a significant influence on outcome satisfaction).
359 See Tom Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK
OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 295 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004)
(discussing how justice judgments influence negotiation); Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants'
Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural
Justice, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 179, 187-91 (discussing how procedural justice factors may
apply to mediation). See also Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected
Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 860 (2001)
(arguing that all court-connected third-party processes "should and must be judged
against the standard of procedural justice").
360 See Barclay et al., supra note 79, at 630.
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process itself. When attorneys conduct interviews they are providing their
clients with an exposure to our system of justice, in its broad sense. Author
Jean Sternlight, in her prior incarnation as a plaintiff-side employment
attorney,361 conducted many interviews with persons such as Edna, who
believed they had been treated unfairly in the course of their employment. On
countless occasions Sternlight found herself having to provide such clients
with the bad news that their claim would likely fail on the merits or that,
while theoretically meritorious, their claim was not economically viable.
Nonetheless, many of these clients, having received such bad news, still told
Sternlight that they felt much better for having had the opportunity to at least
tell their story to a neutral person who could give them some feedback on
whether they had been treated illegally. Often such clients, while told they
"did not have a case," left the office seemingly happier than when they had
entered. Accordingly, Jack can make sure he gives his clients a full
opportunity to tell their story and explain to his clients how their treatment
likely compares to that of other similarly situated persons. He should be
careful not to interrupt his clients or otherwise treat them rudely, as this
would not be consistent with the dignified treatment associated with
procedural justice.
There are several reasons why Jack might want to interview his clients in
a way that would leave them feeling that they had experienced procedural
justice. First, as an attorney who cares about his clients' welfare, he should
want them to have a rewarding interview experience. Second, providing
procedural justice in the interview may increase his clients' satisfaction with
proposed settlements. Clients who have not had the opportunity to present
their grievances may resist settling and look to a trial to obtain procedural
justice. Third, providing greater satisfaction to his clients by giving them a
procedurally just experience may ultimately lead to more client referrals.
3. Retributive Justice
Finally, retributive impulses can be triggered by the outrage that is
experienced when an offender violates a community norm and causes
361 Stemlight worked for a small firm in Philadelphia, Samuel & Ballard P.C., from
1983-92. Professor Ann McGinley, also a former plaintiff-side employment attorney,
reports a similar experience: "I found that clients needed to talk about their experience at
work. Often, even if they did not have a legal case, they were comfortable and relieved to
have told the story to me. I gave them sympathy and expressed regret that the law did not
recognize their loss. I explained that I understood that what they had experienced was
real and painful. They often went away happy that they had been heard, at least by me."
E-mail from Ann C. McGinley to Jean Stemlight (July 11, 2007) (on file with authors).
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harm.362 "Retribution is concerned primarily with the elimination of a sense
of injustice" that results from the offense and implicates issues of whether,
how, and how much punishment is warranted. 363 Retributive justice, then, is
aimed at reasserting the value of the violated norm, providing the offender
with his or her just deserts, and alleviating the harm that resulted from the
violation.
Understanding the human craving for retribution or vengeance may help
Jack better understand the desires of his clients. Whereas Jack tends to try to
solve all legal problems monetarily in order to compensate for harm that was
done, at least some of his clients may place a higher premium on retributive
concerns than on compensation. Thus, in questioning Edna, Jack should be
aware that Edna may be very interested in punishing the supervisor who
targeted her for termination, or in requiring the company to make a public or
at least private apology. Learning about these desires may eventually help
Jack settle the case.
H. How People Make Decisions
The counseling portion of an interview 364 is designed to help clients
make or at least start to make decisions. In the litigation context, potential
plaintiffs like Edna and the Kiddos must, for example, decide whether to
initiate settlement discussions, whether to invite the opposition to participate
in mediation or arbitration, whether to commence litigation, or whether to
take no legal steps at all. Clients who are defendants or potential defendants
in a lawsuit, such as Carl, must similarly decide whether to try to settle the
claim expeditiously, and if so how. If they choose not to settle or cannot
settle early, they must explore other procedural options including, if they are
sued, how to defend the lawsuit. Transactional clients like Agnes must begin
to decide how to structure the transaction, and how to communicate the terms
of the transaction to affected persons, if at all. While philosophies differ
regarding how directive lawyers should be in helping clients make these sorts
362 See Neil Vidmar, Retributive Justice: Its Social Context, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 291 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002). See also John
Darley, Just Punishments: Research on Retributional Justice, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 314 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002).
363 Dale T. Miller & Neil Vidmar, The Social Psychology of Punishment Reactions,
in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO TIMES OF SCARCITY AND
CHANGE 145, 146 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981).
364 We focus here on the initial counseling session. Subsequent counseling, such as
counseling about settlement will involve other aspects of psychology not covered here.
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of decisions,365 both directive and non-directive lawyers need to understand
how clients structure and make decisions in order to be effective as
counselors. 366
1. "Rational" Decisionmaking
In making decisions we might strive to have the time and resources to be
able to obtain all the information needed to make an informed decision, fully
analyze all the relevant options, and make explicit trade-offs among all the
relevant dimensions of the decision problem. Indeed, in some abstract
models:
[D]ecisionmakers are assumed to (1) perfectly define the problem, (2)
identify all criteria, (3) accurately weigh all of the criteria according to their
preferences, (4) know all relevant alternatives, (5) accurately assess each
alternative based on each criterion, and (6) accurately calculate and choose
the alternative with the highest perceived value. 367
Yet, in the real world, there are a variety of reasons that perfectly rational
decisionmaking based on full information does not take place. First, human
beings often use cognitive strategies that result in analysis that can depart in
predictable ways from perfect rationality. 368 Second, we do not and probably
365 See SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 8 at 10-16 (contrasting "instrumental" view
of lawyering, in which client is viewed as a "necessary nuisance," with more client-
centered approach advocated by the authors). See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress
in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV.
369 (2006) (showing that exponents of client-centered representation have differing
views regarding the meaning of that often-praised phrase).
366 See Kathleen M. Galotti, Decision Structuring in Important Real-Life Choices,
18 PSYCHOL. Sci. 320, 320 (2007) (using the phrase "decision structuring" to describe
"the phase in which the individual considers options and decides on criteria to be used in
choosing among those options"); John M.A. DiPippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve
Legal Counseling, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 81 (2002) (discussing how
psychology of non-rational choice can be used to improve counseling of legal clients).
367 BAZERMAN, supra note 126, at 3-4 (1994). See JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE
ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 24 (1993) (describing weighted additive rule); JONATHAN
BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 312-15 (3d ed. 2000) (describing multi-attribute utility
theory (MAUT)). These approaches are compensatory decisionmaking strategies in that
they utilize all the available information and make explicit trade-offs. PAYNE ET AL.,
supra, at 24.
368 See supra Part III.A and III.B; infra Part III.H. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
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cannot make decisions based on full information. Gathering information is
costly, time consuming, and sometimes impossible. For example, when
clients such as Edna and the Kiddos decide whether to try to negotiate a
resolution to their situation prior to commencing litigation, they and their
lawyers must make an assessment as to how the opposing party might
respond to settlement proposals both prior and subsequent to the
commencement of a lawsuit. They must also consider what the likely costs
(financial and otherwise) of a lawsuit would be, and what the likely results of
a lawsuit might be. Absent a crystal ball, none of this information is
completely knowable. 369
Furthermore, even if we could gather all that information, we also lack
the time and capacity to consider a near infinite number of options. 370 Were
we to try to make decisions based on completely full information, we would
probably not be able to make any decisions at all. Even in a simple legal
dispute, for example, the client and attorney might consider whether to
negotiate before litigating; who should conduct any such negotiations
(attorney or client); whether negotiations should be conducted by letter, e-
mail, phone, or in person; and with whom negotiations should be attempted.
The list of potential options is essentially infinite, particularly given that
background facts will continue to change.
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1053 (2000); Daniel J. Keys & Barry
Schwartz, "Leaky" Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making
Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality, 2 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 162, 162
(2007) (arguing that because "the psychological processes that affect decisions may be
said also to "leak" into one's experience[s]," the "formal principles of rationality do not
provide a good enough normative standard against which to assess decisionmaking").
369 Some students, lawyers, or clients may assume that it is always best to sue first,
in order to show one has some clout and lay claim to the preferred forum, and then
negotiate later, from a position of strength. While this is sometimes the best approach,
there also are circumstances under which it will make sense to negotiate first. For
example, initiating litigation actually worsens one's bargaining position where the
opposing party would prefer to avoid the publicity that accompanies a lawsuit. Similarly,
filing suit can potentially harm a plaintiffs reputation in certain circles or cause a
defendant to feel compelled to clear its name in public.
370 Indeed, having more options to consider is not necessarily or always a good
thing. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE is LESS (2004);
Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88
IOWA L. REv. 601 (2003).
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2. Alternative Decisionmaking Strategies
Thus, while an approach to decisionmaking based on assumptions of
perfect rationality and full information may seem ideal, it is for good reason
that both lawyers and clients use a variety of decisionmaking strategies that
depart from this model. For example, people may examine options one by
one until they find an option that satisfies a predetermined set of minimum
requirements-a process known as "satisficing."371 When decisionmakers
satisfice, they do not compare all the options and attempt to find the "best"
one, but settle for the first "good enough" or minimally acceptable option
they encounter. 372 Following a somewhat similar strategy-"elimination by
aspects"--decisionmakers eliminate options that do not meet some threshold
on a particular attribute.373 This process is continued with successive
attributes until a single option remains.374 Other strategies include choosing
the option that rates the highest on the attribute that is deemed to be the most
important; 375 choosing the option that is better on a majority of attributes; 376
371 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 204-06 (1957). See also Herbert A.
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. EcON. 99, 118 (1955)
(concluding that people seek results that are "good enough").
372 SIMON, supra note 371, at 204-05. Satisficing is an example of a non-
compensatory approach to decisionmaking. In non-compensatory decisionmaking,
tradeoffs are not made between the attributes of options. Thus, "excellent values on some
attributes cannot compensate for poor values on other attributes." PAYNE ET AL., supra
note 367, at 2; see also Ilan Yaniv & Yaacov Schul, Acceptance and Elimination
Procedures in Choice: Noncomplementarity and the Role of Implied Status Quo, 82
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 293, 295 (2000); BARON, supra
note 367.
373 See Amos Tversky, Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice, 79 PSYCHOL.
REv. 281, 285 (1972).
374 Id. Ultimately, one must find an attribute that distinguishes remaining options.
Id. 375 PAYNE ET AL., supra note 367, at 26 (describing the "lexicographic heuristic");
Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Betting on One Good Reason: The Take the Best
Heuristic, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 75, 80-81 (Gerd Gigerenzer et
al. eds., 1999) (describing the "Take the Best" heuristic). Ties can be broken by looking
to the next most important attribute. PAYNE ET AL., supra note 367, at 26; see also Paul
Slovic, Choice Between Equally Valued Alternatives, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HuM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 280 (1975).
376 PAYNE ET AL., supra note 367, at 27 (describing the "majority of confirming
dimensions" approach which involves a series of pairwise comparisons between options,
each time retaining the option that fares better on more dimensions). This is a partially
compensatory strategy.
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choosing the option chosen last time377 or based on the attribute used the last
time; 378 choosing the first option that comes to mind;379 or choosing an
option based on what other people have chosen under similar
circumstances.380 Each of these strategies may well fail to provide the "best"
course of action, yet such strategies are used because of the costs and
limitations of alternative choice processes and may sometimes be the "best"
under such circumstances. Indeed, there is evidence that people who satisfice
are more satisfied with their choices than are those who attempt to
maximize. 381
Lawyers who are knowledgeable about decisionmaking strategies can
help their clients in several ways. First, such lawyers will not necessarily
attempt to make decisions based on full information or infinite options.
Rather, they will recognize that information is costly and that there are
tradeoffs between seeking more information and making a decision based on
existing information. Second, knowing that decisions based on full
information are virtually impossible, attorneys will help their client choose a
good decisionmaking strategy that is consistent with the client's goals,
budget,38 2 and need to make a prompt decision.383 Armed with this insight,
Jack might say:
Mr. and Mrs. Kiddo, we are going to need to make a decision whether to
377 Id. at 29 (describing the "habitual heuristic").
378 Gigerenzer & Goldstein, supra note 375, at 80 (describing the "Take the Last"
heuristic).
379 Daniel G. Goldstein et al., Group Report: Why and When Do Simple Heuristics
Work?, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 173, 177 (Gerd Gigerenzer
& Reinhard Selten eds., 2001) (describing the "Take the First" heuristic).
380 Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive
Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 3, 31-32 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al.
eds., 1999) (describing heuristics based on imitation).
381 See, e.g., Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness is a
Matter of Choice, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1179 (2002); see also
Sheena S. Iyengar et al., Doing Better But Feeling Worse: Looking for the "Best" Job
Undermines Satisfaction, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 143, 147 (2006).
382 Some clients may, based on their goals and budget, want to choose a more
complete decisionmaking process than others. That is, a client who is doing estate
planning for a $20 million estate needs and can afford a more complete review of options
than a client like Agnes, with a $200,000 estate, may need or be able to afford.
383 Sometimes an attorney and client will believe that they need to make a process
choice quickly based on factors such as the availability of a key decisionmaker, possible
impending bankruptcy, the fear that the opponent will bring a lawsuit first and thus obtain
their choice of forum, or the concern that certain information may become public.
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initiate litigation fairly soon against the company, or whether we should,
instead, attempt to negotiate a resolution prior to commencing litigation.
Ideally it would be great if we could have all possible information before
making this decision, such as our likelihood of prevailing in court, how
much we would recover if successful, and how the company is likely to
respond to a settlement demand. Unfortunately, we will never have all the
answers. So, we must decide how much research we want to do before
deciding which course of action to follow. What are your thoughts at
present?
Such a comment will invite the Kiddos to provide their initial thoughts
on litigation versus settlement, while also providing an opportunity to let
them know that all strategies carry risk.
3. Seeking Information
When people do attempt to generate more information to guide their
decisionmaking, they may not always act optimally.384 Setting aside the costs
of gathering information, it is generally useful to gather lots of information
and generate lots of options. However, people sometimes seek information
that is irrelevant in that it would not alter their decisions. 385 For example, in
one study people were asked to decide whether to book a vacation at an
attractive price that was about to expire, to decline to book the vacation, or to
pay a small fee to preserve the option to purchase at the sale price for two
additional days.386 The majority of people who were told that they had just
passed a major exam and the majority of people who were told that they had
failed the exam chose to purchase the vacation. 387 However, people who
were told that they would learn the results of the exam the following day
tended to choose to defer the decision about the vacation until they learned
whether they passed or failed.388 Thus, when the information (pass v. fail)
384 See generally Anthony Bastardi & Eldar Shafir, Nonconsequential Reasoning
and Its Consequences, 9 CuRRENT DIRECTIONs PSYCHOL. Sci. 216 (2000).
385 Id. The "sure-thing principle" holds that "if one prefers x to y given any possible
state of the world, then one should prefer x to y even when the exact state of the world is
not known." Id. at 216.
386 Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under
Uncertainty, 3 PSYCHOL. Sci. 305, 305 (1992).
387 Id. Of those who were told that they had passed the exam, 54% chose to
purchase the vacation; of those who were told that they had failed, 57% chose to do so.
Only 30% of the pass group and 31% of the fail group chose to preserve their option. Id.
388 Id. at 305-06. 61% chose to pay to preserve their option. Id. at 306.
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was available at the outset, it did not influence decisions about the vacation.
Nonetheless, people in the group that lacked the information preferred to
wait for this information before making a decision, apparently failing to
recognize that the information would not otherwise affect their decision. 389
Other similar studies have found that people are particularly likely to seek
out additional information when their decision is difficult to make. 390
Not only can the process of searching or waiting for this irrelevant
information be costly, but it can also change the nature of the decision,
turning information that initially had no value into information that can make
a difference. Importantly, there is evidence that "[w]aiting for information
that appears relevant to a decision can raise the extent to which it is brought
before one's attention and thus increase its influence on choice." 391 Because
people do not want to conceive of themselves as choosing to seek out
irrelevant information, "they see the pursuit as indicative of the fact that the
information has potential impact, and proceed to treat it accordingly. ' 392 In
one study, the majority of students considering a protest over campus
bookstore prices chose to settle with the university even when it was clear
that the university would not take disciplinary action against them if they
engaged in the protest.393 However, when it was unclear whether or not the
university would take disciplinary action, most students chose to wait until
this information was available and, once it was clear that no discipline would
ensue, the majority chose to protest rather than to settle.394 Thus, waiting for
the information imbued it with importance to the decision in a way that
altered the decision that would have been made if the same information had
been available at the outset.395
An attorney who is aware of this tendency to seek out even irrelevant
information can try to counter it in herself and in her clients. In the course of
389 Id. See also Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, Thinking Through Uncertainty:
Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice, 24 COGNTVE PSYCHOL. 449, 452-59 (1992)
(finding similar results in a "Prisoner's Dilemma" game).
390 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics
of Deferred Decision, 3 PSYCHOL. Sci. 358, 359-60 (1992).
391 Anthony Bastardi & Eldar Shafir, On the Pursuit and Misuse of Useless
Information, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 28 (1998).
392 Id. at 30.
393 Bastardi & Shafir, supra note 384, at 218.
394 Id.
395 Bastardi & Shafir, supra note 391, at 28 (finding similar results for scenarios
involving college applicants, student course choices, mortgage applications, and
consumer purchases); see also Donald A. Redelmeier et al., The Beguiling Pursuit of
More Information, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 374 (2001).
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an initial interview, both an attorney and client may well feel that they want
to gather more information before making a decision such as whether to
initiate a lawsuit, whether to initiate settlement conversations, or whether to
structure a transaction a certain way. Of course it is often good and
appropriate to seek out information. Neither an attorney nor client should
necessarily want to make snap judgments. Yet, as the attorney feels the need
to seek out information she should at least ask herself: "Is this information
really important? If I found out X, what would I do? And if I found out not-
X, what would I do?" Perhaps the attorney, having had this internal
conversation, will realize that the information she thinks she needs is not
important after all. Similarly, knowing that many people have a preference to
delay decisions while they gather information that may actually be irrelevant,
Jack may want to ask delaying clients similar questions. If the client realizes
that the information she thought she wanted would not actually make a
difference, the delay may be avoided.
4. Framing
Jack might think that people (like computers) would be able to
objectively analyze the pros and cons of an option and decide whether that
option maximizes their interests. However, it turns out that peoples'
evaluations of options are linked to the way the option is described or
framed, particularly relative to other options.396 These predictable biases can
be important in the context of lawyer-client interviews.
Peoples' willingness to take risks is affected by whether they believe they
are facing a potential gain or loss.397 In a body of work known as "prospect
theory," 398 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have shown that people are
396 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky,
Prospect Theory]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, & Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343-44 (1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices]; Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 120-28 (1996) (applying insights from
psychology of framing to the litigation context).
397 Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 396, at 267; Kahneman &
Tversky, Choices, supra note 396, at 341; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 396, at 453-
54.
398 Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 396, at 263; Kahneman &
Tversky, Choices, supra note 396, at 342; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 396, at 454;
see also Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
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risk-averse towards moderate to high probability gains 399 and low probability
losses,400 and risk-seeking towards moderate to high probability losses401 and
low probability gains.40 2 Moreover, people tend to be "loss averse," such that
"losses loom larger than gains" and a loss of a given size tends to be more
aversive than a gain of comparable size is attractive. 40 3 While one might
think that "a gain is a gain and a loss is a loss," it turns out that the
characterization of options as gains or losses is highly manipulable.40 4 A
number of implications flow from these insights.
First, people may demand more to give up something they already
possess than they would be willing to pay to acquire that same item-a
phenomenon referred to as the "endowment effect. '405 For example, in one
study half of a group of students were given coffee mugs. 40 6 Students with
mugs were asked to indicate the price at which they would sell the mug;
students without mugs were asked to name the price at which they would buy
a mug; trades would then be executed as determined by the responses. 40 7
However, few trades were executed because mug owners consistently set
CI. L. REv. 163, 167-68 (2000) (noting that legal scholars have tended to emphasize the
part of Tversky and Kahneman's findings having to do with moderate to high probability
risks, but neglected the application of their theory to low probability losses and gains).
399 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTANTY 297, 306 (1992). That is,
people might not pay $100 to obtain a 50% chance of winning $200.
400 Id. Thus, people tend to be willing to pay a little bit up front to insure against
large, but low probability negative risk.
401 Id. That is, people might prefer to take a 25% risk of having to pay a $1000 fine,
than pay $250 to surely avoid that fine.
402 Id. We know, from the abundance of lotteries, that people are very willing to
spend a few dollars to obtain a very, very low chance of winning a large lottery payout.
403 Id.
404 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 396, at 343; Korobkin &
Guthrie, supra note 113, at 1-2.
405 See generally Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption,
150 J. INSTrrUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 18 (1994); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 193, 194 (1991); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive
Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REv. 1341, 1359, 1368 (1995)
(demonstrating that pain and suffering awards are higher when framed as the amount
necessary to make one suffer the injury ex ante than when framed as the amount
necessary to make the plaintiff whole ex post).
406 Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1330 (1990).
407 Id. at 1330-31.
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selling prices that were higher than the prices set by buyers. 408
Second, people tend to prefer the status quo over other options because
the potential downsides of a change loom larger than the potential gains-a
tendency known as the "status quo bias." 40 9 Thus, people tend to prefer to
stick with their current entitlements and tend to gravitate toward default
rules. 410 In one telling example, the states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania
both offered two different levels of automobile insurance coverage-one
level that had a higher premium and entailed the right to sue and a second
level with a lower premium and no right to sue.411 However, the states
differed in one important respect-in Pennsylvania the default policy
comprised the higher priced, more comprehensive policy with a discount
available for those who would waive the right to sue.412 In New Jersey, the
default policy was the lower priced policy, with an option to pay more to
obtain the right to sue.413 Although the policies in the two states were
similar, more drivers in Pennsylvania (75%) opted to purchase the more
comprehensive policy than did drivers in New Jersey (20%), with most
drivers in each state opting for the default policy. 414
A third implication is that people tend to find a particular option less
attractive when considered among other options than when it is considered in
isolation-a phenomenon known as option devaluation. 415 When people
compare options, they tend to compare the pros and cons of the options.
Because losses loom larger than gains, the negative features will assert
prominence in this comparison and each option will look less attractive than
it would have on its own.416 Finally, a tendency to avoid losses can incline
people to overweigh "sunk costs"-that is, costs that have already been
408 Id. at 1332.
409 See Kahneman et al., supra note 405, at 194; Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo
Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608, 625 (1998).
410 Korobkin, supra note 409, at 625; Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The
Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J.
EcON. 1149, 1159 (2001) (finding increased participation in 401(k) plans when
enrollment was the default).
411 Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 48 (1993).
412 Id.
4131Id.
4141Id.
415 See Lyle Brenner et al., Comparison, Grouping, and Preference, 10 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 225, 227 (1999); Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff
Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING REs. 281, 286-87 (1992).
416 Brenner et al., supra note 415, at 225.
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incurred. 417 Because such costs are not recoverable, decisions about whether
to invest additional resources (e.g., time, money) should not take them into
account.418 Nevertheless, decisionmaking is often influenced by such
previous investments. 419 For example, one study found that theater season
ticket holders who had paid more for their tickets were more likely to attend
the performances than those who had paid less.420
Jack, in discussing options with his clients, may wittingly or unwittingly
greatly influence his clients' choices by the way in which he frames those
choices. For example, when talking with the Kiddos, Jack might frame the
decision to file a lawsuit as a loss--emphasizing the irrevocability of such a
filing. This might incline the Kiddos to opt to try negotiations first, so as to
avoid the loss of options. Alternatively, Jack could frame such a decision as a
gain-emphasizing the possible gains in leverage and momentum. This
might incline the Kiddos to file suit. Ideally, Jack can present the Kiddos
with both the gain and loss frames and help them grapple with balancing the
inevitable risks and benefits.
Jack will also inevitably frame options when he chats with Carl Cementa.
As a potential defendant, Carl may be thinking about future losses:
If Henrietta sues me, I will lose the legal fees I will have to pay and I will
also lose whatever I have to pay out after a hearing or trial. If I choose to try
to settle now, pre-litigation, I will lose whatever amount I pay out and I will
lose out in terms of reputation because word will get out that I had to pay
off a former client.
On the other hand, Jack could potentially frame an early settlement as a
gain, in which case it would likely look much more appealing to Carl. How
can an attorney turn a loss into a gain? Just listen:
Carl, I know you feel like you are in a tough situation. One option is a
quick, low cost settlement. It may be that if you reach out to Henrietta now,
on your own, before any lawsuit is filed, you can resolve this informally. In
my experience, some clients just want to hear an apology, and perhaps
417 See generally Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost,
35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985); Richard Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 39,
47-50 (1980).
418 Arkes & Blumer, supra note 417, at 124-25, 139 (explaining that sunk costs
should not objectively influence decisions).
4 19 Id.
420 ld. at 127-29.
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receive some monetary recognition. Perhaps you can give her a call, listen
to her explain the problems she has been suffering, and offer her your
professional advice. You could explain that you have never had a problem
before like she described, that you really think that her water damage
problem is due to other factors, but that you would nonetheless be willing to
refund her a substantial portion of her original payment. Though you may
not feel like paying out $5,000, this is really peanuts compared to the legal
costs and risks of liability you could be facing were she to actually proceed
with a lawsuit. It is at least worth considering whether you want to try to
save those expenses by making an early settlement.
Carl may still reject the idea of attempting an early settlement, but
certainly Jack has increased the likelihood that Carl will choose to try to
settle early by framing a potential settlement as a gain rather than a loss.
It should now be clear that attorneys have tremendous power to influence
their clients' decisions by framing their clients' decisions in a particular way.
Indeed, even if an attorney has a goal of letting clients make their own
decisions, it will be virtually impossible for an attorney not to influence their
clients' decisions by framing the choices in one way or another. So, what is
such an attorney to do? The best we can suggest is that the attorney, now
more conscious of her power, do her best to describe client options in an
evenhanded manner. That is, if an option can be seen as either a loss or a
gain, the attorney should use both descriptions. 421
5. Affective Forecasting
Good decisionmaking depends, in part, on the ability to anticipate or
predict how we will feel about our choices once we have made them. To
what extent will a client, for instance, be more satisfied with settlement X or
settlement Y? To what extent will one feel vindicated following a favorable
jury verdict? Recent research in psychology has explored how well people
perform in predicting their future emotional states.422 This research has
421 A choice may also depend on whether the decision task is approached as one in
which an option is selected or one in which one or more options are rejected. When
acting affirmatively to choose an option, attractive features of the options tend to be
salient. In contrast, when deciding which option(s) to reject, the downsides of each option
are the focus. Accordingly, an option that has both strong positives (i.e., reasons to
choose that option) and strong negatives (i.e., reasons to reject it), may be both more
likely to be chosen and more likely to be rejected. See generally Eldar Shafir, Choosing
Versus Rejecting: Why Some Options Are Both Better and Worse Than Others, 21
MEMORY & COGNITION 546 (1993).
422 See generally Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35
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found that people are reasonably accurate in predicting: (1) the valence or
direction of their future emotions-that is, at predicting whether something
will make them feel good or bad, and (2) the specific emotion they will
feel-for example, whether they will feel sadness or anger.423 On the other
hand, however, this research has demonstrated that people are not very good
at predicting the intensity or the duration of these anticipated emotions:
In a score of studies, people have been shown to mispredict how they
will feel after relocating a household, breaking up with a romantic partner,
losing an election, receiving a gift, learning they have a serious illness,
failing to secure a promotion, scoring well on an examination, failing to
lose weight, reading tragic stories, winning a football game, receiving
personality feedback, being insulted, tasting food, and so on.424
Other studies have demonstrated a similar inability to predict the
emotions that will follow the denial of tenure,425 the results of a pregnancy
test,4 26 or the death of a spouse. 427
There are many reasons why people err in making such predictions.
Sometimes people lack experience with the event and do not know what to
expect;428 fail to accurately remember their previous emotional reactions;429
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (2003) (reviewing research on affective
forecasting); Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness
Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978). For an examination of some
implications of affective forecasting for legal contexts, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law
and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005).
423 Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 422, at 347-5 1.
424 Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decisions and Revisions: The Affective
Forecasting of Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 503
(2002) (citing studies).
425 Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 622-24 (1998).
426 Barbara A. Mellers & A. Peter McGraw, Anticipated Emotions as Guides to
Choice, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 210, 212 (2001).
427 Michael S. Caserta & Dale A. Lund, Bereavement Stress and Coping Among
Older Adults: Expectations Versus the Actual Experience, 25 OMEGA: J. DEATH & DYING
33, 34 (1992).
428 See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 422, at 354-55 (describing a "misconstrual
problem"); see also Julie A. Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined
Gender Harassment, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 15, 21, 23-24 (2001) (fimding that people predict
they would feel angry in response to harassment, but that victims report feeling afraid).
429 Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 422, at 358-60; see also Daniel Kahneman et al.,
When More Pain is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End, 4 PSYCHOL. SCl. 401, 404
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or rely on faulty theories about what affects their emotional well-being. 430 In
addition, people tend to fall prey to "focalism" or a "focusing illusion" in that
they focus on a particular aspect of the event in making their prediction and
do not take into account the countervailing emotional influences of other
aspects of the event or of other life experiences. 43' Moreover, people may be
disposed to an "isolation effect" in which they "disregard components that
the alternatives share, and focus on the components that distinguish them."432
Finally, people tend to suffer from "immune neglect" as they underappreciate
the ways in which their "psychological immune system" will buffer them
from the emotional fallout of future events.433
Given these phenomena, lawyers may potentially be able to help clients
figure out what they really want.434 Although the lawyer cannot literally get
inside her client's head, the lawyer does at least have the benefit of having
worked with other similarly situated clients in the past.435 Thus, when Edna
tells Jack that what she wants more than anything is simply to force the
company to defend its action in court, Jack can tell her that other clients
thought the same thing but were actually disappointed when the trial
ultimately came about. Or, Carl may be a non-confrontational person who
(1993) (finding that recollections of pain were disproportionately influenced by the peak
and the end of the experience).
430 See generally Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, If We Are So Rich, Why Aren't We
Happy?, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 821 (1999); Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, Beyond
Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 (2004); WELL-
BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
2003); Rebecca K. Ratner & Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest and Its Effects on
Social Action, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (2001).
431 See David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make
People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI.
340, 340 (1998); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 822 (2000).
432 Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 396, at 271; see generally
Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Location, Location, Location: The Misprediction of Satisfaction
in Housing Lotteries, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1421 (2003).
433 See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 422, at 381 (arguing that "people fail to
appreciate the extent to which they will 'ordinize' positive events by making sense of
them [and] fail to appreciate the extent to which they will 'defang' negative events by
rationalizing, reconstruing, or minimizing them"); see generally Timothy D. Wilson et
al., Making Sense: The Causes of Emotional Evanescence, in ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY 209 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2002).
434 Chris Guthrie & David F. Sally, Miswanting, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK
277, 279-81 (Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
435 Id. at 280; DANIEL T. GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 245-51 (2005).
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fears that having a face-to-face conversation with an angry Henrietta would
be extremely unpleasant. Again, Jack may offer the reassurance that other
clients, who felt similarly, ultimately found such a conversation to be
productive. While Carl may be correct that face-to-face conversation with
Henrietta would not be enjoyable, it may well be less unpleasant than he
fears. To the extent the Kiddos are focused on their concern that by settling
they will let down their son, Jack can draw their attention to other
considerations such as the possibility that continuing to fight a lawsuit and
forcing Kyle to keep reliving his bad experience may also be very hard on
him. If the Kiddos stop battling the manufacturer in court, they may still be
able to work on the issue of magnetic balls through publicity or other efforts.
6. Decision Regret
One particular emotion that people anticipate and take into account when
making decisions is regret. Regret is "the painful feeling a person
experiences upon determining she could have obtained a better outcome if
she had decided or behaved differently. ''436 When making decisions, people
anticipate the prospect that they will experience regret following the
decision-expecting to experience more regret for negative outcomes when
they must choose one option and reject other possibilities;437when they act
than when they fail to act;438 when they miss their goal by a narrow margin
or come close to succeeding but do not;4 39 when they receive feedback about
436 Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of
Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 65-66; see generally Graham Loomes &
Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under
Uncertainty, 92 ECON J. 805 (1982); David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under
Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961 (1982); Ilana Ritov, Probability of Regret:
Anticipation of Uncertainty Resolution in Choice, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 228 (1996).
437 Guthrie, supra note 370, at 635-38.
438 Thomas Gilovich & Victoria H. Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What,
When, and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 379, 380-81 (1995).
439 Counterfactual thinking occurs when people make "if only" comparisons of
actual outcomes with imagined alternatives. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Dale T.
Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REv. 136
(1986); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);
Dale T. Miller et al., Counterfactual Thinking and Social Perception: Thinking About
What Might Have Been, 23 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 305 (1990).
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what the outcomes of non-chosen options would have been;440 or when they
have made an atypical choice.44 1 Taking into account this anticipated regret,
people make decisions that they think will avoid or minimize the amount of
regret that they expect to feel.44 2 This inclination to avoid anticipated regret
means that people will take into account not only the expected outcome of
the decision itself, but also "the feelings associated with the outcomes of
foregone options."44 3
While taking into account the regret that one is likely to experience
following a decision is often reasonable, it can sometimes contribute to less
optimal decisionmaking. Certainly, "anticipated regret may 'facilitate[] high-
quality decisionmaking' by prompting a litigant to engage in 'vigilant
appraisal of each course of action' and to construct 'inventive solutions that
take account of calculated risks."' 44 4 On the other hand, overweighing or
incorrectly assessing anticipated regret may be detrimental to
440 See Guthrie, supra note 436, at 70; Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles,
Avoiding Regret in Decisions with Feedback: A Negotiation Example, 63
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 87, 87-88 (1995); see generally
Steven J. Humphrey, Feedback-Conditional Regret Theory and Testing Regret-Aversion
in Risky Choice, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 839 (2004); Marcel Zeelenberg et al.,
Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on Risky Decision
Making, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 148 (1996). Thus,
Guthrie argues that litigants settle, in part, because they "never learn what they would
have recovered at trial, but litigants who reject settlement offers in favor of trial learn the
outcomes of both options. Settlement, thus, offers litigants an opportunity to avoid, or at
least minimize, regret, while trial increases the likelihood litigants will experience
regret." Guthrie, supra note 436, at 72-73.
441 See Itamar Simonson, The Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibility on
Purchase Decisions, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 105, 106 (1992).
442 See generally Christopher J. Anderson, The Psychology of Doing Nothing:
Forms of Decision Avoidance Result From Reason and Emotion, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL.
139 (2003); Bell, supra note 436, at 979; Robert A. Josephs et al., Protecting the Self
From the Negative Consequences of Risky Decisions, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 26 (1992); Alvan R. Feinstein, The 'Chagrin Factor' and Qualitative Decision
Analysis, 145 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1257 (1985); Erik Hoelzl & George
Loewenstein, Wearing Out Your Shoes to Prevent Someone Else From Stepping Into
Them: Anticipated Regret and Social Takeover in Sequential Decisions, 98
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 15 (2005); Russell Korobkin,
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default
Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998).
443 Guthrie, supra note 436, at 69.
444 Id. at 84-85 (quoting IRVING I. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 219, 222, 224
(1977)).
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decisionmaking, resulting, for example, in a greater willingness to settle
below an initially determined reservation price 445 or causing people to place
too high of a premium on the ability to change their minds in instances in
which such flexibility is not valuable.446 In addition, a person who fears the
regret that may flow from taking an action may err too much on the side of
doing nothing. Similarly, a person who fears the regret of a near miss may
choose a more risky course of action that will either clearly work or clearly
fail, but not miss by a little. These choices may not be optimal.
Unfortunately, moreover, people's predictions about their post-decision
regret may not always be correct. 447 In particular, as discussed above, people
are not terribly accurate in predicting the intensity and duration of their
future emotional reactions.448 Indeed, recent studies have shown that people
may anticipate feeling more regret than they ultimately experience. 449 One
reason for this may be that decisionmakers tend to evaluate options
differently once they have made a decision--changing their evaluations in
ways that may help to minimize regret. Psychological research has found that
the act of "making a decision can lead to selective memory for information
supporting that decision. '450 Studies have found that for a variety of
445 See Larrick & Boles, supra note 440, at 93-94 (demonstrating such effects in
negotiation). Studies have shown that people lower their reservation price in order to
achieve a settlement that will protect them from learning that an alternative course of
action would have been better. In effect, they pay a premium to avoid predicted regret. Id.
446 See Gilbert & Ebert, supra note 424, at 511 (finding that "people prefer to have
the opportunity to change their outcomes, and believe such opportunities will not
influence their experience of those outcomes, but that, in fact, these opportunities inhibit
the psychological processes that would otherwise have helped them manufacture
satisfaction"). There is a tendency for people to be more satisfied with a decision when
they make it and move on to adapting to it than if they retain the option to reverse the
decision. Id. See also Kin F.E. Wong & Jessica Y.Y. Kwong, The Role of Anticipated
Regret in Escalation of Commitment, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 545, 550-51 (2007)
(finding that anticipated regret associated with withdrawal or persistence influences
escalation decisions).
44 7 See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Looking Forward to Looking Backward: The
Misprediction of Regret, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 346, 346 (2004).
448 See supra Part III.G.5.
449 See generally Gilbert et al., supra note 447, at 349.
450 Mara Mather et al., Misremembrance of Options Past: Source Monitoring and
Choice, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 132, 132 (2000) [hereinafter Mather et al., Misremembrance];
see also Jon R. Davidson & Sara B. Kiesler, Cognitive Behavior Before and After
Decisions, in CONFLICT, DECISION, & DISSONANCE 10, 18-20 (Leon Festinger ed., 1964)
(demonstrating post-decisional selective memory for information when choosing between
job candidates); Denise Dellarosa & Lyle E. Boume, Jr., Decisions and Memory:
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decisions that people make (e.g., choosing job candidates, roommates, blind
dates), people are more likely to attribute positive aspects of the choices to
the option they have chosen. 451 In other words, not only are favorable aspects
of the chosen option likely to be correctly associated with that option, but
favorable aspects of the non-chosen option are likely to be incorrectly
associated with the chosen option.452 Such post-decision effects on memory
can serve to minimize post-decision regret. 453 To put it more simply, once we
decide something we have a tendency to make ourselves happy with that
decision, so that fears of subsequent regret are often overstated.
As with the phenomenon of affective forecasting, 454 the lawyer who is
knowledgeable about regret aversion can try to counsel his clients that they
should worry less about regrets and more about anticipated results. Jack
might say to Agnes, regarding the drafting of her estate documents:
I know you are worried about making a decision today, because you are
afraid you may make a decision that you will later regret. However, at some
point you really have no choice but to make a decision regarding how you
want to divide your assets. Indeed, if you continue to postpone these
decisions you will have effectively made a decision to die intestate, and that
would surely be a regrettable decision.
If a client appears to be delaying an important decision, such as whether
to settle or file a lawsuit, based on a fear of subsequent regret, Jack may want
to point out that if the client does settle or file the lawsuit, they will never
know how the alternative would have turned out. This observation may give
the client some comfort, because anticipated regret is lessened when the
outcome of alternatives will not become known.455 For example, Jack might
Differential Retrievability of Consistent and Contradictory Evidence, 23 J. VERBAL
LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAv. 669, 669 (1984) (demonstrating similar phenomenon for
decisions about whether to hospitalize a patient); see generally Mara Mather et al.,
Remembering Chosen and Assigned Options, 31 MEMORY & COGNITION 422 (2003)
(distinguishing assignments from options chosen).
451 Mather et al., Misremembrance, supra note 450, at 135-36.
452 Id. at 136. Correspondingly, people also sometimes associate negative features of
the options with the non-chosen option. Id.
453 See Armor & Taylor, supra note 116, at 343-45 (discussing optimistic
reinterpretation); Jack W. Brehm, Post-Decision Changes in the Desirability of
Alternatives, 52 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (1956); see also Thomas R. Shultz
et al., Free Choice and Cognitive Dissonance Revisited: Choosing "Lesser Evils" Versus
"Greater Goods," 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 40 (1999).
454 See supra Part III.H.5.
455 Larrick & Boles, supra note 440, at 94.
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say to Edna:
I have had clients in the past refuse to settle cases early because they were
afraid they would later hear that a similarly situated person got a better deal.
Yet, I have not once actually had a client come to me to report hearing of
such a better settlement by a similarly situated person. The reality is that
each dispute is typically so unique that the odds of learning of a similarly
situated person's settlement are pretty remote.
Or,
It is natural to want your day in court. In the past, I have often taken clients'
claims to court because the client told me they would always regret it if they
did not see whether they could win in court. But, even when I won many of
those clients' cases, an awful lot of those clients told me that going to court
did not give them the satisfaction they were seeking. In the end, clients
often find the trial to be disappointing, because even in court we cannot
force people to tell the truth or to tell the whole story.
Of course, Jack does not want to push his clients too hard to make
decisions before they are ready. If he does push them hard, and if they do
make decisions that they later regret, they could even take out their regret on
Jack by firing him, failing to send him referrals, or suing him for malpractice.
IV. RECAPPING THE RELEVANCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS TO
SPECIFIC STAGES OF INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
It is clear that psychology provides many useful insights for attorneys'
interviewing and counseling practice. This part will recap some of the
highlights, following the order of a typical interviewing and counseling
session.
A. Preparing for the Interview
1. Pre-Interview Information
Before they commence their initial interview with a client, some lawyers
chat with the client by phone, ask the client to fill out a written survey or
other document, or have a paralegal do a screening interview. From a
psychological standpoint, brief preliminary phone conversations can
538
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potentially be helpful in beginning to establish a relationship and build
rapport.4 56 Conversely, the use of surveys or screening interviews with
paralegals may give the impression that the attorney does not care enough
about the client to participate in a conversation, 457 and may lead the attorney
to pre-determine what kinds of issues are important. 458 In-person interviews
offer a better opportunity than phone conversations or certainly written
surveys to impress the client, build rapport, learn from the client, minimize
reliance on the attorney's prior conceptions, and assess the client's own
credibility. 459 If an attorney feels it is important to get a "heads up" on the
subjects to be discussed, we suggest a brief and friendly phone call to probe
the generalities of the problem.
2. Setting the Stage
Whereas Jack has expressed little or no interest in the setup of his
interview room or his appearance, psychologists have found that these things
can be important. 460 Ensuring clients' comfort is not just a matter of good
manners, but also important to help build rapport. The client who feels good
rapport with her attorney will be more forthcoming, and also more likely to
fully hear the counsel offered by the attorney.46 1 Thus, Jack should pick an
interview setting likely to ensure privacy and to build both rapport and
confidence. If an attorney keeps a neat and comfortable office with diplomas
or other awards on the wall, the intimate office setting can be appropriate.
Alternatively, attorneys who have messy or otherwise unimpressive offices
may want to conduct interviews in a nice conference room. In either setting,
the attorney may want to offer the client a choice of seating options, and
ensure that physical distance is sufficient for the client to feel comfortable.
Similarly, although Jack wants to believe that his brain, not his
appearance, is relevant to his clients, psychological research shows that
peoples' appearance plays an important role in how they are perceived.462
Perhaps Jack's longtime clients will not care if he dresses down, but with new
clients Jack must be careful to create a good first impression that builds
456 See supra Part III.E.4.
457 See id.
458 See id.
459 See supra Part III.A.
460 See supra Part III.E.6.
461 See supra Part III.E.4.
462 See note 74 and accompanying text.
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confidence and generates comfort. 463 To some degree his style of dress and
grooming may depend on his clientele. Lawyers who work as sports agents
or who represent entertainers may well want to dress more flamboyantly than
lawyers who do estate planning for elderly widows in the Midwest. So, while
we cannot prescribe a particular set of clothes or hairstyle that is best for all
situations, we can say that appearances do matter.464
B. Conducting the Interview
1. Importance of Open-Ended Questions
Once Jack commences the interview, it will be important for him to use
open-ended questions. Such questions are useful, from a psychological
standpoint, for a variety of reasons. First, they allow clients to tell the story in
the order that makes sense to them. 465 This will encourage clients to tell a
more complete story,466 aid clients' recall, 467 allow clients to provide a level
of detail with which they are confident,468 allow clients to explain their non-
legal concerns,469 and deter attorneys from putting their clients' stories into
pre-existing schema. 470 Allowing clients to speak fully in response to open-
ended questions will also speak to clients' desire for procedural justice.471
Whereas Jack has previously prided himself on his short interviews,472
cutting off clients' answers is a false efficiency that will prevent Jack from
463 See generally Milford, supra note 300 (explaining that what an attorney wears
makes a difference and giving suggestions on appropriate attire).
464 Positive affect or mood may also affect lawyers' effectiveness. For example,
there is evidence that positive emotions broaden one's attentional focus and increase
creative thinking. See generally Barbara L. Fredrickson, What Good Are Positive
Emotions?, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 300 (1998); Clark Freshman et al., The Lawyer-
Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We Know and Don't Know About How Mood Relates
to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 31; Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and
Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION 417 (Michael Lewis & Jeannette Haviland-
Jones eds., 2000).
465 See supra Part III.C.2.
466 See id.
467 See id,
468 See id.
469 See supra Part III.B. 1.
470 See supra Part III.B.3.
471 See supra Part III.G.2.
472 See supra Part II.
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either gathering full information or establishing client rapport. 47
3
Of course Jack will want to go back and ask his clients to fill in some
details, and he may well need to ask pointed questions to cover issues not
discussed by the clients in responding to open-ended questions. However,
Jack should guard against interrupting clients. Such interruptions may well
cause clients to provide more limited information or to forget key details
474
and is unlikely to make them feel respected.475
2. Cultural Sensitivity and Avoidance of Stereotypes
As Jack questions his clients he must be careful to avoid stereotypes. The
mere fact that his client is dressed like a slob does not mean, for example,
that his client is poor. Rather than make assumptions based on clients'
appearance, race, ethnicity, gender, or other factors, Jack should use his
questions to allow his clients to tell their own stories. 476 At the same time,
Jack should be attuned to the possibility that his clients' culture may lead
them to have different preferences than might be natural to Jack. Some
clients may, for example, be uncomfortable with the handshake, use of first
names, and straight gaze that Jack has said he uses with all clients.477
3. Listening Effectively and Responding Encouragingly
In addition to asking appropriate questions of his clients, Jack should
also draw on his new psychological knowledge to listen and respond
appropriately. Most people probably think they are fairly good listeners, but
in fact many of us do not listen as effectively as we might. Jack may well be
guilty of multi-tasking-letting his mind wander to other tasks while his
clients describe their problems. Or, Jack may allow himself to be guided
unduly by stereotypes and heuristics, placing his clients' problems into pre-
determined categories. 478 To battle these likely flaws Jack needs to try to
focus more attentively on his clients, and such effective listening includes not
only hearing clients' words but also paying attention to their tone and body
language.479
473 See supra Part III.E.4.
474 See supra Part III.C.2.
475 See supra Part II.G.2.
476 See supra Part III.F.
477 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
478 See supra Parts HI.A.2, III.B.
479 Some suggest that the practice of mindfulness mediation is a good way for
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Moreover, the old Jack viewed himself as a law professor, seeking to
extract facts as quickly and efficiently as possible. Law professors are not
seen as kind and gentle in their employment of the "Socratic method. '480 But,
psychological studies have shown that interviewers can both obtain more
information and also create better rapport by engaging in an effective and
sympathetic back and forth with their clients.481 Similarly, Jack must develop
some comfort with interacting with his clients at an emotional level. If Jack
attempts to completely avoid emotion, he will be unable to understand his
clients' non-legal concerns, unable to build a solid rapport with his client,
unable to encourage his client to provide all information pertinent to the legal
issue, and unable to connect well to his client as a counselor.482
4. Helping Clients Remember
Jack knows that his clients' memories are far from perfect. However, he
now understands the ways in which human memories differ from
computers. 483 He also has at his disposal a number of helpful tools derived
from the psychological literature that he can use to try to effectively trigger
client memories. For example, he can use open-ended questions; 484 ask his
clients to retell their story in chronological or reverse chronological order;
ask them to focus on details of the setting that may not be directly relevant to
the legal problem; and try to get clients to focus more on facts. 485 He also
knows from the psychological literature that he will not have much success if
he simply urges his clients to probe their memories better for all of the
facts486 and understands that frequent interruptions can interfere with client
memories.487
attorneys to become more aware of their own and others' words and body language. See
Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer. On the Potential Contributions of
Mindfulness Mediation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 1, 3-8 (2002).
480 See generally Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994); ScoTT TuRow, ONE L (1977);
THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).
481 See supra Parts III.C.2, III.E.4.
482 See supra Part III.E.3.
483 See supra notes 216-40 and accompanying text.
484 See supra Part III.C.2.
485 See id.
486 See Fisher, supra note 147, at 734.
487 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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5. Building Trust
The old Jack would never have focused much on the importance of
building trust. He would have assumed that the client would trust him based
on his obvious intellect. And, if the client did not trust him, that was the
client's loss. But, the psychology literature shows that Jack ought to care
about creating trust because he will more readily obtain full information from
a trusting client.488 Similarly, Jack will be more effective as a counselor
when his clients trust him.489 To gain his clients' trust, Jack should not only
continue to show clients that he is a competent and intelligent attorney, but
also show clients that he cares about them as people and that he is willing to
set aside his own personal interests, when necessary. Studies have shown that
open communication, perspective taking, and willingness to explain can all
be important to building a trusting relationship.
6. Being Aware of Clients'and One's Own Likely Cognitive Biases
We have discussed a broad array of cognitive biases that affect typical
clients and typical attorneys. 490 Both lawyers and clients tend to perceive the
world through their schema and stereotypes, 491 emphasize personal
characteristics when they attribute causation,492 assume that others see the
world the same way they do,493 are affected by an array of positive
illusions, 494 and show a tendency to do Monday morning quarterbacking. 495
As clients report the "facts" as they understand them to their attorneys,496 the
attorneys need to consider that their clients' discussions of these "facts" are
undoubtedly affected by the psychology of cognition. Attorneys need to ask
follow up questions and seek alternative perspectives to try to get beyond
these biases. Similarly, attorneys need to be aware of the use of such
heuristics in their own thinking.
488 See supra Part III.E.4.
489 See id.
490 See supra Part lII.
491 See supra Part III.A.2.
492 See supra Part III.A.3.
493 See supra Part III.A.4.
494 See supra Part 111.B.3.
495 See supra Part III.B.4.
496 See supra Part III.A. 1.
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7. Verifying Veracity
Jack worries, probably rightly, that some of his clients may lie to him.
However, whereas Jack used to have great confidence in his own abilities to
sniff out the liars, he now understands that very few of us are in fact able to
accurately detect lying.497 Thus, Jack will be better off keeping an open mind
and withholding judgment about veracity while seeking confirmation from
other witnesses or documents.498 Jack also needs to remember that witnesses
often report the same incident quite differently based on their different
perceptions, construal, and memories, even though neither witness is
lying.499
8. Remembering the Interview
As we have discussed, Jack's own memory is no more infallible than that
of his clients. Jack must take steps to ensure that he adequately recalls and
records his discussions with his own clients, as absent special measures,
surely his memory will fail. 500
C. Analysis
Jack is very confident of his analytical abilities and indeed has the good
LSAT scores and grades to support his confidence. Yet, it is likely that Jack,
like the rest of us, commonly falls into some analytical traps. He should
particularly try to guard against the following: being overly optimistic
regarding his own skills and regarding clients' prospects for success; 501
allowing the framing of a particular decision as either a gain or loss to affect
his evaluation;502 overestimating the likelihood of a particular event based on
the apparently high "availability" of that event;503 following a tendency to
potentially throw good money after bad;50 4 or stereotyping his clients or
497 See supra Part III.D.
498 See id.
499 See supra Parts HI.A, III.C.4.
500 See supra Part III.C.4.
501 See supra Part III.B.3.
502 See supra Part III.H.4.
503 See supra Part III.B. 1.
504 See supra Part III.H.4.
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other persons his clients might discuss in the interview.50 5
D. Providing Advice
Providing advice to clients, or for that matter to anyone, can be tricky.506
No matter whether Jack seeks to be directive or client-centered in his
approach, he will need to overcome a variety of psychological hurdles to be
effective as a counselor. First, Jack needs to avoid the tendency to focus
exclusively on purely legal and monetary matters.
As Jack helps his clients think through their options, he needs to
remember that many clients will have a craving for justice-procedural,
distributive, and retributive. 50 7 To some degree, Jack can fulfill his clients'
desire for procedural justice through the ways in which he interviews
them. 508 But, as Jack counsels clients about their options, he should recall
that his clients may have a strong interest in having their voice heard or in
presenting their claims to a neutral, and not just in receiving a particular
substantive outcome. 50 9 Of course Jack should also consider his clients'
desire for distributive justice, while recognizing that this may mean
something more than just getting the most one can for oneself.510 In addition,
clients may have needs based on their sense of retributive justice-such as a
need to punish or to receive an apology. So, as Jack asks his clients to
consider whether it makes sense to try to litigate and to think about potential
settlement strategies, he should describe those options in a way that allows
clients to consider whether such outcomes would be "just."
Dealing with clients' cognitive biases is also challenging. Given clients'
tendency to be overoptimistic, 511 attorneys need to make a special effort to
explain potential risks and downsides clearly, and to try to make sure that
clients are not just hearing the positive and tuning out the negative. 512 At the
505 See supra Part I.A.2.
506 As every parent and every child know, receivers of advice sometimes do the
opposite of what was recommended. See generally JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966).
507 See supra Part II.G.
508 See supra Part III.G.2.
509 See id.
510 See supra Part II.G. 1.
511 See supra Part II.B.3.
512 While some law students or inexperienced attorneys may believe that it would be
desirable to leave clients with their rosy glasses view of the world, failing to advise
clients properly of the risks that they face will often lead to very unpleasant consequences
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same time, an attorney who beats her client over the head with negative risks
may well have a difficult time establishing a good rapport. 5 13 Clients look to
their attorneys to be their advocates, and may feel that an attorney who
spends too much time warning of downsides is not an effective advocate.
5 14
Walking this fine line between optimism and pessimism is tricky, and no
single strategy will work for all clients. The attorney needs to try to
communicate risks while at the same time maintaining her role as a strong
advocate for the client. For example:
I will do my best to win this claim for you, and I have had some good
successes in the past. However, no attorney is always successful and this
claim has some real risks. For example, [provide details pertinent to legal
risks of possible lawsuit as well as financial, reputational, or other costs].
You need to carefully think through whether, for you, the possible benefits
of bringing this claim outweigh the very real risks.
The attorney can also try to maintain her good relationship with the
client, albeit while giving bad news, by making it clear that the legal risks the
client faces do not necessarily reflect the moral value of the claim or the
attorney's personal view of whether or not the client was wronged. In
chatting with Edna Employee, Jack might explain:
Ms. Employee, I have heard your account of the way you were treated at
work. As you explain things it certainly sounds like you were treated very
unfairly. It seems that you have endured a very difficult set of events and I
certainly understand why you are very hurt and angry. I understand why
you would like to bring a lawsuit in order to prove that you were wronged
and prevent others from being similarly mistreated. Unfortunately, I have to
tell you that from a purely legal perspective, there are some real potential
weaknesses to your claim. First, in our jurisdiction, employment is called
"at-will." That means that, in general, an employer can fire an employee for
a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason whatsoever, so long as that reason
was not discrimination on the basis of something like race, gender, or age.
Now I know that you believe that you were in fact discriminated against,
later in the attorney-client relationship. Of course, failing to properly advise clients of the
full nature of their situation can also be unethical. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2002) (requiring, inter alia, that an attorney "keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter," and "explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation").
513 See supra Part III.E.4.
514 See, e.g., Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 254, at 1455-56 (noting that clients are
concerned about lawyers' commitment to their case).
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but our challenge will be how to prove that in a court of law. We will need
to present your case using the witnesses and documents we can find. The
reality is that some of those witnesses may not tell the truth, because they
will be afraid of losing their own jobs. And, even if helpful documents
exist, they are in the company's files and realistically may not be accessible
to us. So, we have to assess the positives and negatives of bringing a claim
in light of these factors. I am certainly not saying you should not bring a
lawsuit. Indeed, I am more than ready to represent you, should you decide
to make that choice. But, I want you to think through the likely benefits and
risks carefully and make the decision you think will be best for you.
The psychologically attuned attorney will need to try to assess her
client's individual needs, and will recognize that advice that might be too
negative for one client will be appropriate for another. Also, the attorney
must listen carefully to the client to discern whether she has or has not heard
the downsides previously stated by the attorney. Once the client has
processed the negative information, repeating it may not be necessary and
may just harm the rapport between the attorney and client. But, if the client
has apparently failed to hear the risks, the attorney may need to restate them
in a way that the client can more fully understand. 515
The attorney also needs to be careful in the way that she frames a client's
options. We have seen that the attractiveness of a particular option varies
substantially depending upon the way it is presented.516 Grouping one option
with certain others may lessen or heighten its attractiveness. 517
Characterizing an option as a gain rather than a loss relative to the status quo
will make that option more attractive. 518 Similarly, the attorney needs to be
careful about providing early assessments or other information that may tend
to "anchor" clients' perceptions or expectations. 519 So, what is the
conscientious, psychologically aware attorney to do? One temptation may be
to take a vow of silence, in that astute attorneys will realize that they cannot
help but influence their clients every time they open their mouths. Yet,
silence is not an option because the attorney has been hired to provide good
counsel. Thus, our best advice is that the attorney be conscious of the
significance of the terms she uses, and try to vary her advice accordingly. To
avoid undue anchoring, for example, the attorney can be somewhat cautious
as she makes predictions, particularly early in the representation. Where
515 See supra Part III.E.5.
516 See supra Part III.H.4.
517 See id.
518 See id
519 See supra Part III.B.2.
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options can be presented as either gains or losses, the attorney could present
them in both lights.
As clients respond to the advice afforded by their attorneys,
psychologically educated attorneys can be prepared to address common
phenomena that may affect the client's decisions: a tendency to gather
irrelevant information,520 difficulty predicting future emotional reactions
generally,521 and a tendency to make decisions based on regret aversion.5 22
The psychologically attuned attorney can try to counter all of these
phenomena by addressing them head on. 5 23
Counseling clients involves, in part, acting as a teacher. Thus, the vast
psychological literature on learning theory is highly relevant to attorneys.
That literature shows that people learn in different ways, and that effective
teachers use multiple methods to convey their messages.5 24 Thus, whereas
the typical attorney may rely substantially on oral communication with the
client, the psychologically attuned attorney will know to use different
approaches as well. Good teachers also know that important lessons often
need to be repeated, so attorneys should not assume that their clients heard
and retained everything that was said at a prior session.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been said that "neither LAW nor HUMAN NATURE is an exact
science," 525 and surely many lawyers would agree. Nonetheless, the science
of psychology has much to contribute to the art of legal practice and to the
craft of interviewing and counseling clients. While we cannot provide an
exact recipe for success, we hope that by reminding lawyers of the
importance of psychological science and by highlighting some critical
insights offered by that field, we have provided the tools to improve their
representation of clients.
520 See supra Part III.H.3.
521 See supra Part III.H.5.
522 See supra Part III.H.6.
523 See supra Part III.H.3.
524 See supra Part IH.E.5.
525 HARRIS's HINTs ON ADVOCACY 316 (George W. Keeton ed., 14th ed. 1911).
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